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

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY ORIENTAL STUDIES

VOL. I.

THE IMPROVEMENT

OF

THE MORAL QUALITIES

AN ETHICAL TREATISE OF THE ELEVENTH CENTURY BY SOLOMON IBN GABIROL, PRINTED FROM AN UNIQUE ARABIC MANUSCRIPT, TOGETHER WITH A TRANSLATION, AND AN ESSAY ON THE PLACE OF GABIROL IN THE HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF JEWISH ETHICS

BY

STEPHEN S. WISE, Ph.D.

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



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Columbia University Oriental Studies
EDITED BY
RICHARD J. H. GOTTHEIL, PH.D.

THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE MORAL QUALITIES

To the Memory
OF
MY FATHER AND TEACHER
IN LOVE, REVERENCE, AND
GRATITUDE

עזרו הדברים הפלכיים בנפשותיכם כאשר תעזור החרישה
וההשקייה את הזרע בגידולו

"Help the Celestial bodies with your souls, even as tilling and irrigating help the seed to grow."—*Ethics of Gabirol.*

Ut ager, quamvis fertilis, sine cultura fructuosus esse non potest, sic sine doctrina animus.—*Seneca.*

PREFACE

THE original suggestion to write on the "Ethics" of Ibn Gabirol came from my revered friend and teacher, the late Rev. Dr. Alexander Kohut. After some study I came upon the counsel of Dr. Rosin in his article[1] on the same subject, which strengthened my determination to prepare a work on the "Ethics" of Solomon ibn Gabirol, and, if possible, publish the text of Gabirol's ethical treatise, "The Improvement of the Moral Qualities," a manuscript of which, I learned, was contained among the treasures in the Bodleian Library at Oxford.

For a time I was compelled to base my studies upon a photographic reproduction of the manuscript, made under the kind supervision of Dr. A. Neubauer. During the summer of 1895 I resided in Oxford, and was enabled to make a careful examination of those passages the difficulty of reading which had been increased by the photographic process. During my stay in Oxford my work was facilitated in every way by Dr. Neubauer, of whose kindness and hospitality I desire to make grateful acknowledgment.

The manuscript, herewith published, is unique:[2] there being no opportunity to collate the manuscript with other texts, it has

[1] Cf. "J. Q. R.," iii., p. 161.

[2] In the summer of 1896 Professor Gottheil found, in the library of the Alliance Israélite Universelle, Paris, a copy of the "Ethics," which, upon comparison, proved to be an exact reproduction of the text of the Oxford manuscript, evidently having been copied from it letter by letter.

been reproduced with the fewest possible changes; a few suggestions, with a view to emending the text, have been embodied in footnotes.

The translator has collated four Hebrew manuscripts[1] (Paris, Bodleian (2), Jews' College) as well as the printed editions, and he expects to edit in the near future a Hebrew version of the "Ethics,"[2] which, while taking account of the various Hebrew manuscripts, shall more clearly reproduce, in some respects, the spirit of the original Arabic.

I wish at this time to express my sincere gratitude to Prof. Richard Gottheil for his unfailing kindness and valued counsel during the term of my study at Columbia University.

I am indebted to Prof. J. H. Hyslop for some hints in the interpretation of the "Ethics," and to Mr. I. Broydé of the Jewish Encyclopedia staff for a number of suggestions bearing on the Arabic text as well as the translation.

S. S. W.

PORTLAND, ORE., May 2, 1901.

[1] Cf. Introduction, p. 7.

[2] "The Improvement of the Moral Qualities" is referred to, for the sake of brevity, under the title "Ethics."

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INTRODUCTION

To write an history of Jewish Ethics is to begin with the first pages of the Bible.[1] The doctrine that the world was created by Deity has a purely ethical significance, which bears upon many departments of human conduct. That Deity pronounced all that He had created good, is the sum and substance of optimism; the idea that one man was the progenitor of the whole human race, implies the loftiest humanitarian principles that can be conceived. In this wise, almost all the narratives of the Bible, and, certainly, a large number of passages in the Pentateuch, the Prophets, and the Hagiographa, are of clear and unmistakable ethical bearing and import. But in the days of the Biblical authors the branches of learning were not as strictly divided as they are at present. Jurisprudence, history (including family and tribal traditions), and whatsoever there was of natural science and speculative thought clustered around one subject, Religion, and were intertwined with it.[2]

The command, "Thou shalt not steal," was binding not because theft was a social crime, but because God prohibited it. The historical records of the Hebrew people, as they developed from a family and tribe into a union of tribes and a nation, were looked upon as authentic, because Moses had written them at the command of God. The geometrical and architectural principles in accordance with which the tabernacle in the desert and, subsequently, the Temple of Solomon were built, were

[1] Cf. Rosin ("Maimonides," pp. 1–4). The first sentence in Lazarus (German edition, p. 3) is "Die Bibel ist das Grundbuch der jüdischen Ethik."

[2] Cf. H. Cohen, "Das Problem der jüdischen Sittenlehre" ("M. G. W. J.," vol. xliii., p. 387).

of divine inspiration. "Love thy neighbor as thyself" was a sacred command of God.[1]

Medicine was practised by the priests, hygienic laws were strictly enforced, astronomical observations were made, because the religious law required these things. Thus all the wisdom of Biblical times was identified in a degree with religion. The wisdom of the prophets came to light as suggested by a religious subject or occasion; hence the peculiar feature of the Bible, to wit, the interblending of all the subjects of art, science, philosophy and literature, without any plan or system other than the one predominant desire, to further the cause of religion. Ethics shared the same fate at the hands of those who wrote the Bible.

In the consciousness of the people a goodly number of ethical thoughts and principles became crystallized in time in the form of sayings or adages, and many of these sayings or maxims were stored up in the Book of Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Ben Sira, and scattered here and there throughout the other books of the Bible. In the Hebrew such proverbs or adages, together with parables, fables, and even didactic songs, bore the common name of Mashal (משל), and in the collections just mentioned we sometimes find these ethical dicta interspersed with religious exhortations.

In the period of the development of the Mishna, the Talmudim (Jerusalem and Babylonian) and the Midrashim, some advance had been made in the exposition of ethics.[2] We frequently meet in these works with ethical sayings and parables of real beauty and value, and even attempts at explaining Biblical injunctions on the basis of ethical principles. Still no attempt seems to have been made to reduce the study of ethics to a formal science or the study of ethical teachings to a system; although the works of Plato, Aristotle, and other Greek philos-

[1] Cf. Lazarus (pp. 109, 110): "In its origin Jewish ethics is theologic. . . . For man's will and conduct there are standards—that is, moral laws to be obeyed, and God is the law-giver. Judaism regards what is morally good and what pleasing to God, moral law and divine regulation, as inseparable concepts."

[2] Cf. Back (Winter und Wünsche, iii., pp. 627 *et seq.*).

ophers were not unknown to the Hebrew sages. Here, again, efforts were made to collect memorable sayings and proverbs, for instance, in the "Chapters of the Fathers," but none to construct a system. Abundant attention was given to the matter of concrete ethics[1] (ἔθος), but no attempt was made to formulate a systematic treatise on the subject corresponding to ἦθος.[2]

During the period of the Saburaim and the Gaonim, up to the time of Saadya Gaon, the representatives of Jewish thought and learning certainly could not busy themselves with the building up of a theoretical system of ethics. The chief efforts of the schools of Sura and Pumbaditha were bent upon evolving order from out the chaos of Talmudic jurisprudence, social, criminal, and religious, and upon adapting the Talmudic law to the various conditions under which the Jews lived in their dispersion the world over. In addition to the profound wisdom and untiring activity required for the performance of such a task, the rabbis must have wielded a moral power which commanded unbounded respect for their teachings and enactments; but, engaged as they were in the truly herculean task of keeping a vastly dispersed constituency in common allegiance to the law, and that without any worldly means of coercion, they could not think of constructing a system of ethics, independent of dogmatic religious teaching.

The first to undertake this task was Saadya (892–942) in the tenth chapter of the "Emunoth we-Deoth." According to his theory, the higher soul of man manifests itself in three dynamic forces, so to speak—inborn love, inborn aversion, and discernment. In the tenth chapter of his book, Saadya enumerates thirteen qualities of the soul which originate in intuitive love, and which must be made subservient to discernment or mental training. Although this may be considered an endeavor to systematize ethical theory, it cannot by any means be regarded

[1] Cf. Lazarus (pp. 8, 9).

[2] Cf. Hyslop ("Elements of Ethics," New York, 1895, p. 1), "Choice of Pearls" (p. 162, note to maxim 360), Rosin ("Maimonides," p. 34 *et seq.*), and "J. Q. R." (vol. iii., pp. 165, 166), and Guttmann (p. 17).

as a complete work. Saadya makes no reference to the qualities which result from inborn aversion, and thus leaves us in the dark as to one-half of the system which he proposes to construct. Moreover, the principal dynamic force of the soul, discernment, by which the offshoots or qualities resultant from the other forces must be controlled and trained, is nothing more nor less than what is called soul in a theological sense, in a Jewish theological sense, and means little or nothing to the non-Jew or non-believer. The real merit of the "Emunoth" consists in the philosophical view it takes of the Jewish religion, and in its brilliant defense of the ancient faith, as interpreted by the rabbis, as against the onslaughts of Karaism on the one hand, and of heretical rationalism on the other. Still the writer foots entirely upon tradition and dogmatic belief, and one must read through the entire work and put one's self *en rapport* with the author's religious views before being able to read appreciatively the last chapter on the subject of ethics.

Ibn Gabirol took a new stand: he made an attempt to systematize[1] the principles of ethics, independently of religious dogma or belief. What Saadya ascribes to the higher soul of man Gabirol attributes to the lower soul; and the dynamic forces of Saadya's higher soul he reduces to mere qualities or traits of

[1] Munk (p. 169) believed that it was not the aim of Gabirol to establish "un système de morale," but that he merely endeavored to write "un manuel populaire de morale." Horovitz (p. 141, notes 155–158), following Munk, argues from Gabirol's statements that the latter does not purport to set up an ordered system of ethics, but merely wishes to write a practical handbook of morals in compliance with the desire of his friends. "Er schlägt daher kein streng wissenschaftliches Verfahren ein, es fehlt an jeder Definition der behandelten Begriffe, noch viel weniger lässt er sich auf eine psychologische Zergliederung der erörterten Tugenden und Laster ein. . . . Wir können seinen Versuch nur als misslungen ansehen." Cf. also p. 142, note 164. Bacher (p. 51) holds that Gabirol's "Ethics" pursues a scientific method. L. Venetianer ("Das Buch der Grade von ibn Falaquera," Berlin, 1894, p. xiv.) considers "Das Buch der Grade" "die erste wissenschaftliche systematische Ethik in der Literaturgeschichte der arabisch-jüdischen Philosophie." The "Buch der Grade" is no more *streng wissenschaftlich* than the ethical system of Gabirol. Hertz (p. 13) makes a similar claim for Bahya's "Hoboth Ha-lebaboth," which he considers "the first Jewish ethical treatise—according to philosophical method."

the lower soul. Discernment, again, which his predecessor regards as the balancing force of the higher soul, Gabirol acknowledges to be no more than the utmost limit of perfection in the lower soul, the line, so to speak, where the purely human and the divine meet in man. In this wise, Gabirol's system of ethics covers all that is truly human in conduct and in character. With religious ethics which is beyond the "line of intelligence," in so far as intelligence itself depends upon higher inspiration, he does not meddle. From this point of view his "Ethics" is unique, and must have created a considerable stir among the religious thinkers of his time; but since Gabirol avoids all religious questions, refers to the rabbis in reverent tone, and quotes the Bible[1] in support of his views, he could not be condemned as a heretic—he was shunned rather than despised.

The life of Gabirol, sharing in this respect the fate of the Hebrew prophets and many later leaders in Jewish affairs, is little known, and the little that is known is gleaned from casual remarks which occur in his poems and from the meagre notices of authors[2] who refer to his works.

Salomo ben Jehuda ibn Gabirol[3] (the Arabic form of his

[1] In the "Ethics," Gabirol refers to the Bible in order to find some additional support for his views, but he nowhere bases his thought upon a biblical verse or paragraph. In the "Fons Vitæ" he went one step further and entirely refrained from citing the Bible. Horovitz (p. 78, notes 4, 5) alludes to this, following Munk. Cf. Schmeidl (p. 103), Bacher (p. 45), Guttmann (p. 4), and Stössel (p. 47), who points out that Gabirol in this respect stands alone among the Jewish-Arabic philosophers, Saadya, Maimonides, and their successors.

As proof of the attempt "Gabirol todtzuschweigen," one need but refer to the work of a philosopher of the thirteenth century, who, in his "Ya'ir Netib." recommends the diligent study of ספרי המוסרים, but fails to mention Gabirol's "Ethics." Cf. Güdemann ("Das jüd. Unter. währ. der Span.-Arab. Per.," p. 59 of the Hebrew part). The mention of "The Choice of Pearls," by the same author, Jehuda b Sam. b. Abbas, may imply that even as early as the thirteenth century the Gabirolian authorship of the "Choice of Pearls" was not accepted. Cf. Steinschneider ("H. U.," pp. 382–388).

[2] Cf. Dukes (pp. 118–121).

[3] The name may be written either Gabirol or Gebirol; cf. Geiger (p. 119, note 25). As to the form Gebirol, a diminutive, cf. Kaufmann ("M. G. W. J.," vol. xliii., pp. 308, 309).

name being Abu Ayyub Sulaiman b. Yaḥya ibn Jabirol), poet[1] and philosopher,[2] was born in Malaga about 1021, lived for a time at Saragossa, and died at Valencia in the year 1058[3] or 1059. The two philosophical works of Gabirol are "Fons Vitæ" and "The Improvement of the Qualities of the Soul," the

[1] Cf. Geiger, Sachs, Kämpf, Dukes (several works), Stein and Steinschneider ("H. U.," p. 379, note 77), who give the literature on the subject.

[2] For an account of the life and the works of Gabirol, consult Munk, Grätz, Dukes, Guttmann, Geiger, Horovitz, Kaufmann, Kämpf (pp. 167–191), Myer, Schmiedl, Sachs (pp. 213–248), Joel, Stössel, Bacher (pp. 45–55), Rosin ("Maimonides," pp. 11, 12), Löwenthal, Kaufmann ("Attributenlehre," pp. 95–115), Dukes ("Ehrensäulen," pp. 1–25 and 59–76), Karpeles ("Geschichte der jüdischen Literatur," i., pp. 465–483), Winter und Wünsche (ii., pp. 723–730), Eisler ("Vorlesungen über die jüdischen Philosophen des Mittelalters," Wien, 1876, i., pp. 57–68), Friedländer ("Geschichtsbilder," Brünn, 1880, pp. 23–28), Bäumker ("Avencebrolis Fons Vitæ," Münster, 1895), Adler ("Ibn Gabirol and His Influence upon Scholastic Philosophy," London, 1865), Guttmann ("Das Verhältniss des Thomas von Aquino . . . zur jüdischen Litteratur," Göttingen, 1891, pp. 16–30), Muller ("De Godsleer der Middeleeuwsche Joden," Groningen, 1898, pp. 90–107), Kahana (השלח, vol. i., pp. 38–48).

[3] This latter date is uncertain, but is accepted by Steinschneider ("H. U.," p. 379) and Neubauer ("M. G. W. J.," vol. xxxvi., p. 498 *et seq.*), who base their judgments upon the statements of authors nearly contemporaneous with Gabirol. Steinschneider accepts the statement of Sā'id (circa 1070), who praises Gabirol as a logician and makes mention of his death, February, 1058, before the completion of Gabirol's "thirties." This coincides with the date given by the poet Jehuda al-Ḥarizi, who relates that Gabirol died at something over thirty years. Munk (p. 157, note 1) quotes these words of Ḥarizi from the Amsterdam edition of the Taḥkemoni, ובן תשע ועשרים נרו כבה ועד חשלשים לא בא, but raises the very vulnerable objection that Gabirol could not have died at so early an age, seeing that his works were important and revealed above all the prolonged meditations of a spirit ripened by years. Munk (p. 156, note 1), who accepts the date of Gabirol's death, 1070, in the city of Valencia, as given in Abraham Zacuto's "Yuḥasin," publishes an extract from an Arabic work of Moses ibn Ezra (Hebrew Supplement, pp. 515–517, and French translation, pp. 263–265), whom Ḥarizi probably followed, which declared that "this young man, Gabirol, died in the flower of his youth, in the early part of the eighth century (*i.e.*, about 1040 of the present era)—he had hardly passed his thirtieth year." Kämpf (pp. 187–191), basing his argument upon an explanation of Professor Roediger, holds that the Arabic text of ibn Ezra bears out the interpretation that Gabirol "had already passed the thirties." Neubauer, Steinschneider ("H. U.," p. 379, note 76), and Kaufmann (p. 79, note 2) accept this date, namely, about 1057, which corresponds with Sā'id's date. Guttmann (p. 1, note 1) without giving any reasons in support of his position, inclines to the later date of Zacuto; Grätz (note 2, pp. 419–421)

latter being ethical in character. The "Ethics" was written in the year 1045[1] (1048). On the whole, the "Ethics" is written in a fluent and classic Arabic style. Though excellently translated it must be said that the occasional obscure passages are not made less obscure by the translator. The main difficulty in translating arose from the fact that the Hebrew language did not compare with the Arabic in the copiousness of its philosophical terminology. In some places the Hebrew is marked by an almost slavish fidelity to the original. The present translator has erred, in not a few passages, in the same way.

The manuscript (1422,2 in the Bodleian Library) is a part of the collection which was founded by Bishop Huntington during his residence in the East as chaplain to the English merchants at Aleppo. It consists of 46 pages 8vo, written in the Syrio-Rabbinic Hebrew characters, about the end of the fourteenth century, according to Neubauer. The following Hebrew manuscripts of the "Ethics" are extant: Paris (Bibliothèque nationale, Ms. Hebr., 671,2), Bodleian (Neubauer 2413,7, and 1402,2), Jews' College, London (Neubauer 48,3), Leeuwarden (cf. Neubauer, "Israelitische Letterbode," vol. xii., p. 83), München (St. 201,1 and 327,3), Talmud Torah Library in Rome, and Casanate Library in Rome.[2] The following are the printed editions:[3]

likewise accepts the date 1069 or 1070. Dukes ("Ehrensäulen," p. 10, note 2), whose calculation is rather far-fetched, believes that Gabirol died some time between the years 1070–1080, at about the age of thirty.

[1] Steinschneider and Neubauer are correct in reading the date as 828 (1068), but it has occurred to me that this date may be merely a reminiscence of the year of Gabirol's death, current in the days of the copyist. Munk admits that 1428 (Sel. era), as he reads the manuscript, leads to an erroneous conclusion. Steinschneider ("H. U.," p. 381, note 94) is inclined to accept the date 1045, which is given in the earliest Hebrew sources and some of the Hebrew manuscripts.

[2] The two manuscripts in Rome were collated by K. Pollak for the Budapest edition.

[3] Cf. Steinschneider ("H. U.," 381). Lengthy extracts from the "Ethics" are given in a Latin translation by G. Gentius, Amsterdam, 1640 (cf. Dukes, p. 121), in a Latin version of Maimonides' הלכות דעות. The translator evidently used only a Hebrew text, for the verses, as well as the concluding paragraphs of the Arabic text, are missing. Rosin (p. 163, note 2) mentions an edition of the "Ethics," published at Wilna in 1845.

Constantinople, 4to, 1550 (together with Baḥya's חובות הלבבות).

Riva di Trento,[1] 4to, 1562 (together with Honein's מוסרי הפלוסופים, and ם התפוח under the general title, גורן נכון.

Luneville, 4to, 1807 (same title and contents as the Riva di Trento edition).

Lyck, 12mo, 1859 (same general title גורן נכון, but only the "Ethics").

Warsaw, 8vo, 1886 (not mentioned by Steinschneider, "H. U.").

Budapest, 8vo, 1896.

The "Fons Vitæ" was attributed for centuries to a scholastic philosopher, Avicebron, until Munk recognized[2] in 1846 that Ibn Gabirol and Avicebron were one, the name Avicebrol (Avicebron) being a corruption of Ibn Gabirol or Ibn Gebirol.[3] The Arabic original of the "Fons Vitæ" is lost, but a Latin translation has been preserved which was made by Johannes Hispalensis, with the aid of Dominicus Gundisalvus. According to Steinschneider ("H. U.," p. 380) four manuscript copies of this translation are extant. Munk discovered the identity of Avicebron and Ibn Gabirol through a comparison of the Paris manuscript of the "Fons Vitæ" with a Hebrew work by Shemṭob Palquera in the Paris Library, which proved to be a paraphrase of the Arabic original, of which the "Fons Vitæ" was evidently likewise a translation. This discovery was of the greatest importance, inasmuch as Avicebron the Jew, Salomon ibn Gabirol, played no unimportant part in the development of scholastic phi-

[1] In the Index Expurgationis; cf. "R. E. J.," xxx., p. 273.

[2] Cf. Guttmann (p. 7, note 1) and "Literaturblatt des Orients," 1846, No. 46.

[3] Kämpf (p. 175, note 11), in showing that the name Ibn Gebirol was naturally altered in time into Avicebron, cites the name Reuben ha-Barceloni, which became Bargeloni. The reverse change occurred in the name Ibn Gebirol, through the transitional stages of Avengebirol, Avencebrol, and Avencebron, to Avicebron. The change from Ibn to Avi is not uncommon; cf. Ibn Sina—Avicenna, Ibn Badsha—Avempace. According to M. Wittmann ("Die Stellung des Hl. Thomas von Aquin zu Avencebrol, Ibn Gebirol," Münster, 1900, p. 1, note 5), the form Avicebrol is found as late as the time of Bradwardina, who died 1349. The note is based upon information furnished by Dr. Cl. Bäumker.

losophy. In recent years the "Fons Vitæ," particularly the Latin version, has received scholarly and ample treatment in the works of Seyerlen, Guttmann, Bäumker, and Wittmann.

In setting out to write the "Ethics," Gabirol endeavored to give a systematic exposition of the endowments of the human soul, *i.e.*, the impulses, which may be so trained as to lead to virtue, or permitted, ungoverned or ill-governed, to make for vice. This task accomplished, he began to work at the "Fons Vitæ," which was designed to explain the revelation of Deity in the world.[1] The "Ethics" may be regarded as a work preparatory to the "Fons Vitæ." The results, at which he arrived in the "Ethics," [2] reasoning from the human senses, as he perceived them, up to the highest spiritual possibilities of man, formed the basis of his theological demonstration in "Fons Vitæ," which is based upon deductive methods of reasoning.

In the "Ethics" [3] Gabirol does not question any of the theological or philosophical conceptions of his time.[4] God is: He has created all that exists; man is the masterwork and highest purpose of creation, the aim of all that has been called into existence.[5] The symmetry of his form and the beauty of

[1] Cf. Munk (p. 4 and p. 170 *et seq.*).

[2] Frankel-Grün (p. 43, note 2), following Geiger (p. 86 *et seq.*), speaks of Gabirol's "Ethics" as "Vorstufe zur Metaphysick." Löwenthal ("Pseudo-Arist.," p. 39) holds the "Ethics" to have been written demonstrably later than the "Fons Vitæ."

[3] An excellent, though brief, analysis of the "Ethics" of Gabirol is given by Guttmann (pp. 17, 18), who, however, overestimates, in my judgment, the influence of Saadya upon the teachings of Gabirol. Cf. Munk (pp. 167–169), Dukes, Rosin (pp. 166–181), and Horovitz (pp. 138–142).

[4] It would undoubtedly be a fruitful task to trace the elements of Gabirol's system of ethics, in so far as these are directly related to physics and metaphysics, back to their first—mainly Greek—sources. Nevertheless, even though we would insist in the spirit of Gabirol upon viewing this work as a system of ethics rather than as a mere compilation of moral maxims, Gabirol does not dwell sufficiently upon this aspect of his work to justify such a course.

[5] This theory was held by Saadya (Emunoth we-Deoth, iii. 58, iv. 75, vi. 95, edition of Slucky, Leipzig, 1864), Bahya (Brüll, p. 73, note 1), Donolo and Israeli (Fried, pp. 59 and 37), Joseph ibn Zaddik, and even by Gabirol's fierce antagonist, Abraham ibn Daud, but opposed by Maimonides; cf. Rosin ("Maimonides," p. 99), Guttmann ("Saadya," pp. 83, 84, and 159–163), and Fried (p. 42).

his construction[1] render him the peer of all animal creatures; and his intelligence and the spiritual endowments, which constitute his soul, raise him infinitely above those creatures.[2] This soul makes him the equal of the angels, which are the powers intermediary between the physical world and Deity. By cultivating his powers for good (his virtues), man becomes even the superior of those intermediary beings;[3] for the latter cannot be any more or less than that which they are, or accomplish any more or less than that unto which they are destined, while man may rise through the measure of his spiritual perfection and beneficent activity to Deity himself, and even cause the angels to serve him. At this point Gabirol quotes passages from the Bible in which the angels are represented as acting in the service of man, or even dominated by him. Curiously enough, in this place, as well as in all the subsequent parts of this book in which the Bible is cited in support of his views, the author ignores the Talmudim and Midrashim, which might have answered his purpose better and illustrated his thoughts to greater advantage.

The argument thus far is based on the assumption that man is a direct emanation of the Deity, and that his soul tends toward reunion with the source of all being. The question now suggests itself—why is there any difference between man and man? In other words, why do individual men vary in their temperaments and spiritual powers? There can be but one answer to this question, and that is, the differences are due to the cultivation of the soul. In the measure in which the soul is more or less cultivated, in the measure in which it divests itself of its sympathies with the lower sensual impulses and makes for a loftier spiritual ideal, it places itself higher in the scale of human perfection and ascends nearer to Deity. Still,

[1] Cf. Musen (p. 11).

[2] Cf. Brüll (p. 73, note 2).

[3] Saadya places man above the angels, according to Abraham ibn Ezra; cf. Guttmann ("Saadya," p. 160, note 1) and Schmiedl (p. 84). This view was held as early as the ninth century—by David ben Merwan, who is quoted *ad rem* by Jephet ben Ali of the tenth century; cf. Beer (p. 15, and notes 27-30).

the soul, as it manifests itself in the life of this earth, in visible existence, is but a creation of Deity and not Deity itself; it is not entirely free[1] to act of its own accord. In our time we would say that the powers of every individual soul are limited to a degree by the accidents of birth and environment, as well as by racial and family peculiarities—heredity. In Gabirol's time it was believed that the soul was limited by the celestial bodies: in principle, the ancient and modern thought on this subject concur; the qualifications of every individual soul are limited. But since we cannot accurately determine our relation to Deity, and know not what limits the accidents of birth and environment have destined for our souls, it is our duty to make for the highest ideal.

"Help the celestial bodies with your souls, even as plowing and irrigating help the seed to grow." Through such efforts man can evoke the latent powers which are within him. There are numerous passages in the Talmudim in support of these views, of which our author could not have been ignorant;[2] but Gabirol, it appears, studiously avoided quoting these authorities unless he had some special reason for so doing.

The question next suggests itself—how and when should this helping of the celestial bodies, this cultivating of the soul, begin? Gabirol answered this question in the following way: In order to cultivate his soul, man must necessarily know its peculiarities. He must therefore study himself as he is, closely examine his character and inclinations, habituate himself to the abandonment of what is mean, *i.e.*, whatsoever draws him into close contact with the physical and temporal, and aim at the

[1] Cf. Maimonides (Wolff, p. 58), who takes especial note of these limitations, which he calls "natural," but he makes light of "celestial influences." Cf. p. 48, note 1, showing that Gabirol's belief in planetary influence did not weaken his faith in man's freedom of will.

[2] Cf. Löwenthal ("Pseudo-Arist.," p. 43, note 1), who holds, together with Sachs, in opposition to the view of Guttmann, that Gabirol was a student of the Talmud. Stössel (p. 39) holds that Gabirol's Azharot, as well as the "Gebetstücke verrathen ohne Zweifel seine Vertrautheit mit dem rabbinischen Schriftthume"

spiritual and the abiding. This effort in itself is blessedness, and man's ability to make such an effort is a proof of divine benevolence. Passages from the Psalms are adduced in support of these views.

Up to this point Gabirol has said nothing new; he merely sums up the accepted articles of belief in a manner that leads to his own system. If the conjecture be correct, that he deliberately avoided the Talmud in order to place his system of ethics on a basis independent of rabbinical dogmatism,[1] such an introduction to his work was nothing less than ingenious. The most ardent devotee of the Talmud could not object to these postulates, for the Bible bears them out, and the rabbinical law contains nothing to oppose them. Men of thought and insight could hardly fail to see that if the author could dispense with the rabbinical teachings in the exposition of ethical principles, a strong doubt arises as to the necessity or even the validity of those teachings concerning the ceremonial law. Undoubtedly at the hands of such thinkers, such rabbinists, he received the unkind treatment of which he makes mention further on. In the introductory chapter of the "Ethics," Gabirol's task has not been difficult; for he leaned on generally accepted beliefs and principles. At this point, he abandons the beaten track and proceeds to pursue a then comparatively

[1] Seyerlen (p. 25 and notes 38 and 43) compares Gabirol with Spinoza, the latter introducing modern philosophy as the former introduced mediæval philosophy, and he emphasizes Gabirol's philosophical independence of Jewish theological dogma in the words (p. 41, note 43): "Denn er hat die Philosophie keineswegs bloss als die Magd der rabbinischen Theologie angesehen und behandelt, als das bloss formale Organ für die Vertheidigung und den Ausbau der talmudischen Weisheit, wie z. B. der bei den Juden so hochgefeierte Maimonides; ihm ist die Philosophie durchaus Selbstzweck, er weist ihr eine souveräne Stellung an, eine Stellung so gänzlich unabhängig von der Theologie, dass selbst jeder Seitenblick auf diese vermieden wird." Cf. Geiger (pp. 90–93), Stössel (pp. 46–48), Sandler ("Problem der Prophetie in der jüd. Religionsph.," Breslau, 1891, p. 29, note 66), and Spiegler ("Geschichte der Philosophie des Judenthums," Leipzig, p. 254), who holds that Gabirol "trug nicht des Glaubens Sklavenketten" and also "attacked the authority of the 'Kalam.'" Kämpf (p. 173) maintained that although Gabirol was untrammelled in his philosophic research, he yet expected to reconcile his results with the teachings of theology.

unknown path. He bases his ethical system on the work of Rabbi Shabbatai Donolo,[1] whose words he copies in so far as is required for his purpose.

GABIROL.	DONOLO.
(Translation of Jehuda ibn Tibbon.)	(Introduction to פירוש נעשה אדם בצלמנו
ואומר כי האלהים ברא את העולם הגדול ההולך על ארבעה טבעים . . . ולעומת זה ברא וכו׳: שם בו הדם לעומת האויר והליחה הלבנה לעומת המים והמרה השחורה לעומת העפר והסרה הארומה לעומת האש ובראו יתברך שלם בצורתו ובכל כליו לא יחסר דבר וברא בו חמשה חושים וכו׳	ומארבע היסודים האלה יסד וברא את כל העולם כולו ואלה הם ארבעת היסודות רוח ומים ואש ועפר והם דם וליחה ומרה ארומה ומרירה שחורה הדם כנגד הרוח . . . . וכח הליחה קר ולח והמרה הארומה כנגד האש . . . . והמרירה השחורה כנגד העפר וכו׳

Being a close and logical thinker, he merely sums up and iterates Donolo's idea[2] that man is the microcosm, a counterpart or reflex of the universe entire, macrocosm, and leaves this subject, bringing us directly to his own assumption that the five senses, whose powers of perception are manifested through the composition and intermingling of the four elements[3] of the human body, constitute the links between the physical and the spiritual in the constitution of man. To impress this thought upon his readers, Gabirol allegorizes[4] the passage of

[1] A physician and astronomer of the tenth century (b. 913).

[2] Fried (p. 59, note 1) shows that Donolo, in considering the world a microcosm and man a macrocosm, and in deriving the composition of the body from four humors corresponding to the four elements, follows the work of Israeli (855–955), which is in turn dependent upon ס׳ יצירה. Cf. Geiger ("Melo Chofnajim," Berlin, 1840, p. 29). Fried furthermore proves the dependence of Gabirol (p. 59), Baḥya, Moses ibn Ezra, Halevi, Ibn Daud, Joseph ibn Zaddik— (cf. Jellinek, "Mikrokosmos," p. x., Bloch in Winter und Wünsche, ii., p. 729, Steinschneider, "H. U.," p. 407, Kaufmann, p. 5, note 2, Joel, i., pp. 29, 30)—upon Israeli.

[3] Cf. Horovitz (p. 129, note 110). On the place of the four elements in the metaphysical speculation of the Middle Ages, cf. Schmiedl (pp. 282–287).

[4] According to Grätz (vi., p. 47), Gabirol "allegorisirte Schriftverse um sie den Ideen seiner Philosophie anzubequemen." Dukes (p. 113), changing the opinion he had expressed in "Ehrensäulen" (p. 11), declares, in regard to this passage: "Dieses ist eine philosophische Allegorie zu nennen." The critics, who viewed this "philosophical allegory" as a mere exegetical effort, have done an injustice to the great thinker and poet. Gabirol's exegetical proofs of his ethical principles are mere mnemonics, as the Talmudists have it, or inserted for the mere purpose of giving an apparently religious or theological coloring to his extremely secular and rationalistic views. This I would hold in opposition to the belief of Bacher and Rosin, who lay great stress upon Gabirol's theological bearing and sig-

Ecclesiastes (ix. 11), in such a manner as to make its component elements severally indicate the different points of his proposition.

Though he attributes the virtues to the senses,[1] Gabirol would have it distinctly understood that he treats only of the five physical senses, and not of the concealed[2] senses, which partake of the nature of the soul, such as הרגשה, perception, and בינה, understanding. Thus he draws a sharp line of distinction between the purely physical and the purely psychical perceptions;[3] with the latter Gabirol does not pretend to meddle, having made only the qualities that depend on the former the object of his

nificance. Brüll (p. 71) thinks that Gabirol's method is common to all mediæval ethical writers. A confirmation of this opinion is to be found in the fact that Gabirol always, or usually, states his thesis before citing biblical passages, while his contemporaries and predecessors, excepting perhaps Saadya, who is almost as much of a rationalist, practise the reverse method. Bloch (Winter und Wünsche. ii., p. 700) thinks it is characteristic of the Jewish "religious philosophy" of the Middle Ages to cite the Bible only in support of propositions, the very reverse of the scholastic tendency, which was to make all reasoning follow upon and be subsidiary to scriptural statement. Schmeidl (p. 103) remarks that Gabirol in "Fons Vitæ" makes no effort to adduce biblical verses in support of his arguments—as has been noted before. From this, again, Joel infers that Gabirol placed himself entirely outside of the pale of Jewish belief. This, however, was thoroughly refuted by Kaufmann ("Attributenlehre," p. 109, note 19). Hence it seems that Gabirol failed to quote the Bible in his philosophical works, rather out of reverence for Scripture than because of aversion to it. But in his younger days, when he wrote the "Ethics," he was not so cautious, and quoted biblical passages as mnemonics, if not in confirmation of his thought. This he did in compliance with the practice of all the Hebrew writers of his age. It would appear from this that when Gabirol was mature enough to compose the "Fons Vitæ," he felt himself so strong and secure that he no longer deemed it needful to accommodate himself to the prevalent style of writing. Cf. Guttmann (p. 4). For this additional reason his philosophy was ignored by his contemporaries and he personally was persecuted. Abraham ibn Daud alone set forth (in his אמונה רמה) expressly to confute the heretical teachings of Gabirol. Maimonides completely ignored him. Cf. Beer (pp. 22, 23, and Anmerkungen, xxxii. to xxxv.).

[1] Cf. Guttmann ("Saadya," p. 261, note 1.)

[2] Horovitz (p. 138, note 138).

[3] Rosin (p. 174) remarks that among the virtues enumerated by Gabirol, "three of the cardinal platonic virtues, viz., temperance, wisdom, and justice, are omitted." Viewing the line of distinction here laid down, there is no room left for such an objection. Only such qualities as are attributed to the physical senses are considered by Gabirol.

investigation. The good and the evil in man are judged on the basis of his relations to the world without. These relations take their rise through the physical senses, for a man cannot act toward that which is outside of him, save as he perceives it through coming into physical touch with it. Therefore, all the tractable qualities of the soul must be cultivated with due regard to the part played by the senses.[1] In addition to the distinction between the physical and the concealed senses, Saadya made a further distinction between the tractable qualities of the soul, such traits as can be trained unto the good, or allowed to lead unto evil, and the "powers of the soul," כחות הנפש. These "powers of the soul," according to Saadya,[2] are natural impulses acting independently of the power of will or even of consciousness. It is by means of these that the existence of the soul is made manifest. These are הכרה, cognition,[3] תאוה, desire (inborn love), and כעס, wrath (inborn aversion). The two latter powers act from impulse, so to speak; their possessor being unconscious of, and, in a measure, irresponsible for their action. Cognition or discernment is the supreme natural power, which maintains the balance between inborn love and inborn aversion. Gabirol ignored this idea of his great predecessor, for he disagreed with Saadya, as will be made clear, but appears unwilling overtly to express his disagreement.

The wise man ought to profit by the knowledge that the senses, in a measure, determine the qualities (the virtues and vices), and that these again are constituted of and governed by

[1] For a fuller treatment of the relation of the senses to the moral qualities, cf. the last chapter of Horovitz.

[2] Guttmann ("Saadya," p. 261, note 1; p. 201, notes 2 and 3; p. 223, note 2).

[3] Maimonides divides this "power of the soul" into two parts—שכל המעשי, "practical intelligence," *i. e.*, that part of intelligence which chooses between the good and the evil; and שכל העיוני, "theoretical intelligence," which can distinguish between the true and the false. In both cases discernment acts intuitively, (cf. רוח חן, ch. 3). The two aspects of this "power of the soul" are alike distinct from the שכל הפועל, which is a clear, rational conception of the causes that affect man from without.

the four humors[1] which represent the four physical elements.[2] The wise man ought to make his senses serve him, and yet hold them well in check, in order to keep them from that which is not meet for them. Like the skilful physician,[3] who determines the nature of an illness by taking account of the disproportionate division (or combination) of heat and cold, humidity and dryness in the body of the patient, and who mingles his drugs in such proportions as to respond to the wants of the sick body and restore its natural equilibrium, the wise man ought to take heed of his qualities, which are identical with his senses, and yield to them only in so far as it may be necessary. Deity has given these natural impulses that they may be trained according to the requirements of worthy conduct; through rightful rule over them, the object of man's being is attained; that is, the higher life is attained as long as life endures.

Thus we have Gabirol's theses, which may be summed up as follows: The qualities of the soul are made manifest through the five senses, and these senses in turn are constituted of the four humors. Even as the humors may be modified one by the other, so can the senses be controlled and the qualities of the soul be trained unto good or evil.

One qualification must be noted: the soul here spoken of

[1] Cf. Dieterici ("Mikrokosmus," pp. 89, 90).

[2] Cf. Dieterici ("Logik," p. 103). In a very appreciative paper, included in the "Sitzungsberichte der königl. bayer. Akademie der Wissenschaften zu München," 1866, ii., Haneberg, who is closely followed by Guttmann, shows the relationship of Ibn Gabirol to the Encyclopädie of the "Iḫwān al-ṣafā." The points of contact between the Encyclop die and the "Ethics" are less marked, except in those things common to both "Fons Vitæ" and "Ethics," *e.g.*, Microcosm and Macrocosm. Cf. Guttmann (p. 35, note 7), Seyerlen (p. 21 and note 29), and Horovitz (p. 91).

[3] Rosin ("Maimonides," p. 12, note 2; p. 37, note 5; p. 47, note 3; pp. 77, 78 and notes) thinks that Maimonides' term for ethics תקון המדות (possibly a reminiscence of Gabirol's designation, the title of this book in the translation) shows that he, too, conceived ethics to be, figuratively speaking, like the attempt of the physician to order or re-arrange the bodily elements with a view to restoring harmony, which is health. Cf. Guttman ("Ibn Daud," p. 217, note 1), Wolff ("Maimonides," p. 2), Guttman ("Saadya," p. 282), Dukes (p. 93, and "Phil.," p. 79, note 2), Rosin (p. 169), and Musen (p. 6).

does not connote the divine within man; it refers only to the animal soul within man.[1] The author is cognizant of purely psychical qualities, which have no relation to the physical constitution, but he does not treat of these. Similarly, he is cognizant of the concealed senses, which stand in no relation to the humors and elements. But he refrains from treating of these. Gabirol's object is to establish a system of purely physio-psychological ethics.[2]

In attributing the qualities of the soul to the five senses, Gabirol is as original[3] as he is ingenious. In his demonstrations he leans altogether on the Bible and avoids the Talmudim and Midrashim. To the sense of sight he attributes the virtues of meekness and pudency, and their opposites, pride and impudence. He describes the sense of sight as the principal one possessed by man,[4] standing in relation to the whole human

[1] Cf. Rosin ("Maimonides," p. 46, note 1), also chap. 7, יסוד מורא, of Abraham ibn Ezra, translated by Creizenach, Frankfort, 1840.

[2] Dukes uses the term (p. 10) "eine psychologisch-ethische Abhandlung."

[3] Cf. Dukes (pp. 95, 96). Kaufmann ("Die Theologie des Bachya ibn Pakuda," Wien, 1874, p. 193 *et seq.*) argues that Baḥya's failure to mention Gabirol in the enumeration of his philosophical sources, together with the fact of "eine entschiedene Verwandschaft mit Baḥya in einem Punkte," compels us to the conclusion "dass Gabirol in dieser Schrift bereits aus dem Werke Bachya's entlehnt habe" (cf. "Sinne," p. 29, note 92). Kaufmann (p. 194, note 2) gives a close comparison of Gabirol's classification of the twenty qualities with Baḥya's חובות הלבבות. For a thoroughly convincing refutation, cf. Brüll (p. 71 *et seq.*). Steinschneider ("H. U.," p. 372, note 39), while undecided, leans a little to the side of Gabirol's priority. Dukes (p. 10) does not doubt Baḥya's dependence upon Gabirol. Bacher (p. 57, note 1) thinks that Baḥya's arrangement (iii., 10) of the good and evil qualities follows that of Gabirol,—thus dissenting from the view of Kaufmann. Hertz (p. 28, note 4) regards it "questionable whether Baḥya and Gabirol at all knew each other's work." Broydé ("Les Reflexions de l'âme par Bahya ben Joseph ibn Pakouda," Paris, 1896) believes that Baḥya designed this work to be a refutation of the ethical principles laid down by Gabirol. Schreiner ("H. B.," vol. i., pp. 121–128) dissents from Broydé in this, and Guttmann ("M. G. W. J.," vol. xli., pp. 241–256) strenuously denies the authenticity of this work, maintaining, moreover (p. 246, note 5), "Der Parallelismus zwischen Bachya's und Gabirol's Schriften, den Broydé aufstellt (Hebr. Einleit., S. 9), entbehrt jeder wissenschaftlichen Begründung."

[4] Maimonides adopts this idea in full; in fact, many resemblances to the thought of Gabirol are traceable in the writings of Maimonides (רוח חן, end of chap. 1 and beginning of chap. 2).

structure as the sun to the solar system. Its excellence consists in that it perceives near and distant objects within the same time; its demerit, on the other hand, consists in the inability of the eye to see when it is closed; but the opening and closing of the eyes in a conscious state depend upon the power of the will, and the will power is exercised by the mind, which is an attribute of the divine soul. Hence the sense of sight stands nearest to the divine soul.[1] Another proof of this is that the eye performs its functions only while its possessor is awake and has full control over his senses; when man is asleep, the activity of his mind is at a standstill, his eyes do not see. "Wonderful," says Gabirol, "are the words of the philosopher, who said that the soul has spiritual hues, which are reflected by the motions of the eyebrows." Hence the eye expresses directly the qualities of the divine soul.[2] Our author, however, will not go a step further into the inquiry as to the nature of the divine soul; the animal soul with its qualities forms the field of his research. He touches upon this boundary only to prove that the sense of sight forms, so to speak, the link between the purely animal and the divine within man, and to justify his position in attributing to it the qualities of meekness and pudency, pride and impudence.

From Gabirol's discussion respecting each of the virtues, to which the second part of the "Ethics" is devoted, it appears that meekness is occasioned by a clear perception of the insignificance of the individual man as compared with the greatness and grandeur of the world; pride, on the other hand, is caused by an over-estimation of self and self's attainments. Pudency, likewise, is the effect of calm consideration and wise reflection touching the fitness of action to environment, whereas impudence is a sanguine, ill-considered display of over-estimation of

[1] For a full exposition of the relation of the senses to the soul as understood in the time of Gabirol, see Kaufmann's "Sinne."

[2] Löwenthal ("Pseudo-Arist.," p. 125, note 6) suggests the Talmudic allegory ("Niddah," f. 30 b), showing that the sense of sight is the principal agent in conveying wisdom,—even to the unborn child.

self, and disregard for the worth and attainments of others. Gabirol advises the proud and impudent to contemplate the grandeur of creation, and to ponder upon the worth of the wise and truly great men, in order that their arrogance may be moderated. He points out, too, that pride and impudence are instinctively, as it were, hated and despised, and that they providentially lead to disgrace and humiliation.

Next to the sense of sight is the sense of hearing, which may be said to be almost as important as the former. The "perceptions" of the sense of hearing are not as numerous and not as attractive as the "perceptions" of the sense of sight; nor can the ear be controlled, as is the eye, by the power of the will—still, as a mere animal function, it is tractable. To the sense of hearing Gabirol attributes the qualities of love and mercy, hatred and cruelty. He is not quite explicit in giving the reasons which lead him to attribute these qualities of the animal soul to this sense, but he intimates that men of understanding will find his hints quite sufficient, and begs the reader to excuse him for failing to produce arguments which require elaborate and scientific demonstration. It is easy to perceive why he is reticent at this point, and why he here puts forward the provocation suffered by him at the hands of adversaries. In attributing love and mercy, together with their opposites, to the sense of hearing, and thus including them among the qualities of animal life which can be modified by intelligent design, Gabirol runs counter to the accepted belief of his time. It was pointed out that his predecessor, Saadya, laid down as a postulate that desire and aversion, inborn love and inborn hate, belonged to the "powers of the soul" which work independently of the will, and for the working of which man is, in a certain measure, irresponsible. Gabirol, on the other hand, classifies these with all other animal qualities which are subject to change and modification at the demand of human reason. This point of difference between him and Saadya was not alone sufficient to arouse against him the enmity of the disciples of Saadya, but even to mark him as an heretic. For he had ruled out

providential intervention in the two most important "forces of the soul," and thus made them out to be the servants of reason or intelligence.

Love, according to Gabirol, is identical with lust, and is to be attributed to animal passion. It is a quality to which most human beings are heir, and which only those whose reason has perfectly mastered their animal nature are spared. One of the most pernicious effects of this trait is, that he who is given to it lacks consistency and does not abide by his word. The wise man must keep himself free from this passion. The good sides of this quality come to light in the love of friends and relatives, in the love of native land, in the love of wisdom and of God, that love which prompts to good-will, to the fulfilment of duty, and to ideal pursuits. Mercy is the noble twin sister of love, and Gabirol finds no evil in it. Its nobility is so exalted that it has even been represented as an attribute of Deity. Hate is the opposite of love, and, as in the case of the latter, its possessor is marked by inconsistency and a lack of truthfulness. Sorrow and discontent are its constant companions. The worst form of hate is that which is caused by envy or jealousy. Love and hate merge into each other if the object of love be not ideal, if it be the mere satisfaction of physical desire. Cruelty again is a quality of degraded and savage human beings, of those whose nature is most nearly related to that of wild beasts. Even in cases of meting out justice, cruelty may be excusable, but is never commendable. A wise man should abstain from it altogether.

To the sense of smell are attributed the virtues of good-will and wide-awakedness, wrath and jealousy. All these qualities are revealed or expressed in the act of breathing. In order to exercise good-will under exasperating circumstances, where displeasure would almost be in place, an effort is required like unto that which is expended in holding one's breath. Wide-awakedness in the doing of any work requires free breathing, and jealousy, which is related to wrath, is betrayed by strong or suppressed breathing. The critics of Gabirol, who pointed

out the incompleteness of the "Ethics," must have had this part of his work in view, for he is too laconic in his explanations in this part of the treatise. But in this case, as in the case of the sense of hearing, it has been pointed out that his reticence can easily be explained. Attributing wrath to mere animal life, and subjecting it unconditionally to the training of the higher spiritual endowment in man, he again runs counter to the accepted belief of his time, which classed wrath among the "forces of the soul." In the second part of the work, treating of wrath, Gabirol plainly says that he does not follow the accepted systems of ethics which classed wrath among the "forces of the soul," but places it among the "tractable qualities of the soul," *i.e.*, among the animal impulses, which the rational soul can and must control. To justify his position he quotes two rabbinical passages, viz., "Pirke Aboth," v., 14, where this trait is declared to be of four kinds or degrees, and "Sabbath" (Babylonian Talmud) f. 105, where it is said that "he who rends his garments in his wrath, is like unto an idolater." Avoiding the Talmud wherever he could, and quoting it only when he opposed the accepted theory of Saadya, our author simply intended to disarm the animosity of the adherents of the old doctrine, which he knew his opposition would arouse. The two passages he cites are indeed a strong refutation of Saadya's assumption. If wrath were an intuitive impulse and beyond the control of the rational soul, the rabbis could not classify it as of four degrees; a natural impulse always remains true to itself, and consistent in all its manifestations. Nor could they judge so harshly the individual who yields to this impulse. That they have done so proves their agreement with the teaching of Gabirol, that wrath is a tractable quality of the animal soul over which the rational soul must prevail.

Gabirol holds that contentedness is closely related to, if not identified with, meekness or humility, and the same process of thinking which leads to the latter must also conduce to the former. Contemplating the grandeur of creation leads, as we have seen before, from pride to humility, and in the same way,

attributing every individual experience to life as a whole, which is the "origin of all that is good, and the source of grace," leads man to contentedness. Man should aspire to be deserving of honor and elevation, but he should be contented with his position humble though it be, until deserved preferment is bestowed upon him; let him never seek promotion or preferment. Trying circumstances should be accepted as a training and influence for the good, as a providential guide. Forbearance and forgiveness are offshoots of the quality of contentment, for he who exercises this virtue will not allow provocation and displeasure to affect his demeanor toward others. Envy is an offshoot of wrath; it is a trait common to all rational beings, and few are they who can escape its pangs. Primarily it is an incentive to activity, for if a man sees that his neighbor possesses good things, he desires to acquire similar things, or other things that are equally good, although, if he had not seen them, he could very well do without either the one or the other, and would never make any efforts to possess them. When jealousy is allowed to gain the upper hand it develops into covetousness, which is diametrically opposed to nobility and leads to the greatest wrong-doing. The wise man should keep himself aloof from it, for it brings no good; it causes pain and constant worriment, leads to misanthropy, brings on spiritual and physical disquietude. Envy is a good quality only when it conduces to a desire to emulate the good, when it develops into zeal for noble principles. Wide-awakedness is peculiar to a sanguine disposition, and is displayed at its best by persons who are free from evil inclinations and who are not burdened by the weight of care and worry. The wise man must exercise this quality in all his actions, in his search for wisdom as well as in the performance of his practical duties. Laziness is its opposite, and in its turn conduces to duplicity; the person who is too lazy to perform his work has recourse to sly cunning in order to gain what he wants or to find excuses for not performing his duty. When a man is active and wide-awake, the gases which the body exhales vanish in the air; on the other hand, when the

body is inactive, these gases mount to the brain, causing drowsiness and sleep. Wide-awakedness is a very commendable quality and leads to prosperity. Still the wise man should take care lest it degenerate into rashness or light-mindedness, for good work can be accomplished only after calm consideration.

The sense of taste is the least noble of all the senses, but it has an advantage in that none of the other senses can exist without it, nor can it be thought of where the other senses are missing. The control of the sense of taste requires a nobler effort than the control of the other senses, for through it the predominance of intelligence over the purely animal inclinations is most clearly manifested. It must not be forgotten that the first sin of man was committed as a result of the desire to gratify this sense.

To the sense of taste are attributed the qualities of joy and grief,[1] tranquillity and penitence, qualities which imply enjoyment and gratification or the reverse, privation and care. Gabirol has no difficulty in connecting cheerfulness, apprehensiveness, and intellectual calm with the sense of taste, but he uses a roundabout argument to establish the connection of penitence (remorse) with this sense. A person who is not resolute in his deeds, and regrets one day what he has done the preceding day, is always disturbed in his enjoyment of life and is never gratified by that which is, because he cannot rid himself of the thought of the mistakes, real or imaginary, of the past. Cheerfulness is a quality of various aspects in different persons; it is peculiar to the "warm-humid temperament," and more especially to those whose wishes are always gratified and who, for a long time, have been spared the pangs of disappointment and regret. It is natural that such persons be in good health, and that age come not quickly upon them. Sometimes, however, cheerfulness comes with the attainment of a long-cherished desire. If this happen to a light-minded person, his joy is manifested in outbursts of merriment upon occasions when merriment and laughter are out of place. "It is my opinion," says

[1] Cf. Rosin (p. 174, note 1).

Gabirol, "that cheerfulness is becoming to those pure and clarified souls, which are inaccessible to flattery and exempt from hypocrisy, the souls which are 'related to dominion,' which rise in the scale of spirituality—I mean to say, the souls of the righteous who have perfect enjoyment in the object of their activity and great delight in their abstinence from worldly pleasures."

Our author emphasizes here that rejoicing, as well as despondency, belongs to the purely animal nature, and cites Galen as his authority to that effect. Man must always see to it that his "animal soul" be in perfect submission to his "rational soul," *i.e.*, "that his intelligence control his natural impulses."

Apprehensiveness or grief is the opposite of cheerfulness and appears in those whose desires are not gratified, and who are disappointed in their hopes—"when the soul misses that which she loves." The possession of this quality leaves visible marks upon the features of the countenance. The more a man yields to the transient things of this world, the more he succumbs to his animal desires and inclinations, the oftener is he subject to disappointment, and a feeling of dissatisfaction and gloom. On the other hand, the more he turns away from the transient things and physical enjoyments, the more he devotes himself to the study of science or the quest of moral and religious wisdom, the less disappointment will he suffer, and the farther away from him will be sadness. It will be seen in the translation (iii., 2) that Gabirol dwells upon the subject of sadness at some length, and says many admirable things with a view to consoling the sad at heart and the sorrow-stricken. Dr. Sachs pertinently points out that Gabirol's brooding disposition and saddening experience seem to have dictated his utterances on this subject.[1] It is noteworthy that the optimistic spirit of Gabirol prompts him to find a good use even for sadness, and this on purely pathological principles. Sadness causes a person to shed tears, and by these means nature rids itself of the used-up fluids which accumulate around the eye.

[1] Cf. Sachs (p. 217, note 3).

It is because of this that children, in whom the animal soul is dominant, cry so often: nature adjusts itself in them, so to speak. Concerning the quality of tranquillity, our author declares that it is most praiseworthy when it develops into perfect trust and reliance upon the goodness of God. Penitence, on the other hand, is praiseworthy only when it leads to "repentance for sin." But it is most despicable if it prompt one "to say 'aye' one day, and 'nay' on the next day," or to make vows and not fulfil them. It is best for man to avoid doing or saying anything of which he must afterward repent.

The sense of touch is nearest to the sense of taste, and akin to it. Its desire and enjoyment spring from a "perception" of kinship to the desired object. The rational soul has no need of it, save as it answers the physical requirements of the body. To it are attributed the qualities of liberality and valor, niggardliness and cowardice. The hand is the most active instrument of the sense of touch; hence open-handedness (liberality) and close-fistedness (niggardliness), as well as the power to hold fast or to strike hard (valor), and the possibility of being weakened by fright and deterred by danger (cowardice), are expressed in the terms of this sense. Biblical passages in which these four qualities are connected with the hand are cited in support of this thesis. Liberality, or generosity, is a precious virtue, if it does not degenerate into prodigality and wastefulness. It should by all means be made to prevail over the inclination to parsimony. It leads a man to honor and recognition, and to compensation at the hand of Deity. But if generosity degenerate into wastefulness, or deteriorate into an aptness to sacrifice all possessions for the sake of satisfying one's desires, or to a careless surrender of self-respect and self-honor, it is anything but a virtue. Niggardliness is detestable to an even greater extent than generosity is praiseworthy. Generosity in its worst aspects, even when it deteriorates into prodigality and wastefulness, affords some enjoyment and evokes commendation to a certain degree; while its opposite, niggardliness, calls forth nothing but blame and reproach. The wise

men held that no superior traits of character are ever associated with parsimony, and no trustworthiness with love of gain. He who yields to that inclination must part with the hope of a good reputation. The only good side of this quality lies in the fact that its possessor takes care of that which is his own by rightful acquisition; but, even here, a man must be on his guard constantly lest he become avaricious. A wise man should not be niggardly with his wisdom, but give it freely to those who desire to learn, for wisdom is a light which never loses of its brightness and intensity because other lights are kindled by it. When a man perceives that a tendency toward avarice is beginning to creep over him, he should break its power at once; he must begin to practise liberality toward those who are nearly related to him, and, little by little, extend his generosity to larger circles of his surroundings. Valor is the quality of men of a sanguine disposition whose hearts are large, whose veins and muscles are generously developed; it waxes greatest in men who practise the art of war. It is a noble quality when practised in the right time and at the right place, when its possessor exercises it in order to ward off danger that comes upon him unprovoked. But it is wrong to court danger and to brave death needlessly; in such instances the quality ceases to be bravery, becomes foolhardiness, and is akin to madness. It is noble to display bravery in defence of a principle, but ignoble to put one's self in danger merely to show the absence of all fear of injury and death. Valor should manifest itself only when there is a need of it; fortitude and serenity ought to be its limitations and safeguards. Patience and forbearance toward those one loves, fortitude and endurance in moments of hardship, are the noblest manifestations of the quality of courage.

Cowardice is a quality peculiar to mean and despicable souls; the wise ought to loathe it, for it never brings any good. It is most despicable when it leads an intelligent man to use his wisdom and knowledge as a plea to hide from danger and avoid war at a time when the intelligent man is required in order to protect a worthy cause. Cowardice is an offshoot of indolence.

One may, however, display cowardice when one is convinced that strength and bravery cannot avail; in such a case, cowardice ceases to be cowardice and becomes discretion.

The foregoing paragraphs constitute a brief, withal comprehensive, summary of Gabirol's system of ethics as contained in both parts of his work. I have deemed it advisable to connect the principal thoughts on the individual traits of character, to which he gave utterance in the second part of his work, with his theses touching the senses, to which the first part is devoted, in order to make apparent the way in which these individual traits are connected with the senses, according to the theory of Gabirol. The chief aim of the author was to guide his reader to the "improvement of the moral qualities," and this he expected to do by citing the simplest and commonest facts of physical life. The organs of perception were, according to Gabirol, not alone the instruments but also the emblems of the various manifestations of physical life. Having attributed to each of them a number of impulses, which are designated as virtues or vices, he developed a general conception of life as it is in this world (the animal life in man as he distinctly wishes us to understand), which should and must be guided and governed by reason. Reason itself is over and above the life which is cognizable through the perceptions of the sense-organs. The consciousness of holding the animal impulses under control is felicity. The very effort that a man puts forth to make his animal soul subject to his rational soul affords him happiness, but, unlike his predecessor Saadya and his successors, Maimonides and Ha-Levi and their followers, Gabirol treats of ethics as entirely independent of the religious law. In two or three places, it is true, he mentions divine requital; but this he does in such general terms as may be construed in a purely rationalistic sense, or as mere phrases of common parlance. In no instance does he refer to any particular command of the religious law, that is not based upon an ethical principle.

And yet Gabirol was not an unbeliever. He speaks of divine grace and mercy with a sincerity which leaves no room

for doubt in his belief. The word of Scripture is to him unquestionable law and revelation; even to the authors of the Talmud he refers with a reverence that is due to superior beings. Why, then, does he avoid all reference to the specific laws of the Bible and the Talmud? The answer that suggests itself to me is, that, according to Gabirol, all the written and oral laws were designed for intellectual beings and for the training of the rational soul. Logical, systematic thinker that he was, he would have insisted upon an elaborate treatise on the ethics of that soul, *i.e.*, on the qualities of human intelligence and reason, before undertaking to expatiate on the laws and regulations which bear upon it. This was not the task he had set himself in writing the "Ethics," as we have pointed out before. The few instances in which he alludes to the intellectual soul show that he regarded it as altogether exempt from and superior to impulsive action; he would not even admit that intuitive love and aversion are integral parts of and inherent in it. He believes in the superior endowments of some souls, and refers to them frequently. It appears, moreover, that this mystic doctrine makes a sharp distinction between the purely animal and the higher, or intellectual, qualities of man; the former manifest themselves and work through the senses, and the latter, the inward senses, are divine endowments, which manifest themselves in the control they exercise over the animal impulses. The principal agent in the exercise of this control is reason or intelligence. This intelligence is the mediator between the divine and animal in man, and any human being who makes his intelligence master over his natural inclinations may enjoy the bliss to which Gabirol points.

TRANSLATION

OF

THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE MORAL QUALITIES.[1]

THIS is an essay on the improvement of the moral qualities (*i.e.*, character), according to the opinion of the greatest of the ancient sages, composed by the learned, the worthy, the scholarly Solomon ben Gabirol, the Israelite,[2] the philosopher—may God sanctify his soul. He composed it in the city of Saragossa, in the month of Nissan, in the year 828[3] (?) of the Alexandrian era.

Blessed be God, the Mighty, the Wise, the One who is nigh, Responsive, the One, the Eternal, the Primordial, the Creator; greatly exalted be He.

Verily, when we look at man who is the best of all the creatures of the Creator, exalted be His majesty, we recognize that he is the object aimed at in the creation of all substances and beings. Furthermore, he is best proportioned, as regards constitution, of all living beings; and, in addition to this, most perfect and most beautiful of form, and most completely fashioned. He possesses a rational soul, elemental,[4] wise, everlasting, which does not perish with him. For all this there are clear proofs, both intellectual and Scriptural, which every intelligent man knows. The surest proof that man is pre-eminent among creatures is, that he partakes of the state of the

[1] Rosin renders the title more freely by "The Ennoblement of the Character."

[2] The term "Israelite" is replaced in the Hebrew versions, printed and manuscript, by "the Spaniard."

[3] Cf. Introduction, p. 6, note 3, and p. 7, note 1.

[4] Horovitz, accepting the Hebrew translation, פנינית, would render this "transparent," "luminous" (p. 108, note 65); cf. Dukes ("Phil.," p. 57, note 5).

angels in regard to speech and understanding. These two are divine and spiritual properties. Nay more, we see, besides this, that the angels busy themselves with the righteous man, as we learn from the case of Abraham, peace be unto him, in that they brought him glad tidings and also warned him; likewise from the case of Isaac and Jacob, our fathers. The latter said in the course of his excellent prayer for his son (Gen. xlviii. 16), "The angel which redeemed me";[1] and Scripture says of him (Hos. xii. 5), "Yea, he had power over the angel and prevailed"; and Daniel said (vi. 23), "My God hath sent his angel." Concerning the help vouchsafed to the pious and the destruction of their enemies, it is said (II Kings xix. 35), "And it came to pass that night that the angel of the Lord went out and smote in the camp of the Assyrians." There are many similar examples, which I will not go to the length of enumerating.

We know that some men may undoubtedly be superior to others, nay more, that one man may be equal to a large number of men—although they be of one form and one composition,[2] except that the soul of one man is predisposed to worldly honor, with the help of the celestial bodies,[3] and his preference for ethical practice, and because the baser part of him is obedient to the higher, *i.e.*, his intellect exercises control over his physical nature.[4] But if his aim be low and his station unfit to reach

[1] In giving the English of Gabirol's biblical citations, I have quoted as much as is required to elucidate the general context. In doing so, I depart from the precedent laid down by the author or scribe, who frequently cites no more than an initial word or two of the Scriptural passage,—sometimes even the non-essential ones,—leaving it to the reader to recall the rest. In citing the number of chapter and verse, the Hebrew original has been followed.

[2] Wolff (p. 82, note 2) cites the somewhat similar idea of Maimonides.

[3] Dukes ("Ehrensäulen," p. 12, note 1) makes mention of the Talmudic thought respecting planetary influence upon the physical conditions of man and upon his fate; in his religio-metaphysical poem, "The Crown of Royalty," Gabirol treats of this in a brilliant, poetic style. Ibn Ezra did not fail to note that Gabirol had fallen under the spell of the "astrological dreaming of his century"; cf. Stein (p. 33), and Schmiedl (p. 308, note 3), as well as Schmiedl's entire chapter on this subject (pp. 299–316).

[4] This thought, frequently expressed by Gabirol (cf. ii. 1, iii 1), is often met with in Bahya; the references are to the edition of the חבות הלבבות, by Jellinek

that distinction, so that he does not rise to that control of which the bodies in their course have not given promise,[1] *i.e.*, a sign, or to which ethics have not aided him, then the wise and intelligent man ought to expend all his efforts in order to reach the highest dignity which he seeks, in order that it may be, as one of the sages said, "Help the celestial bodies with your souls, even as tilling and irrigating help the seed to grow";[2] and this occurs naturally through the instrumentality of the earth. He should endeavor to be one of the number of the excellent and through his zeal follow in their steps. Further, he must refine his qualities until they be improved and not employ his senses except when it appears necessary, until he becomes one (of those) who is honorably known and famed for his excellence, for that is worldly happiness. But when man reaches it, his eyes must not cease to gaze wistfully at the attainment of that which is above it, *i.e.*, enduring happiness which he can reach in the intellectual world, the world to come. For this is the highest gift of God to His servants, in addition to the favor which is their common lot as existent creatures.[3] The prince David, peace be unto him, had implored that he might attain to the well-being of this world, in saying (Ps. lxxxvi. 17), "Make with me a covenant for goodness." He also desired to be one of those well fitted to attain the bliss of the world to come, in that he said (Ps. xxxi. 20), "O how

(iii., 2, p. 135; ix., 1, p. 400; ix., 2, p. 402; iii., 2, p. 137); cf. Brüll (p. 74, note 3).

[1] Steinschneider ("Alfarabi," p. 75, note 5).

[2] Horovitz (pp. 127, 128, notes 105, 106). Maimonides holds that to admit the influence of the planets upon human relations is to limit the freedom of man. The possibility of such limitation of human freedom by planetary influence Gabirol would not be ready to admit, except in some such way as modern freedomists take account of the influences of heredity and environment. Thein ("Der Talmud oder das Princip des planetarischen Einflusses," Prag, 1874, p. 65 *et seq.*) discusses the position of Maimonides, Albo, Ibn Ezra, and Jehuda ha-Levi in regard to this mystic and unphilosophic teaching.

[3] The thought that existence is in itself a mark of favor from God to man, as set forth in this passage, is dwelt upon at greater length in "The Crown of Royalty," and is, according to Sachs (p. 244, and note), emphasized by many of the later moralists.

great is the goodness which Thou hast laid up for them that fear Thee"; (Ps. xxxvi. 9), "They shall be abundantly satisfied with the fatness of Thy house." This height cannot be reached by any one save through merit. Thus he asked (Ps. xv. 1, 2), "Lord, who shall abide in thy tabernacle, who shall dwell in thy holy hill?" And the answer is, "He that walketh uprightly and worketh righteousness." Having arrived in the course of our remarks at this stage in the account of man's pre-eminence, let us direct our attention to the statement of the object of this our work and the method of deriving some advantage therefrom. This will come to pass after we shall have divided the treatise into all its sections as is incumbent upon us. Then will we realize the benefit of it. Thus Solomon the Wise, peace be unto him, has said (Eccles. vii. 27), "Behold this have I found, saith the Preacher, counting one by one to find out the account"; by which he meant to say that when things are brought together, it is necessary to enumerate them. So, also, by properly ordering the discourse, it will be understood.

God, Mighty and Exalted, has created the expanse of the smaller world[1] dependent upon four elements: He places in man blood corresponding to air, yellow gall corresponding to fire, black gall corresponding to earth, and white moisture corresponding to water.[2] Moreover God, exalted be He, equipped him, *i.e.*, man, with perfectness of form and with every organ

[1] There is evidently an omission in the Arabic text, p. 4, line 5; the Hebrew version includes a line omitted through the mistake of an early copyist, who skipped from the former עלי טבאיע ארבע to the latter, thus omitting the intervening line or lines. This Arabic omission is supplied by Kaufmann ("Sinne," pp. 37, 38).

[2] "Fons Vitæ" of Gabirol, Tractate iii. (Guttmann, p. 117, note 3); Dieterici, "Mikrokosmus," pp. 89, 90; and "Logik," p. 103; "Anthropologie der Araber im Zehnten Jahrhundert," Leipzig, 1871 (pp. 4, 42, 189); M. Friedländer, "Essays on the Writings of Abraham ibn Ezra," London, vol. iv. (p. 24, note 4). This purely Greek conception was speedily incorporated into Jewish teachings. Gabirol's immediate successor—in point of time—Baḥya, follows him here. (Cf. Introduction, p. 13, note 2.) The teaching that man is a microcosm, constituted of the four elements, found its way even into the poetry of the Middle Ages. Cf. a poem of Abraham ben Meir ibn Ezra, cited by Sachs (p. 115, and p. 42 of the

complete and not wanting in any respect; and He created within him five senses, as we shall relate. Solomon the Wise alludes to them when he says (Eccl. ix. 11), "I returned and saw under the sun"; "seeing" here means to observe carefully, the general term for "seeing" being here used in the place of the specific term, "observing carefully" as in saying, "under the sun," he means whatever the sun encircles. In the saying, "The race is not to the swift," he hints at the sense of smell, which is (situated in) the nose, because running is impossible except through the inhalation of air from without to cool the natural heat which is within man. The inhalation is accomplished by the sense of the nose, and if there were no nose there could be no breathing, which causes motion. In saying "Nor is the battle to the strong," he wishes to indicate the sense of hearing; just as we see that war consists of crying and of hearing in battle, as it is said (Ex. xxxii. 17), "There is a noise of war in the camp." In saying, "Nor yet is bread to the wise," he refers to the sense of taste and the meaning is to be taken literally. In saying "Nor yet riches to the understanding," he refers to the sense of touch, which is of a kind with the understanding:[1] the latter is of the category of the inner senses, which are concealed in the nature of the soul, as for example, perception, thought, and understanding. In saying, "Nor is there favor to men of skill," he wishes to indicate the sense of sight, which does not become knowledge except through prolonged attention to scripture and continuous study of books.[2] Were it not for the great length involved and our love of conciseness, we would follow up these allusions with clear arguments, (adduced) from syllogistic[3] reasoning and the

Hebrew supplement), who refers to an eleventh century exposition of this theory in a Piut of R. Isaac ibn Giat ("Ritual of Tripoli," p. 92 b).

[1] Horovitz appears to hold (p. 140, note 154) that Gabirol follows Aristotle in bringing the sense of touch into relation with the understanding; cf. Dukes ("Phil.," p 121, note 4).

[2] Horovitz (p. 138, note 141) adduces the somewhat similar views of Aristotle and Plato; cf. Kaufmann (p. 140).

[3] Ḳiyās is rendered by the Hebrew סברא, "reason." According to Stein-

science of oral traditions,[1] in order that they might be easily and simply comprehended. But for those whose faculties are above the ordinary and who are of high-minded purpose, this little will suffice as evidence that the wise prince alluded to naught else in this passage but the visible (outer) senses, and veiled the mention of the hidden (inner) ones.[2] If a man be wise, he will employ them in the right place and restrain them from everything in connection with which he ought not to use them. Let him rather be like a skilful physician,[3] who prepares prescriptions, taking of every medicine a definite quantity; thus the ingredients vary in quantity; he uses of one the weight of a Danik, and of the other the weight of a Kirat; and so on ac-

schneider ("Alfarabi," pp. 26, 27, notes 21, 22), it is usually translated by the term חֶקֶשׁ.

[1] M. Ehrenpreis ("Die Entwickelung der Emanationslehre," Frankfurt, 1895, p. 1, note 1) holds that Gabirol's use of this term "das Vorhandensein spekulativ-kabbalistischer Schriften im 10. und 11. Jahrh. vermuten lässt," assuming that the Arabic word connotes "spekulativer Kabbala." Munk (p. 283, note 2) insists with much emphasis that Jellinek wrongly renders this term by "la science de la Kabbale," adding "Il est evident que le mot הקבלה signifie ici simplement tradition, ou ce qui est admis sur l'autorité traditionelle. L'original arabe d'ailleurs ne laisse aucun doute à cet égard." Cf. Dukes (p. 103). B. Zimmels ("Leo Hebraeus, ein jüdischer Philosoph der Renaissance," Leipzig, 1886, pp. 57, note 1; 58, note 1; 68, notes 1 and 2) maintains Munk (p. 527) was similarly mistaken in believing Leo Hebraeus to be "sous les auspices de la Kabbale," the mistake arising from the use of the term קבלה, which Leo expressly uses, as does Gabirol, in the signification, the "ancient Hebrew tradition." The term קבלה is used with the same meaning by Saadya, Baḥya, and Ibn Daud; *vide* Bacher (p. 6, note 4; page 40, note 3; p. 59, note 4; p. 145, note 2). Stössel (p. 51) goes so far as to say, "Gabirol ist der Fortsetzer des Buches Jezirah und der Vorarbeiter des Zohar." This view has met with little or no acceptance, save in the case of Isaac Myer (author of "Qabbalah, the Philosophy of Ibn Gebirol, the Qabbalah and the Zohar," Philadelphia, 1888), whose voluminous work is written in support of the theory that Gabirol was an outspoken Kabbalist. Mr. Myer calls "The Crown of Royalty" a "kosmic Qabbalistic hymn," and the "Fons Vitæ" "a philosophical Qabbalistic work," "one of the earliest exposures of the secrets of the speculative Qabbalah."

[2] Quoted by Kaufmann ("Sinne," p. 47, note 32), in the chapter treating of the "inner and outer senses."

[3] Guttmann ("Saadya," p. 284, note 2, and "Gabirol," p. 18, note 1) points out the similarity of this passage to "Emunoth," x., p. 159 (ed. Slucky), and "Die Propadeutik der Araber," Berlin, 1865 (pp. 44 and 163).

cording to his estimate of their respective effects. He will not be satisfied until there be mixed in with it something which will keep it from doing harm (to the person to whom it is administered), and all this must be calculated.

Since this is so, man ought to consider carefully the qualities which belong to his senses and not employ them except when it is necessary; for God, exalted be He, has so constituted them in man that he can wisely order them, since through them he guards the normal condition of his life. By their means he sees colors, hears sounds, tastes food (flavors), smells odors, distinguishes between hard and soft, and all other things which are necessary to his life; and many which are useful we will mention when we commence (the subject), please God. We will now describe the senses and the various advantages to be derived from their use and the necessity of refraining from the use of them when they would cause harm.

We hold that the first and foremost of the senses is that of the eye, since its position with regard to the body is like that of the sun to the universe.[1] It is a sense which never fails to perceive an object without (the lapse of) time, *i.e.*, its perception of that which is near to it is as quick as its perception of that which is far from it; nor does any time elapse between its perception of the near and its perception of the far,[2] as is the case with the other senses. The eye alights upon its objects of perception as long as it is open.[3] Therefore, sleep is impossible unless it be closed. How wondrous is the saying of a philosopher with regard to the sense of the eye! "The soul has spiritual tints, which sometimes become apparent in the motion of the eyelid."[4] Again he said, "Keep watch over the sense of sight: verily it may lead to various kinds of wrong: by some of its motions it may testify to your (having) pride and haughtiness,

[1] Cf. Horovitz (p. 138, note 140).

[2] Cf. Kaufmann ("Sinne," pp. 117, 118, note 55, and p. 120, note 61), and Horovitz (p. 139, note 144).

[3] Horovitz (p. 139, note 143).

[4] Platonic doctrine. Cf. Horovitz (p. 139, note 142), and Dukes ("Phil.," p. 78, note 1).

and by others to your possession of meekness and humility.[1] Therefore, compel it to make the very best movements and restrain it from the most ignoble." "Furthermore," he said, "social intercourse does not exist for the pleasure of the eye, but the enjoyment of the mind." The learned man will understand this saying. How beautiful is the agreement of this utterance with the word of God, exalted and magnified be He (Num. xv. 39), "Do ye not seek after your own heart and your own eyes."

The sense of hearing is next in point of importance. Though the effect of this sense upon the soul is more readily felt than that of sight,[2] man does not heed it as he does the eye. Under good training, with reference to this sense, is included man's refraining from listening to indecent things, and not judging in regard to the pleasant tones which he hears according to their sound, but according to their meaning and intent. One ought not to be ensnared by what he hears, as the bird is ensnared by the sounds to which it inclines with admiration; and one ought to know of the places where it is necessary to pay good heed and those wherein it is not fitting to listen at all, as he of whom it is said (Isa. xxxiii. 15), "that stoppeth his ears from the hearing of blood."

The sense of smell follows the sense of hearing, because a sound is felt in the air; and it is of lesser moment than the sense of hearing. Accordingly, there is less need of training it, because it entails not (the possibility of) obedience or revolt.

As for taste, though it be, in degree, below the senses aforementioned, still the manner of training it is more important, for the body cannot exist without it, as it can exist without the others. The way to train it is,—keep it from that which is forbidden, and give it free rein with regard to that which is per-

[1] Dukes (pp. 97, 98) shows the thought, "Humility dwells in the eye," to be Aristotelian. Cf. "Ethics," i. 3, where two maxims of Aristotle are quoted in the paragraph, which restates the thesis, that pride and meekness are closely related to the sense of sight.

[2] Kaufmann (p. 141, note 4).

missible. Reason[1] should exercise rule over desire in all this. The first instance wherein you can evidence your mastery over your desire is in eating and in drinking; just as it was in this regard that man first sinned.

Touch follows the sense of taste,[2] and is very similar to it. Its pleasures are peculiar to those members of the body in which the humors are well balanced. There is no occasion for the reasoning soul therein, except to guide the body. As to the manner of exercising it, thou must know that these desires are ills of the body, which thou must treat, and diseases which thou must heal. Think not that it is characteristic of the intellectual soul. Do not suppose that complete happiness and perfect blessedness are to be attained thereby, as one attains to excellences, in virtue of which man is adjudged deserving of honor in matters pertaining to the intellect.

As we have entered upon a description of the senses, let us regard each of them in the light of a genus and then mention the species comprised under it, namely, the qualities of man. Then let us name every individual in the species and describe its useful and harmful qualities and the method of effecting its improvement. If now we proceed to represent the qualities of the senses according to number, the result is that every sense has four qualities. We would attribute, firstly, to the sense of sight four, and a like number to the other senses, so that the sum would amount to twenty qualities for the five senses.

Accordingly, we assign to the eye Pride, Meekness, Pudency, and Impudence.[3] Our reason for putting pride in connection with the sense of sight is clear, as has been remarked above, while treating of it; also because thou perceivest the haughty glance of the proud and boastful of spirit. The very reverse of that we behold in the lowly of spirit, that is, meekness. Scrip-

[1] "Plato looks upon the sensual desires as the baser portion of the soul. As such it is intended to be ruled by the nobler, and its virtue lies consequently in obedience to the Reason" (Ritter, "Ancient Philosophy," vol. ii., p. 411).

[2] Horovitz (p. 140, note 151).

[3] Maimonides appears to me to have been familiar with this enumeration of good and evil qualities. Cf. Wolff (pp 6 and 10).

ture says with reference to the unduly lofty (Isa. ii. 11), "The lofty looks of men shall be humbled," and again (*id.* v. 15), "The eyes of the lofty shall be humbled," and so forth. The use here of (the word) "eyes" shows that the quality of pride is to be attributed to the sense of sight. Of meekness it is said (Hab. i. 13), "Thou art of humbler eyes than to behold evil," and so forth. With regard to the impudent, thou observest in most cases that his eyes stare and he is indifferent to shame; thus it is said of them (Isa. iii. 9), "The shew of their countenance doth witness against them." Thus thou wilt notice that the eyes of the unrighteous, the impudent, are troubled and restless, like those of whom it is said (Job xi. 20), "The eyes of the wicked shall fail." Again it is said of the impudent (Jer. v. 3), "They have made their faces harder than a rock." On the other hand, thou wilt find that the pudent man lowers his eyes so that he may merit, by reason of this, the abundant favor of God and men, as it is said (Prov. iii. 34), "He giveth grace unto the lowly"; and as we, with the help of God, exalted be He, will explain very clearly in the successive chapters. This favor can be acquired only by means of (the faculty of) sight, having regard to him that sees and that which is seen. Thus it was said of Moses our Master, peace be unto him (Num. xii. 3), "The man Moses was very meek." Previously it was said, corresponding to this (Ex. xi. 3), "The man Moses was very great."

The sense of hearing constitutes a genus embracing four species, namely, four qualities—Love, Hate, Mercy, and Hard-heartedness (cruelty). One has need of great precision in determining the relation of these four qualities to the sense of hearing. Even though we do not make our exposition thoroughly clear, nevertheless men of understanding will be content with hints and allusions. He ought not to be blamed who brings forward a fraction of the truth for not gathering together the whole. Perhaps the reader will admit as excuse for me, in that I have not succeeded in bringing together the metaphysical and logical proofs and the Scriptural examples as far as I

have gone, the fact that human power is but slight, especially in the case of a man like me, who is always greatly troubled and who does but scantily realize his hopes. In some places in the Bible (a mention of) the hearing occurs, followed by urging; thus the expression (Deut. vi. 4, 5), "Hear, O Israel," and after that it is said, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God," etc. Furthermore (Gen. xxiv. 52), "When Abraham's servant heard"; it is said immediately following, "He who worshiped the Lord, bowing himself to the earth"; and again (Gen. xxix. 13), "And it came to pass that when Laban heard the tidings," "he embraced him and kissed him." Hearing is also used in connection with acceptance and approval, which are at the basis of love; thus it is written (Ex. xxiv. 7), "We will do and we will hear." The performance of a thing is due to the love of a man therefor; thus it is said (Gen. xxvii. 4), "Make me savoury meat, such as I love." Sometimes satisfaction and cheerfulness follow upon hearing: thus it is said (Lev. x. 20), "When Moses heard that he was content," just as anger ensues in the absence of assent and hearkening, as (Ex. xvi. 20), "Notwithstanding, they hearkened not unto Moses." . . . "And Moses was wroth with them." Hatred also results from hearing, as thou must know from the case of Esau, of whom it is said (Gen. xxvii. 34), "When Esau heard," and then follows (*id.* xxvii. 41), "Esau hated Jacob." Mercy is known to result from "hearing"; thus God said (Ex. xxii. 26), "I will hear, for I am merciful." It is said of the righteous dead (Prov. i. 33), "Whoso hearkeneth unto me shall dwell safely." In contrast to this, it is said of the unrighteous (Job xv. 21), "A sound of fright is in his ears: in peace the despoiler shall come upon him," and so forth. Hard-heartedness results from the want of assent; thus it is said of Pharaoh in many places (Ex. ix. 12), "The Lord hardened the heart of Pharaoh and he hearkened not." A hard-hearted people is called (Jer. v. 15), "A nation whose tongue thou shalt not understand, neither shalt thou hearken unto what it speaketh," and so forth.

The sense of smell also commands four qualities—Anger,

Good-will, Jealousy, and Wide-awakedness. Anger is attributed to the sense of smell, as it is said (Jud. xiv. 19), "And his nose (anger) was kindled": anger, indignation, and wrath appear mostly in connection with the nose, as it is said (Dan. iii. 19), "Then was Nebuchadnezzar full of fury, and the form of his nose (visage) was changed." Good-will consists in the tranquillity of the thoughts, which are in the brain, and it is not altered by an "illness" of the sense of smell, though the nearest among the senses affecting it. Concerning good-will it is said (Prov. xvi. 15), "In the light of the king's nose (countenance) is life, and his favor is as a cloud of the latter rain." Jealousy and wide-awakedness are of the sense of the nose, and jealousy is a branch of anger: thus it is written (Prov. vi. 34), "For jealousy is the rage of a man." Thus becomes clear the association of the heated temperament, which is anger, with jealousy in the matter of this sense. Wide-awakedness consists in the movements of a man and results from the ordering of the organs of breathing, which are pivotal to the sense of smell, as we have remarked above in the section devoted to the exposition of the passage beginning with "The race is not to the swift."

The sense of taste includes as its species four qualities, namely, Joy (Cheerfulness), Grief (Apprehensiveness), Penitence, and Tranquillity. Dost thou not see that the greatest pleasure is derived through eating and drinking,—which is attained by means of the sense of taste? Hast thou not heard of the saying on the part of Isaac (Gen. xxvii. 25), "Bring it here unto me and I will eat of my son's venison"; and also (Ruth iii. 7), "And when Boaz had eaten and drunk, his heart was merry." Speech, consisting as it does of words, which are of a kind with (the objects of) taste, sometimes gives rise to joy; thus it is said (Prov. xv. 23), "A man hath joy by the answer of his mouth." Opposed to this we find that grief follows upon the failure to exercise this sense, as it is said (1 Sam. i. 7), "She wept and did not eat." It is also related of Jonathan (*id.* xx. 34), "He did eat no meat the second day of the month, for he

was grieved for David." Many such expressions are used with reference to Saul and others. As to the quality of penitence, the reason for referring it to (the sense of) taste is that contrition and penitence are felt for what has gone before, and one denies himself different kinds of enjoyment, which are rendered possible by means of the taste, as it is said (Hos. xiv. 1), "O Israel, return." The attributing also of the quality of tranquillity to (the sense of) taste is seen in the saying of Sennecharib (II. Kings xviii. 31), "Eat ye every man of his own vine, and every one of his fig-tree;" and again (Jud. xviii. 7), "And they saw the people that were therein, how they dwelt in safety."

The sense of touch also stands in relation to four qualities, and these are Liberality, Niggardliness, Valor, and Cowardice. Liberality in connection with touch is possible only through the action of the hand. Liberality consists in open-handedness, even as niggardliness is but closefistedness. With regard to giving, it is said (Prov. xviii. 16), "A man's gift maketh room for him, and before great men it will lead him." Of niggardliness, it is said (Prov. xiii. 11), "He that gathereth by close hand will increase." That valor is in connection with the touch is evident from the connection between seizing hold of (something) and the hand; thus it is said (Jud. v. 26), "Her hand she put forth to the nail." In opposition to this, it is said of cowardice (Isa. xxxv. 3), "Strengthen ye weak hands"; and again (Ezek. vii. 17), "All hands shall become feeble," and so forth.

It having been made clear that all the qualities of the soul are related to the five senses, let us now return to our first theme—(the elucidation of) which we have stated to be the purpose of this book. Seeing that most men are not sufficiently versed in the ruling of their qualities to enable them to regulate these according to ethical standards and a rational method, we have resolved to write a satisfactory treatise concerning this, which shall contain an account *in extenso* of the qualities, the ways in which to use them, and the mode in which to bring

about their improvement.[1] In addition to this I have met with the persistent importunity of one of my friends, who desires this as a memorial and preparation for himself and for me, in the event that conditions change in the course of time, places become disturbed and men alter. He desires also that the relationship of the qualities to the senses should be set forth. Before explaining this at all, I will make it clear to him by means of a geometrical diagram and visible proofs. Then let us first sketch a diagram of the four temperaments, which we have mentioned above. We have drawn it at the beginning of our work, in the form of a figure, so that the imagination may be quick to grasp it and the senses ready to comprehend it. We have indicated with reference to every temperament whatever are its elements, and then joined to every temperament five qualities, in accordance with the requirements of the calculation. We have joined them to whatever quality they have, in preference to any other, after having classified them in the diagram,—giving those which are hot and cold, and to which of the elements they belong, and likewise those that are moist (humid) and dry (arid), and their conjunctions and disjunctions—all this in the diagram. Of God we pray that He may put an end to the opposition (clamor) of those who, on the strength of their knowledge, enter upon a discussion with us, and that He silence the mouths of those who argue with us in their folly. I have no reason to trust that their envy will not lead them to attempt to humiliate us; yet will I not be deterred by their disturbance, nor dismayed by their brutishness. The Lord sufficeth as my portion, and in Him I trust, for He is a shield to those taking refuge with Him, the surest protection to those seeking after His help, as it is written (Lam. iii. 25), "The Lord is good unto them that wait for Him." Verily, I am innocent of that wherewith they charge me if they speak haughtily: I am too pious to be the victim of their pride, even though they occupy the foremost place, for there is no iniquity

[1] Cf. the words of Baḥya (iii. 10 and iii. 1), who has the same purpose in view; Brüll (p. 79, note 1).

in my hand. Therefore will I bear their attacks; but I do say (Ps. xxxviii. 21), "They hate me only because I pursue the good." God knows that I have not admitted into my work anything except my own thoughts and writing, nor have I busied myself with anything outside of my own ideas.[1] To those who have superior souls and lofty aspirations, their strong affection for our discourse will point out that which we have in mind; and if they alight upon any mistakes in the course of it, they will allow that my excuse is clear and evident, since in its chief parts there is good sense. This is a copy of the first diagram, which represents the elements and the temperaments:



[1] Brüll (p. 71) attaches too much importance to these words, as if they proved that Gabirol made no use of the writings of his predecessors. I take this statement to be nothing more than a disavowal of plagiarism, such as is commonly met with in the mediæval writers. Cf. N. Weisslovitz, "Prinz und Derwisch," München, 1890, p. 15, note 1.

We have arranged to refer every temperament to its element and every quality to its temperament,[1] as required by the argument, which we shall make clear in another place with the help of the Almighty, the Sufficient, may He be exalted. Having sketched this diagram as just explained, we would say here that the sum of the human qualities which we can enumerate is twenty, of which some are praiseworthy *per se*, and others blameworthy *per se*. Whosoever wishes to attain to the improvement of his qualities must pursue in his own person the goodly course so that the praiseworthy qualities come to be to him excellences, unto which he must accustom himself, from which he must not separate from the time of his youth, and whereunto he must apply himself step by step and little by little. Thus saith the sage (Prov. xxii. 6), "Train up a child in the way he should go, and when he is old he will not depart from it." The philosopher hath said, "Intelligence is a gift, moral conduct is an acquirement, but habit is master over all things." Know thou that all the qualities of man, of the possession of which he gives evidence at the period of his youth and manhood, are in him during his infancy and boyhood: though it be not in his power to manifest them, they are nevertheless within him *in potentia*, (if) not *in actu*. Thou wilt observe that in some boys the quality of pudency manifests itself, and in others impudence; some incline to enjoyment, others aspire to virtue, and still others are disposed to vices; these qualities above mentioned and others similar to them being among those of the animal soul; and when men reach unto the stage of maturity, the strength of the rational soul displays its activity and it directs him that possesses it to a proper understanding with regard to the improvement of the qualities, since it is not the practice of the animal soul to improve these. Now in addition to this proposition being susceptible of proof, it has been handed down to us by tradition in the words of the Saint (Prov. xx. 11), "Even a child is known by his doings." As to the youths whom baseness over-

[1] We meet with the same thought in Jehuda ha-Levi; cf. Dukes ("Phil.," pp. 74 and 127, notes 2 and 3).

comes, it is possible to transform them into a noble state as long as the limits of childhood have not been passed; but if they overstep the boundaries of youth and reach maturity, and continue to remain in this condition, it becomes difficult to set them along a good course, just as a sprig may be made to stand erect before it is full grown; but when it has become a tree, it is difficult to bend or move it. From this thou seest that most men when they have reached maturity cannot be turned aside from the course which in their youth they pursued, whereas most men can be directed between the periods of childhood and youth unto good habits.[1] This is the simple meaning of (Prov. xxii. 6), "Train up a child in the way he should go, and when he is old," etc. Thus, too, our Rabbis say, "At twenty years of age, one dies with it."

It is impossible that evil-doing should belong to the rational soul by nature, for this would not be in accordance with wisdom. The Deity hath created the soul pure, stainless, and simple, as saith the sage (Ecc. vii. 29), "This only have I found, that God hath made man upright." Whatever results therefrom that is not good, is the work of the vegetative soul,[2] *i.e.*, the natural impulse. A philosopher has said that, "He who clings to good qualities in order to enjoy by means of them the pleasures of his senses and (to satisfy) the necessities of his body, does not understand their true value; but he understands them who seeks after them, because he recognizes their merit and usefulness and knows that death caused by following them is better than life, based upon their opposites; and he who keeps his thoughts away from the base, lifts them up to the

[1] Rosin ("Maimonides," p. 5, note 4, and p. 65, note 3) suggests the following parallels: "Ueber die ethische Bildungsfähigkeit der Jugend," "Arist., N. E., ii. 2, im Namen Plato's nach dessen De Leg. ii.; aber auch Aristot. ohne Nennung Plato's, N. E. ii. 1, Schl. und x. 10; dazu vgl. Maim. zu Abot i. 14."

[2] This threefold division of the soul, vegetative, animal, and rational (cf. the preceding paragraph of the text), is discussed at greater length in the "Fons Vitæ"; cf. Munk (p. 200), Rosin (p. 46, note 1), and Horovitz (p. 115, note 77, and p. 117, note 82). This same division occurs in Israeli (cf. Fried, p. 37) and Kalonymos b. Kalonymos; cf. J. Landsberger, "Iggereth Baale Chajjim," Darmstadt, 1882 (p. 172, and note on p. 266).

good.". In the measure in which man separates himself from baseness does he near God, may He be exalted; and in the measure in which he nears baseness, does he separate himself from Him. Now in regard to the twenty qualities of man, David, peace be upon him, points to them and alludes to their origin in the "Psalm of David" (xxxvii.) "Contend not with thyself because of evil-doers." Of some of these he clearly treats, as may be gathered from the literal interpretation of the verse; others he indicates merely by allusions: viz., he enjoins serving God, by cultivating qualities that are praiseworthy, and inhibits the exercise of the blameworthy qualities. Furthermore, he condemns the course of those who depart from the right way, as it should be observed, and praises the course of those who rightly habituate themselves to good practice. In saying at first, "Contend not with thyself because of evil-doers," he would put an inhibition upon envy of the wicked; for, if man does not envy them, he is necessarily bound to hate them. Moreover, he warns against envy of them and jealousy of their condition, these being his words (Ps. xxxvii. 1), "Be not envious against the workers of iniquity." He enjoins trustfulness in the Lord and confidence in Him, in saying (*id.*, xxxvii. 3), "Trust in the Lord and do good." Furthermore, he alludes to the exercise of the qualities of pudency and modesty (*id.*, xxxvii. 3), "So shalt thou dwell in the land and feed in faithfulness." His saying, first, "So shalt thou dwell in the land," and then "and feed in faithfulness," shows that long life on earth is the result of cultivating humility and pudency, which he calls "faith," as thou knowest from the saying (Num. xii. 7), "He is faithful in all my house," and that which preceded in the description of modesty. That which we have said of the meriting of life, even long life on earth, corresponds to the expression (Ps. xxxvii. 11), "The meek shall inherit the earth." In saying (*id.*, 4), "Delight thyself also in the Lord," he alludes to the quality of joy, which the righteous exercises in that service of the Lord, wherein he delights. Thus he says elsewhere (Ps. xxxii. 11), "Be glad in the Lord and rejoice, O ye

righteous"; again, he says of the season of gladsome tidings (Isa. lxi. 10), "I will greatly rejoice in the Lord." In saying (Ps. xxxvii. 4), "He shall give thee the desires of thine heart," he alludes to the quality of yearning which is love, for God satisfies the yearning of the righteous, as is promised them in the saying (Ps. xx. 6), "The Lord will fulfil all thy desires." The words, "Cease from anger" are to be taken literally; they forbid giving way to violent anger and wrath. To "Cease from anger and forsake wrath" requires, first, the uprooting thereof, and, second, penitence for what has gone before. "The meek shall inherit the earth." These are the lowly,—viewing the verse literally. In saying (Ps. xxxvii. 12), "The wicked plotteth against the just and gnasheth upon him with his teeth," he alludes to the use which the wicked make of impudence and recklessness. In saying (*id.*, 13), "The Lord shall laugh at him," he means that He will destroy the impudent one and cause the righteous to rejoice in his destruction; thus it is said (Ps. lviii. 11), "The righteous shall rejoice when he seeketh vengeance." In saying (*id.*, 14), "The wicked have unsheathed the sword," he alludes to the fervor and the daring which they (the wicked) display. In saying (*id.*, 14), "To slay such as be of upright conduct," he alludes to the quality of hard-heartedness which prevails over all their (other) qualities. In saying (*id.*, 15), "Their bows shall be broken," he hints at the quality of pride; similarly it is said of a "brazen-faced nation" (Jer. vi. 23), "They shall lay hold of bow and spear." In saying (*id.*, 17), "The arms of the wicked shall be broken," he means that the quality of faint-heartedness takes possession of them when their youth and strength are enfeebled, so that they cannot raise their arms at all. In saying (*id.*, 21), "The wicked borroweth and payeth not," he alludes to the quality of niggardliness. In saying (*id.*, 21), "The righteous showeth mercy and giveth," he has in mind the two qualities which dwell in the soul of the righteous, namely, mercy and liberality. Concluding his enumeration of these qualities, he seals them with the quality of good-will.

We would say that when man pursues the right course in reference to these twenty qualities, *i.e.*, in the manner in which we have described the exercise of those that are praiseworthy, and the putting aside of those that are blameworthy, then God becomes well pleased with him, as it is said (*id.*, 23), "The steps of a good man are ordered by the Lord." Let not man suppose that the passage, "The steps of a good man are ordered by the Lord" implies any compulsion[1] to obedience (to God)

[1] Thus briefly Gabirol may be said to urge the doctrine of free-will, and to express his opposition to the Asharitic teachings in respect of predestination. Cf. Maimonides (Wolff, p. 55 *et seq.* and pp. 94, 95, notes 36, 37), who acknowledges the influence exerted by the physical temperament, which predisposes, without predetermining, the soul to certain lines of action and modes of being. Maimonides proceeds to demonstrate the futility of commanding, instructing, rewarding or punishing him who lacks "freedom of choice." Wolff (p. 94, note 36) is right in saying that the doctrine of the freedom of the will (בחירה) is one of the fundamental principles of Judaism. He cites Philo and Maimonides,—the latter closely follows Aristotle; cf. Introduction (p. 11, note 1), Rosin (pp. 167, 168), and Dukes (pp. 57–62). Saadya devotes the fourth chapter of his "Emunoth weDeoth" to the advocacy of the doctrine of free-will; cf. Guttmann (Saadya, pp. 163–174). Bahya devotes the eighth section of the third chapter of his "Hoboth ha-lebaboth" to an exposition of his understanding of the freedom of will with which man is endowed; *vide* Kaufmann *in loco*. According to Frankel-Grün (chap. ii. pp. 35–41, and Kusari, v. 20, 25), freedom of the will constitutes one of the most important bases of religion in the judgment of Jehuda ha-Levi. Joseph ibn Zaddik is likewise an exponent of this doctrine; cf. Jellinek ("Der Mikrokosmos," p. 60), and Rosin ("Maimonides," p. 18, notes 4 and 5). According to Rosin ("Maimonides," pp. 23, 24), Abraham ibn Daud is no less pronounced in his advocacy of the freedom of the will, as well as Abraham ibn Ezra (p. 73, note 4). An admirable survey of the question is given by Rosin ("Maimonides," pp. 62–76). According to Joel ("Die Religionsphilosophie des Lewi ben Gerson," p. 54, and "Milhamot Adonai," tractate iii., chap. 4), Gersonides was obliged, without acknowledging it, to sacrifice a part of divine omniscience in order to save human freedom. Hasdai may be said to be the one notable protestant against the freedom of the will; cf. M. Joel, "Don Chasdai Creskas' religionsphilosophische Lehren" (Breslau, 1866, pp. 46, 47), "Or Adonai" (tractate ii., part 5, chap. 4), and Ph. Bloch ("Die Willensfreiheit von Chasdai Kreskas," München, 1879). Moses of Narbonne wrote a treatise, המאמר בבחירה, in order to disprove the fatalistic doctrine expounded in the work of a contemporary, אגרת הנזירה; cf. Beer (pp. 114, 2, 3, 40–42). This entire problem has found fairly comprehensive treatment at the hands of Stein, who shows Saadya, Bahya, Jehuda ha-Levi, Abraham ibn Daud, Maimonides, Gersonides, Moses of Narbonne, Aaron of Nicomedia, and Joseph Albo to have been at one in their acceptance of what may truly be called the Jewish dogma of the freedom of the will. Evidently overlook-

or disobedience; (it does point) however, to the bliss and misery (which are their respective reward and punishment). In saying, "The steps of a good man are ordered by the Lord," he means that God created his soul perfect, not wanting in anything; and when it inclines to virtue, to wholesome practice and good conduct, the expression "are ordered" implies that he merits the approval of God; and this is meant by the expression (*id.*, 23), "And He delighteth in his way." As a result of what we have said, it is clear that David, peace be upon him, in these hints, gives a description of the way in which to improve the qualities of the human soul and to accustom it to virtuous practice in the same manner as Solomon the Wise has done in his writings, wherein he urges (men) to effect their improvement in every possible manner,—as I shall indicate, please God, exalted may He be. Following our argument, we shall proceed to describe the method of the diagram, which we have drawn, of the senses and the qualities, and (in the course of the description), we will explain how the qualities originate in the senses, uniting every individual to its species, and every species to its genus, *i.e.*, we will make clear the nature of the qualities derived from the sense of sight and their quantity; so also those derived from the sense of hearing, and the remaining senses in the same way. It will be a tabular diagram, so that it may easily be grasped by beginners in the study of this science, and those desirous of procuring the benefit thereof, those asking help of God in order that they may bring about their improvement, with the help of abstract (exact) and concrete (worldly) sciences. This is the form of the tabular diagram, which is devised in order to illus-

ing the passage to which our note is appended, Stein confessedly omits to treat of Gabirol (p. 22), "da er in seinem einseitigen Neuplatonismus unserer Frage . . . gar keine Beachtung widmet." Cf. Schmiedl (pp. 24–26). L. Knoller ("Das Problem der Willensfreiheit in der älteren jüdischen Religionsphilosophie des Mittelalters." Leipzig, 1884) goes over the same ground as Stein, taking up in turn Saadya, Baḥya, ha-Levi, Ibn Zaddik, Ibn Daud, and Maimonides, but likewise omits to discuss Gabirol's view with reference to the freedom of the will, giving his reason for the omission (p. 15, note 1).

trate the branching forth of the twenty qualities from the five senses:

Sight.[1]	*Hearing.*
Pride.	Love.
Meekness.	Hate.
Pudency.	Mercy.
Impudence.	Hard-heartedness (Cruelty).
Smell.	*Taste.*
Wrath.	Joy (Cheerfulness).
Good-will (Suavity).	Grief (Apprehensiveness).
Jealousy.	Tranquillity.
Wideawakedness.	Penitence (Remorse).

Touch.

Liberality.
Niggardliness.
Valor.
Cowardice.

Having attained what we desired in the matter of the representation of the figures, let us now conclude this introduction to our work by enumerating its divisions and its chapters. We have named our work, "The Improvement of the Qualities," for the benefit largely of the masses, in order that they may gain a knowledge of the nature of the noble, and understand this matter through various methods of expression (illustration). We have introduced in the following whatever logical and demonstrable arguments have occurred to us; and, furthermore, as far as we are able, have adduced Scriptural verses. Nor, after first giving these, do I see any harm in briefly citing some utterances of the wise;[2] and I shall follow this by adorning (what I have said) with "rejez" verses of litterateurs, and some verses from the poets, and anything uncommon that occurs to me, and whatever else I can recall, so that my book may be complete in all its parts.

Perhaps the reader of this will, in his magnanimity and

[1] This classification is not unlike the one to be found in Dieterici ("Logik," p. 148), which gives a list of praiseworthy and blameworthy "Charackterzüge," such as "Hochmuth, Gier, Neid."

[2] Cf. Bahya; Brüll (p. 77, note 1).

highmindedness, excuse my not having exhausted my theme, for my aim in composing this book was not to benefit him who surpasses me in talent at this time, since I do not lay claim, God forbid, to superiority in any department of science. Verily, the fruit which I have plucked from wisdom is my knowledge that I am not wise, that I must not abandon the counsel of my contemporaries, and that I must acknowledge to them my weakness. I would be, in that case, as the saying goes, "as one who tends a garden well when it is in its full bloom; or like one who heaps up brocaded stuffs boastfully in the presence of those who make them." The clearest ground for excusing me, in that I have not exhausted my theme, and the surest reason for omitting to blame me for not having completed it to the very end,[1] is that we live at the present time amid evil and distress, an uninterrupted succession of troubles and disquieting circumstances; but I complain not. Despite this, I do not cease to praise our Creator, exalted may He be, for the grace which He has vouchsafed to us, and for having enlightened our understanding and our judgment, causing us to find the way in which to comprehend something of the sciences.

I have divided my work into five parts, every part containing four chapters, which makes a total of twenty chapters, the number contained in the diagram. To every part I have joined the sense belonging to it, and to every sense whatever qualities belong to it. These are the parts of the work, to wit, five, corresponding to the five senses already mentioned.

[1] Despite his voluntary acknowledgment of incompleteness, it is interesting to note the critical remark of Abraham ibn Hasdai (as pointed out by Steinschneider, "H. U.," p. 342), respecting Gabirol's "Ethics"; מאזני צדק. ed. J. Goldenthal, Leipzig and Paris, 1839, Preface. p. 3. והחכם גבור הלשון ר' שלמה בן גבירול חבר חבור יקר מאד וקראו תקון מדות הנפש אבל הלך בו על דרך הקצור כמו כן דלא השלימו על הראוי לפי דעת רוב המשכילים. Cf. Rosin (p. 166, note 1) and Dukes (p. 119, note 2 and "Ehrensäulen," p. 11).

PART I.

The sense of sight, containing four chapters.

Chapter I., treating of the quality of pride.

Chapter II., treating of the quality of meekness, and urging the exercise thereof.

Chapter III., treating of pudency and modesty.

Chapter IV., treating of impudence and the refraining therefrom.

PART II.

The sense of hearing, comprising four chapters.

Chapter I., treating of love and the methods of exercising it.

Chapter II., treating of hate, the thrusting aside thereof, and the abandonment of any leaning toward it.

Chapter III., treating of the quality of mercy and compassion, the praise of those possessed of it, and the encouragement to choose it.

Chapter IV., treating of the quality of hard-heartedness and the relinquishment of any leaning toward it.

PART III.

The sense of taste, comprising four chapters.

Chapter I., treating of the quality of joy and the methods of exercising it.

Chapter II., treating of grief and consolation for sorrow.

Chapter III., treating of tranquillity.

Chapter IV., treating of penitence and guarding against (the need of) it.

PART IV.

The sense of smell, containing four chapters.

Chapter I., treating of the quality of anger and wrath.
Chapter II., treating of good-will and cheerfulness.
Chapter III., treating of jealousy and envy.
Chapter IV., treating of the quality of wide-awakedness.

PART V.

The sense of touch, embracing four chapters: thus completing the twenty chapters of the book.

Chapter I., treating of liberality and generosity.
Chapter II., treating of the quality of niggardliness and the dispraise thereof.
Chapter III., treating of valor and the exercise thereof.
Chapter IV., treating of cowardice and the guarding against it.

Having finished numbering the parts of the book and its chapters, let us now begin to explain it all, with the help of God, exalted may He be. We pray that He lead us in the paths of rectitude, and by His grace bring us near unto the ways of uprightness. Thus His Saint besought Him (Ps. xxv. 5), "Lead me in Thy truth."

PART I

CHAPTER I.

Treating of Pride (Haughtiness).

How good it is that this chapter happens to be the first of all the chapters, as required by the connection. For I have seen many of the elect exercise this quality unnecessarily and give it preference over their other qualities; so much so, that the masses take it unto themselves and make use of it in cases where it is needless to do so, until it gains the upper hand over their nature. I also observe this quality frequently present in young men, *i.e.*, in the child and the youth, especially if the temperament happen to be "yellow-hot." For it is characteristic of the yellow gall to rise. In its excitement it accustoms the nature of man to exercise this quality until he almost comes to exercise it amid circumstances unsuited to its appearance. Among the special branches of this quality are vanity (presumptuousness), boastfulness, and haughtiness. These are not (included) among the qualities of the ancient saints, of whom their noble virtues testified that they were opposed to them. Now, as we see, some men, who were known to exercise these qualities out of place, have thereby become despicable. Others aim to exercise the praiseworthy aspects of the quality of Pride, and are praised therefor. I shall not go to the length of recounting their names, for they are well known. This being so, we must carefully consider how to acquire the means of exercising this quality in the right place, and subduing it out of season; and we must make mention of the loathing, which ensues as a result of its blameworthiness.

When we perceive this quality beginning to affect the nature of a man, it becomes necessary for us to call his attention to serious matters, such as lead to reflection on the origin of existent things and their end, *i.e.*, the coming into being of things, their beginnings, their transitoriness, and their destruction. When he learns that all existent things are changeable,[1] and finally that his own being will change (waste away) and his body become extinct, then the quality of his soul, which was haughty throughout the course of his life, will become meek and penitent at (the thought of) death. Since we are forced to accept this logical conclusion and traditional reasoning, it behooves the wise man to avoid preferring this quality of his own free will, since it is detestable and there results no benefit whatever from pursuing it. On the contrary, it is the cause of many dangers, especially if man's arrogance urge him not to incline to the advice of any man; and although in (seeking) advice is the essence of good counsel, he turn away from it and abide by his own opinion. Of such a man Solomon the Wise, peace be upon him, said (Prov. xii. 15), "The way of a fool is right in his own eyes." Thou knowest also what befell Korach and Rehoboam and others like them, who cared only for their own opinion. Man must remember that if he realize not his own sins but consider his course correct, there will surely befall him what befell them. Concerning this the sage saith (Prov. xvi. 2), "All the ways of a man are clean in his own eyes, but the Lord weigheth the spirits"; and he saith of pride (*id.* xvi. 18), "Pride goeth before destruction," *i.e.*, the result of pride and pomp is overthrow and degradation. Thus it happened to Pharaoh, who said (Ex. v. 2), "Who is the Lord?" and Goliath when he spake (1 Sam. xvii. 10), "I defy the armies of Israel;" and Sennacherib for his boastfulness in saying (II Kings xviii. 35), "Who are they among all the gods of the countries"; and Nebuchadnezzar in that he said (Dan. iii. 15), "Who is that God that shall deliver you out of my hands?" and others who follow them in the manner of their speech

[1] Cf. Baḥya vi. 5 (p. 297), and Brüll (p. 75, note 2).

and whose end was complete abasement and utter obscurity. Whosoever is in this state is not secure from error and sin. Thus saith the sage (Prov. xxi. 24), "Proud and haughty scorner is his name." He mentions craftiness, because it is the source of boastfulness. Whoever acts in this wise ought to be ashamed, and remember that according to the measure of his superciliousness will he experience contempt, and in proportion to his power will humiliation suddenly befall him. Thus the sage saith (*id.*, xxix. 23), "A man's pride shall bring him low," *i.e.*, boastfulness and arrogance are the main causes of man's humiliation, and these, by my life, are characteristic of the wicked, as he saith (*id.*, xxi. 4), "A high look and a proud heart." Some of the proud vaunt themselves in the exercise of this blameworthy quality, because they delight therein (and try to excuse themselves by) arguing, that the soul inclines to distinction, and finds lowliness irksome. Again, they hold that domineering (supremacy) strengthens it, while submission weakens it, and were there no domination, the world would not be well adjusted.[1] They further say that the prayers of the excellent had the attainment thereof in view when they said (Gen. xxvii. 29), "Let people serve thee and nations bow down to thee." Yea, in this way God distinguished His prophet when He spake to him (Gen. xxxv. 11), "And kings shall come out of thy loins." On the other hand, he punished those who deserved punishment by humbling their power; thus it is said (Isa. ix. 14), "Therefore the Lord will cut off from Israel head and foot, branch and rush in one day," and so forth. Simpletons, discussing this superciliousness, do not consider that, when they resort thereto, their souls become unduly great, that they overstep their bounds, become overbearing toward their relatives, turn away from their companions, deride the advice of

[1] Guttmann ("Saadya," pp. 276, 277, note 2, Emunoth we-Deoth, x. 9) points out that Gabirol closely follows the teaching of Saadya with respect to the love of dominion; it is worthy of notice that Gabirol quotes the same scriptural passages. S. Landauer (pp. xix.–xxi. of his introduction to the Arabic text of Saadya's work) holds that this chapter, the tenth, is a later addition to the book; cf. D. S. A. Taubeles ("Saadia Gaon," Halle, 1888, p. 32, note 43).

every man, for as much as they rely upon their own opinions and go their own way. But when it is so exercised as to keep one away from baseness, to enable one to rise unto the excellences, and to be firm in devotion to God, exalted be He,—which is His highest gift, exalted and magnified may He be, to His servants,—then this becomes the means whereby men gain the grace of God and reach the everlasting kingdom. Of these it is said (Job xxxvi. 7), "He withdraweth not his eyes from the righteous, but with kings are they on the throne; yea, he doth establish them forever, and they are exalted." But he, who resorts to superciliousness unnecessarily and takes only his own counsel, is like him of whom it was said (Prov. xviii. 1), "He intermeddleth with all wisdom." Men disregard such a man and desire not his presence: of such as these the sage saith (Prov. xxvi. 16), "The sluggard is wiser in his own conceit than seven men that can render a reason." And often, moreover, his vanity impels him to undertake something outside of his usual course of action, because he relies upon his opinion saving him and upon his counsel protecting him. It is this that causes him to stumble; thus it is said (Job v. 12), "He disappointeth the devices of the crafty, so that their hands cannot perform their enterprise." Having progressed thus far in our description of the quality of superciliousness, the way in which to make use thereof moderately, and the mode of suppressing its use in the wrong place, we must now proceed to quote very sparingly a few prose utterances of the wise concerning this quality, and whatever verses concerning it we can.

The divine[1] Socrates said: "From whom doth disappointment never part? He who seeks a rank for which his ability is too feeble." Again he said, "He who sets himself up as wise will be set down by others for a fool." I hold that bad manners are attributable to superciliousness. Socrates said, "Aversion is always felt for him who has an evil nature, so that men flee away from him." Aristotle says, "As the beauty of

[1] The appellation "divine," as applied to Socrates and other Greek philosophers, was not uncommon; cf. Schmiedl (pp. 263, 264).

form is a light for the body, so is beauty of character a light for the soul." Again he said in his testament to Alexander his pupil, "It does not show much nobility of purpose on the part of a king to lord it over men; (the less so) for one man over a fellow-man." A certain haughty man is said to have been journeying along with his effects; some of them fell down, whereupon he threw the others out of the wagon. The ancients say, "With him who is pleased with himself, many become displeased." A poet[1] composed these lines concerning the blameworthiness of haughtiness and arrogance:

"Let him who shows great vanity concerning his beauty consider this! If men would but consider what is within them, neither young nor old would feel proud. Are there not in the head of every son of man five orifices from which come forth effluvia? The nose exudes, the ear gives forth an unpleasant odor, the eye sheds tears, and the mouth salivates. O son of earth, to be consumed of earth on the morrow, desist from thy pride, for thou wilt be food and drink (to the earth)!"

It is told of Ardeshir,[2] the king, that he gave a book to a man accustomed to stand at his side, and said unto him, "When thou seest me become violently angry give it to me," and in the book (was written), "Restrain thyself, for thou art not God; thou art but a body, one part of which is on the point of consuming the other, and in a short while it will turn into the worm and dust and nothingness."

[1] The Arabic verses, printed in our text, were not translated into Hebrew by Jehuda ibn Tibbon, the translator of the work. He left them untranslated, with a view to making good at a later time the omission by some Hebrew verses of Gabirol or the verses of another. Cf. Appendix A. p. 106 and Munk (note 4 to p. 167). This purpose was never carried out; cf. Steinschneider ("H. U.," p. 382), and "Ermahnungsschreiben," p. 9 (through a misprint the number ix. reads xi.), who had expected to publish these verses. The citing of these Arabic verses by Gabirol is taken by Steinschneider (Introduction, "J. Q. R.," xii., p. 609) to show that some Jews must have been versed in this part of Arabic literature.

[2] Called an "Indian King" in the "Choice of Pearls" (No. 538, and note 175). Cf. Steinschneider ("H. U.," p. 388, note 130, and p. 881, note 193), also Dukes (p. 72).

CHAPTER II.[1]

Treating of Meekness.[2]

This quality is more nearly a virtue than that which was mentioned just before, because the possessor of this attribute, *i.e.*, modesty and humility, withholds his desire from seeking gratification. When one attains this precious rank, the praiseworthy character in man is made perfect. This, in my opinion, is a disposition which merits praise for him who acquires it. Verily, he is accorded the loftiest praise. Dost thou not see that humility is the highest degree of the nobles and of the prophets, distinguished by their divine rank?[3] One of them said (Gen. xviii. 27), "I am but dust and ashes"; another said (Ps. xxii. 7), "I am a worm and no man"; and so forth. They were praised for their actions and were honored. A man of intelligence should know that lowliness and meekness cause him to realize his desire in regard to present things, as thou knowest from the account of what happened to the captains of Achaziah, because of their folly; and what happened to the third captain who gently spake to Elijah (II Kings i. 13), "I pray thee let my life and the life of these thy fifty servants be precious in thy sight." Him there befell the reverse of what had befallen the former. Verily, fame and glory will be the reward of whosoever is lowly. The recompense of meekness is honor and prosperity, and also the deserving of honor. Thus it is said (Prov. xxii. 4), "The reward of humility and the fear of God are riches, and honor, and life."

The most excellent of the ancient nobles (may God guide thee aright) were accustomed to exercise the quality of meek-

[1] This chapter is given in a German translation, based on the Hebrew text, in Winter and Wünsche (vol. ii., pp. 727, 728), being copied from Dukes (pp. 113–115).

[2] Cf. the chapter on ענוה, in "Emunah Ramah" (ed. S. Weil, Frankfort, 1852).

[3] Cf. Bahya, vi. 8 and 10; Brüll (p. 75, note 1).

ness, and preferred it to their natural impulses. It is related of an illustrious king,[1] that one night while a number of people were assembled about him, he arose to trim the lamp. Whereupon it was said to him, "Why didst thou not utter a command, which would have sufficed?" And he answered them, "As king I rose, and as king I resume my seat." He was wont to say that "Every grace (of man) is envied, except meekness." The philosopher Buzurjmihr[2] said, "The fruits of lowliness are love and tranquillity." Know thou that in honoring his brother or his neighbor, man honors himself. Some one has remarked that "lowliness consists in being beforehand with greetings to whomsoever one may meet, and in descending to the lowest rank." Contentment is of a kind with this quality. When one is gifted with its presence, he has already gained superiority. It is said, "Whomsoever the Lord loveth he inspireth with contentment." Scripture says of the contented servant of God (Prov. xiii. 25), "The righteous eateth to the satisfying of the soul." And it says of the reverse, "But the belly of the wicked shall want." He who possesses strength, health, and a sense of security ought never to feel sad. The fruit of contentment is tranquillity.[3] The greatest riches are contentment and patience. One of the sages has said, "He who desires of this world only that which is sufficient for him, will be content with the very least thereof." Another sage was wont to admonish his son, "He who cannot bear with one word, will be compelled to listen to many. He who esteems his rank but slightly, enhances men's estimation of his dignity." In holding the view that it may be right (at times) to repudiate this qual-

[1] Dukes (p. 114, note 2) points out that this tale is cited in Ibn Khallikan (i. 526), the King being there called Caliph Omar.

[2] Cf. Steinschneider ("H. U.," p. 382, and "J. Q. R.," xii., p. 606, note 3; the reference to the "Ethics" in the same page should be i. 2, not i. 3); Dukes ("Blumenlese," p. 60, note 3), and Landsberger (as above cited, p. 223, note to p. 18).

[3] Gabirol's demonstration that patience and contentment are the offshoots of pudency is shown by Brüll (p. 75, note 3) to have been copied almost literally by Bahya, vi. 10 (p. 311).

ity, I mean thereby that a man should not abase himself before the wicked. With reference to such a case it is said (Prov. xxv. 26), "A righteous man, falling down before the wicked, is as a troubled fountain and a corrupt stream." It was said concerning this, "He who deserves (the greatest) compassion is the wise man lost among fools." In the ethical sayings of Lokman[1] (we find), "When the noble man forsakes the world, he becomes humble: the ignoble in forsaking the world becomes haughty." In the book of al-Ḳuṭi[2] (it is said), "Be humble without cringing, and manly without being arrogant. Know thou that arrogance is a wilderness and haughtiness a taking refuge therein, and, altogether, a going astray."

[1] Cf. Steinschneider ("H. U.," p. 853). In general see V. Chauvin, "Bibliographie des Ouvrages Arabes," iii., Louqmâne et les Fabulistes, Paris, 1898. Dukes ("Phil.," p. 161) cites a similar passage attributed to Ibn Ahnaf.

[2] Gabirol refers to an Arabic paraphrase of the Psalms by one Ḥefeṣ al-Ḳuṭi. Cf. Neubauer ("R. E. J.," xxx., pp. 65–69), and Steinschneider ("H. U.," p. 382, note 99, and "J. Q. R.," xiii., p. 312). Cf. also Dukes (p. 105), who (p. 116, note 2) instances a number of parallels to this maxim of Lokman in the writings of Maimonides, al-Gazzali, etc.

CHAPTER III.

On the Qualities of Pudency and Modesty.

A wise man was asked, "What is intelligence?" and he answered, "Modesty." Again he was asked, "What is modesty?" and he replied, "Intelligence." This quality, although like unto meekness and agreeing therewith, is of a nobler rank than the latter, for it is kindred to intelligence. To every man of understanding the nobility of the intellect is patent, for it is the dividing line between man and beast, in that it masters man's natural impulses and subdues passion. With the help of intelligence man realizes the benefit of knowledge and gets to understand the true nature of things; he comes to acknowledge the Unity of God, to worship his Master, and to bear a striking resemblance to the character of the angels.[1] Since this precious quality is of so noble a kind, it follows that modesty which resembles it is almost equally so. The proof of its being thus related is, that thou wilt never see a modest man lacking intelligence, or an intelligent man devoid of modesty. This being so, man must direct all his efforts to the attainment of this wonderful and highly considered quality.

He must prefer it to all his natural impulses, and regard it as superior to all his other qualities, for by means of it he acquires many virtues, and all vice becomes hidden from him. Thus it is said, "The faults of him, whom modesty clothes with dignity, will not be remarked by men." Dignity and honor follow upon him. Thus it is said (Prov. xv. 33), "Before honor is humility." The meek find acceptance before God because of their modesty; He brings them unto everlasting bliss. Con-

[1] As to the advantages which accrue to man by reason of his intelligence, cf. Bahya, ii. 5 (p. 114), and Brüll (p. 74, note 2).

cerning him who understands its ways, it is said (Ps. xxv. 9), "The meek will He guide in judgment: and the meek will He teach His way." Even as it is necessary that the intelligent man be pudent in the presence of others, so must he be pudent when alone. It was said that, "Pudency and faith are interdependent, and either cannot be complete without the other." A poet said, "Keep guard over thy modesty: truly pudency marks the countenance of a nobleman." It is said that "Impudence and a lack of pudency are offshoots of unbelief." He who wishes to acquire pudency should associate with those who are modest with respect to him. An Arab was wont to say, "Pay no regard to any man unless he show thee that he cannot do without thee, even when thou needest him most, so that, if thou sin, he will forgive and act as though he were the sinner; and, if thou wrong him, he will demean himself as though he had been the offender." Another said, "Finally, one learns from the words of prophecy, 'If thou art not pudent, do whatsoe'er thou wilt.'" In the course of a characterization of modesty, the poet said,

"Upon him reposes the mantel of piety: and, in truth, a light streams from between his eyes."

Al-fadil says: "By reason of belief and piety, men dwell together for a time. Afterward they are kept together by reason of modesty, pudency, and blamelessness." Aristotle said in his discourse, "As a result of modesty (one's) helpers are multiplied." He was accustomed to say, "In chaste children modesty clearly rules over their countenance." It was termed pudency[1] only because it is the way to eternal life. A philosopher said, "Modesty asserts itself in the midst of wrath." Again it was said, "The enmity of the modest man is less harmful to thee than the friendship of the fool." He who desires to guard this quality should not trifle away his dignity when asked to serve men, for when thou hast once worn out thy dignity, thou wilt find no one to renew it for thee. To make use of pudency (that is, to be overpudent),

[1] Play upon the similarity of the words "pudency" and "life" in the Arabic.

in speaking the truth or enjoining good acts, in spreading religion and devotion, is blameworthy. In such cases one must not make use of it; thus the saint said (Ps. cxix. 46), "I will speak of thy testimonies also before kings, and will not be ashamed."* But it is necessary for man to cover his face with the mantle of modesty before all men, as thou knowest from the case of Saul when he hid himself, (as) it is written (1 Sam. x. 23), "Behold he is hidden among the vessels." God selected him for kingship, as it is written (1 Sam. x. 24), "Behold whom the Lord hath chosen." To sum up, according to the opinion of the philosophers and the sages, this quality is one of the virtues of the noble soul, and its relation to these is as that of the spirit to the body. A philosopher said, "Modesty consists in conducting affairs in the best way wherein it is possible for them to be conducted, and in leaving them in their best aspects." He who is modest will attain to power.

CHAPTER IV.

Treating of the Quality of Impudence.

We had much to say on the praiseworthiness of the quality of pudency, but the quantity of blame which we shall mete out to the quality of impudence is small. He who is possessed of the quality of shamelessness is culpable in the eyes of God, as are those of whom it is said (Jer. v. 3), "They have made their faces harder than a rock; they have refused to return." The Saint says with reference to the impudent (Prov. xi. 2), "When pride cometh, then cometh shame," which means that when impudence prevails over the qualities of man, he is scorned by men and not respected. He is not taken seriously, nor is he regarded with that consideration for his wisdom, even though he be learned, which is paid to the pudent. Thus it is written (*ib.*), "But with the lowly is wisdom." If one is wise and desires to pursue the goodly course which is acceptable unto God, let him abandon this quality, refrain from exercising it, and keep it afar from the character of his soul. Of him who is impudent the prince saith (*id.* xxi. 24), "Proud and haughty scorner is his name," by which he means that God will requite according to his doing, whosoever is impudent, as it is written (*ib.*), "Who dealeth in proud wrath." It is possible also that "Who dealeth in proud wrath" refers to such an impudent one as, by reason of the quality of impudence, provokes the displeasure and annoyance of others, and so forth. When this disposition becomes part of man's nature, whosoever is familiar with him must turn him away from it by rebuking him as much as he is able, and by annoying him, until he be rid of all that was in him. Thus it is said (*id.* xxi. 29), "A wicked man hardeneth his face." Yet impudence (boldness)

may be commendable when supporting religion, when performing "service" and speaking the truth. But to oppose thereby the righteous and the Prophets of God is reprehensible. Thus it is said (Ez. ii. 4), "Impudent children and stiff-hearted." If the man who practises this quality be of a yellow (bilious) constitution, and if in the course of his youth he give strong evidence of its possession, he must oppose to it its very reverse. Let him trust in God, and he will accustom himself to avoid this blameworthy quality and subdue it.

(END OF PART I.)

PART II.

CHAPTER I.

On the Quality of Love.

It is almost impossible for any man to be secure from this "accident," O God, save he whose intellect is master over his nature. None such exists; and if any (be found to) exist, he is undoubtedly one of the most excellent (men). Lust is a constituent element in the nature of man, and if he desire to be master and ruler, let him cast away lust (passion), make no use of it whatever, ignore it and do without it, for it is one of the baser qualities. It is well known that the qualities of the wise are not perfected until their souls gain the mastery over their desires. The deeds of him whose intellect prevails over his lustfulness are commendable. Upon the realization of desires, there ensues the penalty of misfortune. One of the signs of him, who is overcome by his lust, is that he is very changeable, restless, and fickle of speech. Especially if, added to this, the bloody temper prevail in his constitution and he be in the period of youth and the season of spring, then it proves too strong for him. Therefore the wise man must shrink from this quality lest he make use of it and turn away from it, for there is connected with it no inconsiderable harm. Thou knowest how contempt, obscurity, and abasement come upon its devotee, and that finally its outcome is evil. This thou knowest from the story of Amnon and what happened to him when he hastened after his desire. Man ought to employ this quality only in the service of God and His divine Law, as it is written (Ps. i. 2), "And his delight is in the law of the Lord," and again (*id.*,

cxix. 97), "How I love thy law," etc. Necessarily, one who occupies himself with the quest of knowledge and moral science (theoretical science and the practical arts), will be (so busy as to be) kept from his lusts. The wise one said, "If aught befall thee and no one occur to thee whom thou mightest consult with reference thereto, avoid it and bring it not near to thy passion, for passion is an enemy of the heart." And he said, "He who is submissive to his lust is routed, and he who rebels against it gains the victory." This quality is preferred by foolish men only because of the imminence (immediateness) of its delight and for the sake of the amusement and merriment and the hearing of mirthful songs which they get through it. They heed not the suffering and the wretchedness that follow in its train, and therefore incline in accord with their natural impulses to the attainment of present pleasure, as it is said (Prov. xiii. 19), "The desire accomplished is sweet to the soul"—turning aside from wisdom and the service of the Lord, because of what appears to be the remoteness of the delight and pleasurableness of these things. Verily, in their opinion, these are remote. Yet these are not remote, but near at hand. They are remote only in their mind. Therefore man must devote this quality of love to God, exalted may He be, as it is written (Deut. xi. 1), "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God"; and to his soul, as it is written (I Sam. xx. 17), "For he loved him as he loved his own soul"; to his relatives, as it is written (Gen. xxix. 18), "And Jacob loved Rachel"; to his offspring, as it is written (*id.*, xxxvii. 3), "Israel loved Joseph"; to his country, as it is written (Num. x. 30), "But I will depart to my own land and to my kindred"; to his companion, as spake David to Jonathan (II Sam. i. 26), "Very pleasant hast thou been unto me"; to his wife (Prov. v. 19), "Let her be as the loving hind and the pleasant roe"; to wisdom, as it is written (Prov. xxix. 3), "The man that loveth wisdom rejoiceth his father." The moral application of this quality is, man must evince it (in his dealings) with all men. It has been said, "He who desires to be endeared to men should conduct himself with regard to them in

the best possible manner. Benefit occasions love even as injury begets hatred." Moreover, included under this quality are wishes and unattainable desires. It is right for the man of understanding that he train himself (to keep aloof) therefrom. The following is part of what the poets have said concerning such wishes as cannot be realized, and wherefrom the soul realizes naught except possibly weariness of spirit, continual disquietude, and protracted restlessness:

"My day is a day which is common to men until the darkness of the night is fallen, and then my couch wearies me. I spent my day in entertainment and in desire but the night brought me altogether to grief."

Among other things which have been said with reference to devoting one's self wholly to pleasure and passion, the blameworthy outcome of this, and the trouble which is associated therewith, the poet says:

"We have drunk of the dregs of the wine as if we were kings of the two Iraks and the sea; but when the sun shone brightly, thou mightest have found me with my riches flown, and poverty once more my own."

When this quality obtains the mastery of the soul, the senses become blunted and man is not conscious because of his being given over to pleasure. He is as those of whom it is said (Isa. v. 20), "Woe unto them that call evil good and good evil." The maxim of the sage is, "Thy love of anything renders thee blind and deaf." One sage, writing to another on the subject of subduing the lusts, said, "Thou shalt not attain what thou lovest until thou suffer much from what thou loathest. And thou shalt not be delivered from that which thou loathest, until thou suffer much through that which thou lovest."

CHAPTER II.

(Treating of) Hatè.

Thou shouldst know that he who hates men is hated by them, and when this quality takes firm hold of the soul, it destroys it, because it leads to the hatred of the very food and drink with which man sustains life. Besides, he suffers injury through the hostility of men. When excessive love is expended on other than divine things, it is changed into the most violent hatred. As thou knowest from the expression (II Sam. xiii. 15), "Then Amnon hated her exceedingly." He who loves thee for some reason will turn his back, simultaneously with its disappearance and ending. Thou must not trust in the counsel of the enemy, the "Hater." Thus it is written (Prov. xxvii. 6), "The kisses of an enemy are deceitful." From this quality there branches out fretfulness. Thou knowest how the prevalence of fretfulness has been censured, the blameworthiness which attaches to its use and the repugnance the soul feels therefor. It has been said that the fretful cannot abide by one state; he has not a friend; his circumstances are always disturbed, and misery never parts company with him. He is like one of whom it is said (Prov. xii. 27), "The slothful (listless) man roasteth not that which he took in hunting." Thou knowest that many men make a show of friendship in their speech and yet frequently are enemies at heart. Do not trust them, as it is written (*id.*, xxvi. 24), "He that hateth, dissembleth with his lips." Even though he be gentle in discourse with thee, do not associate with him, as it is written (*id.*, 25), "When he speaketh fair, believe him not." Thus Joab also made a show of kind-heartedness and affection for Abner and Amasa before killing them. So also did Ismael favor Guedaliah ben Achi-

kam ere he killed him. It is said, "He who sows hatred will reap regret." He who is of this character is ill-disposed to his fellow-man in matters concerning himself and another. So much the more will he be so in those affecting him and his Lord. He acts as though he were praying, but his secret thoughts are quite different. Thus it is written of them (Ps. lxxviii. 36), "Nevertheless they did flatter him with their mouth and they did lie unto him with their tongues," and so forth. The divine Socrates spake unto his disciples, bidding them "Beware of whomsoever your heart hate, for the hearts of men are like a mirror." Thus the sage said (Prov. xxvii. 19), "As in water, face answereth to face, so the heart of man to man." Souls are alike, and the most harmful and persistent form of hatred is that caused by envy. The poet saith,

"Thou canst cure all manner of enmity except the enmity which comes to thee through envy."

In the book of al-Ḳuṭi (it is said), "The very best that thou canst look forward to in regard to thy enemies is that thou bring them back to the love of thee, if that be possible."

CHAPTER III.

TREATING OF THE QUALITY OF MERCY AND COMPASSION (PITY), THE PRAISE OF ITS POSSESSORS, AND AN EXHORTATION TO GIVE PREFERENCE THERETO. THIS FORMS THE SEVENTH CHAPTER OF THE BOOK.

SINCE this quality is of a kind with the nature of the Creator, may He be greatly praised and mightily exalted, it is complementary to the twelve attributes especially characteristic of Him, *i.e.*, the thirteen qualities which are ascribed to the Lord of Worlds, viz., "The Lord eternal is a merciful and gracious God," and so forth. That which it is possible for the wise man to aim at in action is,—being slow to anger, "long-suffering," and largely generous, as it is said, "abundant in loving-kindnesses," tolerant of sin, as it it is said, "Forgiving iniquity," and so forth. The upright and wise man must emulate these as far as he is able to do. Even as man desires that he be dealt with mercifully, when compelled to seek help, so must he be merciful to whosoever seeks his help. This quality is extremely praiseworthy, and God, exalted may He be, has distinguished His righteous servants through their love therefor. As thou knowest of Joseph, where it is said (Gen. xliii. 30), "His bowels did yearn upon his brother." The intelligent man has the qualities of pity and compassion implanted in his soul and ever present therein. The sage said, "Mercy is the result of kindliness and honesty." In regard to it, Solomon the Wise spake when he exhorted to mercy and compassion (Prov. xxiv. 11), "If thou forbear to deliver them that are born unto death." A beautiful feature of this quality in connection with the Creator, exalted and hallowed may He be, is that He is merciful in dealing with all His creatures. Thus it is said (Ps. cxlv. 9),

"The Lord is good to all, and His tender mercies are over all His works." In the book of Al-Ḳuṭi, it is said, "Spare no effort to deliver those who are confronted with death." Again he said, "Do not wrong the weak, for their Protector is God, the mighty One." He said, "Prosperous are they whose heart is ever merciful and meek," and again we find therein, "He who is not merciful will die by the hand of one who is merciless."

CHAPTER IV.

Treating of Hard-heartedness. This is the Eighth Chapter of the Book.

I do not find this quality among righteous or superior men. But it is (to be found) in him whose nature resembles that of a lion, for he is one who is never sated. These are the ones of whom it is said (Deut. xxviii. 50), "A nation of fierce countenance." Upon my soul, this is a wholly detestable quality, whether (its measure be) great or small. It comes into being when the spirit of wrath prevails over a man. This quality is exercised for the purpose of wreaking vengeance upon enemies. There is no harm in making use of it in this manner, although the intelligent man ought not endeavor to be avenged upon his enemies. For this is not befitting. Thus saith the sage (Prov. xxiv. 17), "Rejoice not when thy enemy falleth." To make use of it in order that one may do evil to his fellow-man, to kill him, or to lay hold of the possessions of one who has given no offence, is reprehensible. From such as these may God preserve me, for of their ilk, the Saint said (Ps. cxxiv., 1 and 3), "If it had not been the Lord who was on our side, now may Israel say": "Then they had swallowed us up quick, when their wrath was kindled against us." A proof that this quality is only found in the wicked is the expression (Prov. xii. 10), "But the tender mercies of the wicked are cruel." Plato, the author of the laws in regard to vengeance, said, "He who desires to be revenged upon his enemies should add (a degree of) excellence to himself."

END OF PART II.

PART III.

CHAPTER I.

TREATING OF JOY (CHEERFULNESS). THIS IS THE NINTH CHAPTER OF THE BOOK.

THIS quality is found to differ in various men. Sometimes, it is natural; this is the case in him whose temper is humid-hot as is that of blood; especially when his hopes are well ordered and never confounded, and who, in addition, is far from experiencing suffering and free from affliction. It is but meet that in the nature of him who is of this character there appear the sign of this quality—that his exterior be sound, his health robust, and old age without haste in overtaking him. Thus it is said of such an one (Prov. xvii. 22), "A merry heart doeth good like a medicine, but a broken spirit dries the bones." Sometimes it is coincident with the attainment of the desire and the realization of a wish. Peculiar to it is continual smiling without (apparent) cause. Very often lightmindedness accompanies it, whereof it is written (Eccl. vii. 6), "For as the crackling of thorns under a pot, so is the laughter of the fool." It has been said that one of the distinguishing marks of the fool is his laughing when there is no occasion for laughter. I hold that this quality is to be found in the souls of those, above all, who are free from defilement, the righteous, the pious, the pure, destined for the Heavenly Kingdom, rising to spirituality, *i.e.*, the souls of the upright, for they are in perfect enjoyment of their condition of service and greatly rejoiced because of their worship, as it is written (Ps. xxxii. 11), "Be glad in the Lord and rejoice, ye righteous; and shout for joy, all ye

that are upright in heart." The well-bred man ought not to indulge in laughter when seated in an assembly, for it was said that for him who laughs much, but little respect is felt. Facetiousness takes away the veil of dignity. Even as anxiety (apprehensiveness) when it is aroused gives rise to weeping, so gladness, when it is stirred, incites to laughter. Therefore the intelligent man ought to understand that this quality and some other qualities are not of the rational soul, as Galen holds, but of the animal soul. The proof of this is that thou seest laughter break out in spite of dreadful events. Often, too, man is unable to refrain therefrom. The same is held with regard to wrath and other qualities. Considering this, man should urgently seek to render his animal soul submissive to his rational soul: namely, that his intellect guide his nature. When he does this, he becomes included among the most excellent men. Wherefore Socrates says in regard to joy, "Whatever causes joy causes sorrow." In the ethics of Diogenes, treating of joy, he states: "Joy is life and exaltation to the heart, whereas grief is distress and destruction."

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CHAPTER II.

Treating of Grief (Apprehensiveness). This is the Tenth Chapter of the Book.

This quality usually succeeds in establishing itself in the soul when wishes fail of realization, and then the soul is brought to such a point as almost to be killed when it loses the objects of its love. Oh, what a quality is this! How serious a matter when it comes into evidence, and how waste is its place when it prevails! Thus it was said, "Apprehensiveness is a living death." I have determined to linger here a little in the discussion of this chapter. Perhaps God will grant us His grace and inspire us with excellent words, which may relieve the sadness of man, so that he may find healing in our discourse, because it is impossible to find healing for psychical ills other than in spiritual remedies. As this takes firmer hold of the soul, so also it becomes more difficult to find the remedy. Of God we pray that He protect us therefrom in His graciousness.

The constitution of apprehensiveness is cold and dry, like the black gall (humor). No man can absolutely escape it. In some it attains immense proportions, so that they thereby become afflicted with psychical ailments. Thus it is said (Prov. xii. 25), "Gloom in the heart of man maketh it stoop, but a good word maketh it glad." Know thou that this quality is generally visible in the countenance, as thou hast seen in the case of Joseph, who discerned what was in the heart of "the servants of Pharaoh," when he beheld their austere countenances; it being said (Gen. xl. 6), "And he looked upon them, and behold they were sad," and as Artaxerxes said to Nehemiah (Neh. ii. 2), "Why is thy countenance sad, seeing thou art not sick." Thus it is obvious that this quality is generally dis-

tinctly visible in the countenance. Thou shouldst know that if a man be madly in love with this world,[1] which is a world *de generatione et corruptione*, he never omits to seek the gratification of the senses, constantly moving on from one thing to another. If he attain them and then lose them, gloom overcomes him. On the other hand, if he be made to forget this world, and apply himself to the world of intellect, then it becomes possible for him to escape the psychical ills, which are (occasioned by) worldly acquisitions,—that is, if he turn away from vain works and incline in the fulness of the soul to ethical science and religious laws. Therefore the intellectual man ought to cast away the lowly quality of the masses and the grandiose manner of kings. If it be impossible for a man to have what he desires, he must desire what he has. Let him not prefer continual gloom. We ought to strive to cure our souls of this evil (disease), in the same way as we must suffer hardships in trying to cure our bodies and to rid them of diseases by means of burning and cutting (fire and iron), and so forth. Rather must we gradually accustom ourselves to improve our souls through strength of purpose, and to endure a little difficulty in order that, as a result of this, we may pursue a praiseworthy course. We know, moreover, that if we represent to ourselves that no misfortune will befall us, it is as though we desired not to exist at all. Because misfortunes are a necessary condition of the passing of worldly things. If this were not, there could be no becoming. *Ergo*, to wish that no accident should come to pass is like wishing not to exist. But existence is (a part) of nature, and annihilation likewise is (a part) of nature. Then if we desire that this be not (a part) of nature, we desire the impossible; he who desires the impossible will have his wish denied, and he whose wish is denied is miserable. We ought to be ashamed to give the preference to this quality, grief, and we should yearn to rise unto a state of beatitude. Let him who would not mourn represent to his soul the things that lead to mourning, as though they already were; thus, for example, let

[1] Cf. Baḥya, x. 7 (p. 451), ix. 7 (p. 425); Brüll (p. 77, note 2).

man say, "A certain possession of mine will be destroyed and I will mourn for it," accounting it as already destroyed, or (considering) as already lost that which he loves. Concerning this, the poet-philosopher said:

"The man of prudence grows up, representing to himself his mishaps before they befall him; if they befall him suddenly, they will not terrify him because of the things already pictured in his soul. He sees that one thing will lead to another, and therefore he knows the end from the beginning."

But not the least trace of apprehensiveness is to be found in those who are of lofty souls and noble aspirations. Socrates was asked, "Why do we never perceive in thee any sign of apprehensiveness?" And he answered, "Because I have never possessed anything over the loss of which I would grieve." Wherefore let the intelligent man consider that there is nothing in this world of all that grows, save it be insignificant at the outset, and afterward develops, except grief, which is greatest on the day it comes into being, and the longer it continues the less it becomes, until it entirely disappears. The firm and resolute man is he who braces himself up with all his might in the hour of his affliction. Alexander, in order to console his mother about himself (in the event of his death), wrote to her as follows: "My mother, order a great and fortified city to be built when the news of Alexander's death reaches you. Prepare therein for eating and drinking, and gather together in it, on an appointed day, men from all the lands to eat and drink. When that has been done and all the men are ready to eat and drink what the queen has prepared, let it be proclaimed at that moment that no man should enter her abode whom misfortune has befallen." And thus she did upon the death of Alexander. But when she ordered that no one whom misfortune had befallen should enter her house, she noticed (that) no one (came). Then she felt sure that he had only wished to comfort her about himself.

Alexander had heard from Aristotle, his master, that "Grief injures the heart and destroys it." He wished to ascertain the

truth of this. He therefore decided upon an animal, the nature of which was nearest to that of man, confined it in a dark place, and allotted to it nourishment only sufficient to sustain its body. Afterward he led it forth and slaughtered it: whereupon he found its heart dissolved and melted away. Then he knew that Aristotle had spoken nothing but the truth. Among the words spoken by Galen on grief (we find), "Apprehensiveness is a consuming of the heart, and sadness is a sickness of the heart." Afterward he explained this, saying, "Sadness is felt for what is past, and apprehensiveness for what may occur." In another place again (he said), "Sadness (is occasioned) by what has occurred, and apprehensiveness is (felt) for what may come to pass. Therefore beware of sadness, for sadness is the end of life." Dost thou not see that when the face of man is overclouded (with sadness), he will perish of grief. One of the sages said, "Drinking poison is easier (to endure) than apprehensiveness." Now, if one should ask what benefit is derived from choosing this quality at the occurrence of misfortune and its appearance, I would answer that in shedding the tears which have become spoiled and stagnant, and which nature is incapable of returning to their place, we pour out the putrid humors, which have become rotten, the chyme, and we remedy it through purifying drugs, and thus we cleanse the humor in such a manner as to cause it to return to its original state. Thus it is known that in some small children there is a spoiled excess, which cannot be passed off save through weeping. This, then, is the natural use of weeping. Wherefore Socrates said, "Sorrows are a species of ills of the heart, as diseases are ills of the body." Among the words of Ptolemy on this (subject are), "Let him who wishes to live long, prepare to meet misfortunes with a patient heart."

CHAPTER III.

Treating of Tranquillity. This is the Eleventh Chapter of the Book.

This quality is commendable when a man directs it in faith in the Lord, and places his reliance and his confidence in Him. Thus it is said (Prov. xxii. 19), "That thy trust may be in the Lord." This is a praiseworthy disposition: its possessor is worthy of very good fortune and abundant mercy from God, as it is written (Ps. xxxii. 10), "He that trusteth in the Lord, mercy shall compass him about." He who is in this state deserves to be blest, as it is said (Jer. xvii. 7), "Blessed is the man that trusteth in the Lord and whose hope the Lord is." This quality is usually found in the upright, those who fear God and who are referred to in the command, which declares (Ps. cxv. 11), "Ye that fear the Lord, trust in the Lord." The excellence of this quality and its merit before God, exalted be He, (is seen in the fact that) He promised it to Jacob during his sleep, as it is said (Isa. xliv. 2), "Fear not, O Jacob, my servant," and as it is said of the righteous man who trusts in the Lord and who confides in Him (Ps. cxii. 7), "He shall not be afraid of evil tidings: his heart is fixed, trusting in the Lord."

CHAPTER IV.

TREATING OF PENITENCE (REMORSE) AND GUARDING AGAINST (THE NEED OF) IT. THIS IS THE TWELFTH CHAPTER OF THE BOOK.

THIS quality comes into being, when a man quits a sinful state and repents. When he gives evidence of the quality of penitence, then his repentance is complete. It must be preceded by three conditions, namely, penitence, seeking pardon, and guaranteeing to abandon one's wonted course. Thus our master Saadya Alfayumi, may God be gracious unto him, explained that one of the righteous was wont to say, "He who repents of his past sins is as though he had not sinned." This trait is commendable from this point of view. But the reprehensible side of it comes to light in the case of him who says "Yes" to-day in some matter and after a time regrets what he has said and retracts, or who vows to fast or to give alms and repents of his vow. All this is blameworthy. The reasonable way, in my opinion, is for man to beware of placing himself in a position which he may be compelled to regret. Although men have not the power so to control themselves, that they can choose (all) their qualities, nevertheless they can desire to rise gradually from a base to a lofty course, and from faulty qualities to sound ones. The acme of bliss for man is to be able to bridle his soul, to rule it, to lead it along the right way. He whose nature yields to his intellect becomes lordly; his merit becomes high and profitable, and his deeds are praised.

END OF THE THIRD PART.

PART IV.

CHAPTER I.

Treating of Wrath. This is the Thirteenth Chapter of the Book.

This quality, although among the forces of the animal soul, we have set down as one of the qualities of man, because of its analogy to his other qualities. Let us begin by describing its useful side, although the latter is inseparable from its baneful aspect. There is no quality so reprehensible, but that it at times serves a use, even as no quality is so praiseworthy, but that it frequently becomes detrimental. Thus thou knowest that silence is a commendable trait, but it becomes detestable when resorted to while listening to absurdities. Wrath is a reprehensible quality, but when employed to correct or to reprove, or because of indignation at the performance of transgressions, it becomes laudable. Therefore the thoroughly wise and ethically trained man must abandon both extremes and set about the right mean.[1] Galen said in his book on the qualities of the soul, "Wrath and anger are two words with one meaning." "Sometimes it appears, (to judge) from the countenance of the wrathful, that he is distressed, his body feverishly inflamed, his heart throbbing violently, his pulse beating strongly and

[1] Rosin thinks that Maimonides followed Gabirol in his emphasis upon the Aristotelian "middle way" (p. 12, note 1; p. 14, note 3; p. 26, note 1; pp. 27, 28, note 2; pp. 79-82). Cf. also Rosin ("J. Q. R.," iii., pp. 168, 169), Wolff (chap. iv., pp. 15-17), Dukes (pp. 99-101, notes 2, 3 and 4, and "Phil.," pp 66, 67, and notes). Schmiedl (p. 268, note 1) says very truly that the Aristotelian doctrine of "the golden mean," "*via media*," became in time "ein wahrhaft, jüdisch ethischer Lehrsatz."

swiftly." He said again, "Dignity becomes apparent in him who indulges in wrath only after reflection. But he who indulges therein unadvisedly gives evidence of stupidity." Wherefore the saying, "He who is mighty in wrath and violent in anger is not far removed from the mad." In the book of Al-Ḳuṭi (it is said) that the man of wrath is never seen to be joyful. We would classify the wrathful soul as of four kinds.[1] He who is quickly angered and (as) quickly appeased is of an even-balanced disposition. This is mainly characteristic of a man possessed of a yellow (bilious) temperament. He who is slow to anger and difficult to appease is likewise of an even-balanced disposition. But he who is difficult to appease and quickly angered is in a reprehensible condition because he has overstepped the boundaries of moderation. But he who is slow to anger and quickly appeased is most praiseworthy. This is one of the virtues of the noble and excellent men, among whose qualities wrath rarely ever appears. Those who subdue their souls' anger and prevail upon their nature to restrain it, have been described as noble and characterized as exalted. Thus the sage said (Prov. xvi. 32), "He that is slow to anger is better than the mighty." This is one of the thirteen attributes ascribed to God, exalted is Hé, in the passage (Ex. xxxiv. 6), "And the Lord passed by before him," etc. It is said that as scab is a disease of the body, so is wrath a disease of the soul. The moral man must not become wrathful often, because, by reason of his wrath, he is compelled to bear burdens. Thus saith the sage (Prov. xix. 19), "A man of great wrath shall bear punishment." The sage has forbidden it, saying (Eccl. vii. 9), "Be not hasty in thy spirit to be angry." Furthermore the verse makes clear the reason for his forbidding it in the expression (*ib.*), "For anger resteth in the bosom of fools." The wrathful deserves to be called "fool." It is impossible in most cases for the man of violent wrath to be secure from grave sin and serious transgression. Thus the sage spake

[1] Aristotelian; cf. "Moral Philosophy of Aristotle," by W. M. Hatch (London, 1879, p. 223 *et seq.*).

(Prov. xxix. 22): "A wrathful man aboundeth in transgression." Thou wilt notice that most men, when they become wroth and violently angry, take no heed of the disaster which they may incur through the violence of their anger, like him of whom it is said (*id.*, 11), "A fool uttereth all his mind," and on the other hand (*ib.*), "But a wise man keepeth it till afterward." Therefore our masters, peace be upon them, sought to interdict the immoderate exercise of this quality, saying, "He who rends his garments in wrath is like unto an idolator." Acording to this, a superior man must not be violent in wrath, for he accustoms himself to the qualities of the wild and wicked beast. Nor must he be so gentle as never to become wrathful, for this were characteristic of little boys.[1] The discreet stand with reference to this is to take the intermediate course. Thou must know that man's reason is perfected when it subdues his wrath. Thus Scripture says (Prov. xix. 11), "The discretion of a man deferreth his anger." Ptolemy, the sage, said of wrath, "When thou becomest wrathful, pardon, for if thou dost not yield, the taking[2] of vengeance is a sign of weakness."

[1] Attributed to Aristotle in an article on "Rühmliche Denkmäle der Joiner aus den Türkischen," Diez (vol. i., p. 83); cf. Hatch (above cited, p. 223).

[2] Versified by Steinschneider ("Manna," chap. i., p. 89); cf. Baḥya, vi. 7, ب and Brüll (p. 77, note 3).

CHAPTER II.

Treating of the Quality of Good-Will (Suavity). This is the Fourteenth Chapter of the Book.

This is one of the praiseworthy qualities, since it is rarely to be met with, except in the case of a noble-minded person, who accepts things just as they come to him and looks not for better ones. The quality of contentment is also derived therefrom. This is, as thou knowest, reader, an excellent quality, which we have portrayed and extolled above in the second chapter of Part I., whilst treating of the quality of meekness. If the righteous man be well disposed toward his fellow-men and the latter similarly disposed toward him, it is certain that he will be acceptable unto God.[1] Yea, more, even his enemies will make peace with him. Thus the sage saith (Prov. xvi. 7), "When a man's ways please the Lord, he maketh even his enemies to be at peace with him," as thou knowest from the good-will Abimelech bore Abraham, peace be upon him, and the latter's making peace with him; thus also in the speech of our sainted Rabbi to R. Ḥiyya, and so forth. Wherefore the excellence of good-will is related to life, being a source of superiority and a fount of good fortune according to the saying (*id.*, xvi. 15), "In the light of the king's countenance is life; and his favor is as a cloud of the latter rain." So also in that of man; thus Pharaoh bore good-will to Joseph, even bringing him unto kingly power. Thus Ahasuerus, too, bore good-will to Mordecai. Thou seest how such a man is treated and exalted; how much more he to whom God bears good-will,—therefore the saying (Isa. xlviii. 17), "I am the Lord thy God which teacheth thee

[1] Cf. Diez (vol. i., p. 18, No. 29); cf. Baḥya, v. 5, and vii. 10 (pp. 270, 271), and Brüll (p. 76, note 1).

to profit, which leadeth thee by the way that thou shouldst go." The sage said, "Whosoever is contented is rich: whosoever is obedient is joyous: whosoever is rebellious is sad." He was wont to say, "He who is not content of his own accord with his condition will be (compelled to be) satisfied despite himself." From this quality there branch out forbearance and forgiveness, which are of the attributes of the Creator, exalted is He and blest, and of the wise and noble man. The poet spake, "If I were not to pardon a brother's fault, and if I were to say that I would exact vengeance from him, where then would be the superiority? And if I were to cut myself from my brethren because of their sins, I would be alone, and have none with whom to associate."

It is related: "A king once became angry at a company of men and commanded that they be slain. Then spake one of them, 'Verily we have sinned grievously. Will not thy goodliness manifest itself in forgiveness?' Whereupon he forgave them and slew them not."

CHAPTER III.

Treating of Jealousy. This is the Fifteenth Chapter of the Book.

This quality is an offshoot of wrath. Most rational beings are not exempt from it: but it is in them all, for we see men seeking to imitate the actions of their companions. For instance, when one (man) sees that his friend has acquired some worldly gain, mineral, animal, or vegetable, or other possessions, he likewise endeavors to acquire similar things, although he be able to dispense with them or compensate himself with other things in their stead. Let him not protract his endeavor, nor set his heart upon attaining such possessions. This is the expression to which the sage, peace be upon him, gave utterance (Eccl. iv. 4), "Again I considered all travail and every right work, that for this a man is envied of his neighbor." He whose nature is overcome by this disposition is blameworthy, for it leads him to envy, and a noble man is never found to be envious. Books (*i.e.*, of poetry) have been filled with the censure of envy, and every man of intelligence knows how much has been said as to its baseness. It is necessary to turn from it, for frequently the affairs of the envious lead him to use violence. Thus it is said of such as these (Micah ii. 2), "And they covet fields and take them by violence." Enviousness is a loathsome trait. The wise man must keep himself as far from it as he can, for he gains no advantage through it: on the contrary, continued depression and fatigue of the spirit through desires and the constant hatred of men, scantiness of repose, preoccupation of the mind, apprehensiveness and the punishment of God, for transgressing that which He forbade in His revealed Scripture. Man must not be jealous of unrighteous men, be-

cause he sees them devote themselves to pleasure and (the gratifying of) passions. But let him employ his zeal in the service of God. Thus the sage said (Prov. xxiii. 17), "Let not thy heart be envious of the sinners." Again he spake (Ps. xxxvii. 1), "Be thou not envious against the workers of iniquity." Zeal is goodly only in the service of God, as thou knowest from (the case of) Phinehas, of whom it is said (Num. xxv. 11), "While he was zealous for my sake," and the good reward which he merited thereby, as it is said (*id.*, 12), "Wherefore say, behold I give unto him my covenant of peace." Among the things which have been said with reference to the jealous and envious (we find), "Thou wilt observe the envious man effusive in his affection (for thee) when he meets thee, but hating thee in thy absence. His name is friend, his intention unfriendly." Again it has been said, "It appears as though the envious were created in order to be angered." Furthermore it has been said, "Let it suffice for thee that the envious man is grieved at the time of thy joy." It is incumbent upon man to mount to such an exalted rank with the aid of his powers and gifts, that he be envied therefor." Let him ponder over this, as saith the poet:

"Lo, I was envied, but God increased men's enviousness touching me. Let man rather not live at all than live for a single day unenvied. Man is not envied save for his excellences, which are forbearance, scholarship, nobility, and generosity."

CHAPTER IV.

TREATING OF WIDE-AWAKEDNESS. THIS IS THE SIXTEENTH CHAPTER OF THE BOOK.

I MUST preface, in treating of this quality, of what nature it is derived. I would hold that it is of the yellow-gall species. This quality appears usually when the soul is free from other blamable qualities and when it is not mingled with aught of grief, and most frequently it is (found) in pure and noble souls. It is a commendable quality, and man ought to make use of it in whatsoever work of art or science he be engrossed. Was it not said of him (Prov. xii. 27), "The substance of a wide-awake man is precious," which means that the most precious virtue of the lofty is wide-awakedness, both in the present and future life. In the world *de gencratione et corruptione*, he is wide-awake in his quest of knowledge as well as goodness of service and faith, and in the attempt to attain to the world of intellect. With reference to the reverse of this quality, *i.e.*, weakness of purpose in worldly affairs and in the attempt to save souls, it has been said (Prov. xxiv. 10), "If thou faint in the day of adversity thy strength is small"; and again (*id.*, xii. 27), "The slothful man roasteth not that which he took in hunting." However, we have mentioned the languid while treating of the quality of hatred. He who is one of the estimable, and administers his affairs with alacrity, will succeed in them. Thus it is said (Prov. xii. 24), "The hand of the diligent shall bear rule; but the slothful shall be under tribute." Concerning this the poet spake:

"If the souls become too greatly ambitious, the bodies will be wearied thereby."

This is a beautiful maxim. The sage, peace be upon him, exhorted to wide-awakedness in matters religious and worldly

in saying (Prov. xix. 15), "Slothfulness casteth into a deep sleep." This saying is very evident, for slothfulness necessarily induces lethargy. For when the vapors, which are designed to exude from the pores of the body through forcible movements, are motionless and do not dissolve, they mount to the brain, and bring about constant drowsiness. In the book of Al-Ḳuṭi it is said of wide-awakedness, "He who satisfies his land in respect of cultivation, will be satisfied by it with bread." The ethical aspect of this quality is, "Man must not display it in his lust." He shall not be rash through this in his wrath, for rashness is blameworthy since it is not one of the qualities of the wise. The excellent do not make use of it. But one ought to employ wide-awakedness in matters relating to religion and law. The surest reason for the success of a man is (to be found in) the wide-awakedness with which he conducts his affairs, and the greatest sign of misfortune is his slothfulness with regard to them. The poet has said:

"The pure and noble souls are wakeful, watchful, and sound of judgment, while the stupid and heavy souls are drowsy, mean, and low."

But that intense wide-awakedness which leads to hastiness is culpable. Let the intelligent man beware of using it, for it is the very worst of evils.[1] He who is hasty, rushes to destruction, and the man of hastiness is not secure from disappointment. A verse reads:

"A cautious man will realize his desires. But he who hastens unduly is bound to stumble."

Man must not make undue haste in his affairs, because no good result can be obtained by haste, but through deliberation ends are (more) easily attained. The beauty of the state of wide-awakedness lies in its being potential in the soul and not appearing quickly in action.

[1] Attributed to Plato; cf. "Denkwürdigkeiten" (above cited, vol. i., p. 82); paraphrased by Steinschneider ("Manna," chap. iii., p. 90).

END OF PART IV.

PART V.

CHAPTER I.

Treating of the Quality of Liberality (Generosity). This is the Seventeenth Chapter of the Book.

This quality, when it is employed with moderation[1] and does not lapse into prodigality, is commendable. Man must prefer this quality to its antithesis, *i.e.*, the quality of niggardliness, since the great men who are renowned by reason of their excellences are not convinced that niggardliness is a praiseworthy quality. Dost thou not see, may God guide thee aright, in how many places the sage extols the man who is generous? In one place he says that liberality brings a man to many degrees of eminence in this world and in the world to come. Thus it is said (Prov. xviii. 16), "A man's gift maketh room for him and bringeth him before great men"—in this world, because it brings him near to kings whose good-will he gains through gifts; as thou knowest from the respect of Ben Hadad for Asa, and Tiglath for Ahaz, because presents were made to them—and in the world to come he will attain the merited (share of its) bliss, which man realizes because of his serving the Lord with his substance in almsgiving. Thus it is said (Isa. liii. 12), "Therefore will I divide him a portion with the great." Since liberality was a virtue of our father Abraham, peace be upon him, he became known thereby and it was ascribed to him. This quality is attributed to him in the Holy Scripture in several places, and thus is to be understood the explana-

[1] Maimonides (Wolff, p. 16) likewise holds that liberality is the golden mean between prodigality and niggardliness.

tion of (Ps. xlvii. 9), "The generous of the people are gathered together, even the people of the God of Abraham." This is a commendable quality because it secures honor for him who exercises it. Thus it is said (Prov. xix. 6), "Many will entreat the favor of the generous, and every man is a friend to him that giveth gifts." Through this a man merits his fellow-men's praise when he gives generously, and he is lauded therefor. Thus spake a poet:

"When thou goest to him, thou wilt find him of pleasant demeanor as if thou wert about to give him what he will give thee. Had he naught but his life to give, he would give this. Wherefore, let the fear of God be upon whomsoever would ask this of him."

But the unseemly side of this quality appears when man wastes his substance needlessly and mismanages it; as, for instance, he who spends it in devotion to pleasures and in gratifying his lust. This is squandering and is not characteristic of the wise. A gift in the right place is a treasure put aside. It perisheth not in the course of time, but abideth with the ages. This is the opinion of Solomon, peace be upon him, who said (Eccl. xi. 1), "Cast thy bread upon the waters; for thou shalt find it after many days." This verse evidently exhorts to generosity, for if man be generous and bountiful, he will reap the fruit thereof. Thus spake the poet:

"Sow thou generosity in the field of gifts, and noble deeds shall be harvested by thee early."

Wherefore man ought to know that if he be in a prosperous condition, then his generosity will not impair his prosperity, and if he be in a straitened condition, his adversity will not continue on that account. It is peculiar to this noble quality, that he who employs it never feels the want of anything; on the contrary, his abundance is much increased. Thus it is said (Prov. xxviii. 27): "He that giveth unto the poor shall not lack." Furthermore, David the Saint, peace be upon him, says of generous and liberal men (Ps. cxii. 9), "He hath dispersed, he hath given to the poor: his righteousness endureth

forever." What is your opinion with reference to the use of this gracious virtue? It is like lending unto God, exalted and magnified is He. Thus the saying (Prov. xix. 17), "He that hath pity upon the poor lendeth unto the Lord." Thus it was said in the book on Ethics: "Bestow kindness on those who are worthy and upon those who are unworthy. In the case of the worthy, thy kindness will be in the right place; and in the case of the unworthy, prove thou thy worth." Again it was said with reference to liberality, "It is a part of the noble qualities to give liberally to him who asks." In the book of Al-Ḳuṭi (it is said): "Know thou that resolution consists in doing things with firmness. Consider well when to yield and when to deny, when to grant and when to promise. For a gift after denying is better than denying after (promising) a gift and favor. Setting out to do after consideration is better than to abandon after setting out. Know that thou shouldst be more prompt to do what thou hast not promised, than to promise what thou wilt not do. Therefore beware of hastily promising what thou fearest thou mayest be unable to perform. Adorn thy promise with truth and thy deed with justice."

CHAPTER II.

Treating of Niggardliness.[1] This is the Eighteenth Chapter of the Book.

Know thou that this is a reprehensible quality. Among the host of reprehensible qualities there is none more abominable than this. For thou seest that he who is lavishly bountiful of his substance, although blameworthy, is satisfied with the pleasure he derives and men's goodly praise which is his. But niggardliness is accompanied by evil repute without even the attainment of pleasure; and to be of evil repute is not one of the qualities desired by the excellent. The noble-minded man ought to shrink from this quality and not employ it on any occasion. The sages are at one in thinking that manliness does not go well with prodigality, nor religion with an inordinate desire (for gain). He who is of this character may well despair of a good repute and a fair record. Thus it was said (Isa. xxxii. 5), "The vile person shall be no more called liberal, nor the churl said to be bountiful." This "vile person" is like him, in the wilderness of Maon, who said (I Sam. xxv. 11), "Shall I then take my bread and my water, . . . and give it unto men whom I know not whence they be?" Thou knowest the severe punishment with which he met. But the good feature of this state is that man does not squander his substance, be it great or small, but guards it by means of this quality. He must not overdo this, however, lest he pass over to the quality of greed, which is not of the qualities of the noble. Thus the sage spake in condemning niggardliness (Prov. xi. 26), "He that withholdeth corn, the people shall curse him"; and, on the contrary, "Blessing shall be on the head of him that selleth it."

[1] This chapter is given, in a German translation from the Hebrew, by Dukes ("Ehrensäulen," pp. 12, 13).

This verse outwardly[1] refers to "charity," but its hidden implication is knowledge.[2] The wise man ought not be niggardly in dealing out his knowledge, for knowledge is not lessened by imparting it (to others), as little as the brightness of the fire dies away when a light is kindled therefrom. The best rule with regard to the employment of this quality is to accustom one's self to beneficence toward kinsmen, until one gradually habituate one's self to benevolence toward strangers, and thus train one's self to choose generosity.

[1] On this point, Bacher (p. 53, note 1) says: "Was hier als verborgener (allegorischer) Sinn angegeben ist, fällt mit der agadischen Deutung des Verses zusammen (Sanhedrin, 91 b, unten). Ebenso gilt als selbstverständlich diese allegorische Auffassung des Verses als Warnung vor engherziger Zurückhaltung der Belehrung bei Abraham b. Chija, הגיון נפש, ed. Freimann, p. 17 a. . . ." Gabirol's use of terms in this place suggests the formal distinction between the "outward" and "inward"—manifest and hidden—meanings of Scripture, made by the Islamic sect of Batiniya; cf. Haarbrücker (Th. i., p. 256).

[2] The same idea is expressed in the Midrash (Bemidbar rabbah, par. 15), in reference to the prophetic powers of Moses; cf. Wolff ("Muhammedanische Eschatologie," Leipzig, 1872, p. 207, and note 412).

CHAPTER III.

Treating of Valor. This is the Nineteenth Chapter of the Book.

The man who prevails over the temperament of the blood-nature, who is large-hearted, full-veined, and long-armed, thou wilt generally find to be a man of valor, especially if, combined with that, he be master of the art of war. This quality is praiseworthy (in man), when it is manifested in his strength, and in accordance with his determination to be saved from what might befall him. But when he departs from a moderate course and unites valor with the quality of folly and it becomes the cause of a man's throwing himself into dangerous places then it is reprehensible. Of these two dispositions the sage saith (Prov. xxviii. 14), "Happy is the man that feareth always; but he that hardeneth his heart shall fall into mischief." But as regards the great men who are mentioned as possessors of this quality, heavenly signs gave evidence of their possessing this power,—thus Joshua, Gideon, Samson, Saul, David, Jonathan, Joab, and Abner, and others like them, whose power gave evidence of the quality of valor, were praised therefor; and those whose weakness, in contradistinction to the former, gave evidence of the quality of cowardice, were not commended for it, as I will show in regard to them in the following chapter. It is necessary to devote this quality to the service of God, as thou knowest from (the story of) Moses, peace be upon him, when he retaliated upon the people by saying to the children of Levi (Ex. xxxii. 27), "Put every man his sword by his side"; and as thou knowest from Phinehas in the matter of his zeal. Thus it is said (Num. xxv. 7), "And when Phinehas, the son of Aaron the priest, saw it, he rose up from among the congregation and took

a javelin in his hand." This quality of valor never fails to be conspicuous in the souls of mighty men and courageous heroes. With reference to valor and patience in facing danger, the poet spake:

"There came a day in the heat of which some people warmed themselves, but though there was no fire, they acted as if in the fire's midst. But we had patience until the day was done. Likewise, a case of misfortune can be brought to a close only through patience."

Among the things which have been said in order to encourage the use of valor is: "Crave death, and life will be granted thee." The Arabs were accustomed to call the man of valor "safe." Among the things which have been said on the emboldening of the spirit in combat is the word of the poet:

"I went to the rear to preserve my life (in battle), but I found that I could not preserve my life unless I went forward."

Thus the noble man must make use of this quality in such a way as not to overstep the middle path lest he be called demented (foolhardy). But he must pursue an excellent course in regard to this quality. The philosopher spake, "The extreme limit of valor is strength and endurance with respect to what thou abhorrest." Valor cannot go hand-in-hand with vanity (untruth), nor firmness with absurdity, nor patience with weariness, for these are of the qualities of asses and swine. Valor consists in persevering in the right and overcoming thy desires, until thou feel that to die in the best way thou hast found is more desirable than to live in the opposite (*i.e.*, evil) way, which the power of understanding may have revealed to thee. According to Al-Kuṭi, "Valor is the nature of a noble soul, corresponding to the strength of the body."

CHAPTER IV.

Treating of Cowardice. This is the Twentieth Chapter of the Book.

This quality is generally found in spirits that are abject and downcast, poor and wretched. It is a reprehensible quality. Let the wise man be on his guard against it, let him make no use of it, exert himself to keep away and abstain from it, since he derives no benefit from it; on the contrary, he reaps ill-repute, a vile record, and a diminution of praise. Men of lofty purpose must dread it when they have learned to employ their power of distinguishing in the use of things, so that it may be the means of escaping serious danger. Among the offshoots of this quality is slothfulness, of which we have already treated. Thou knowest what was said with regard to its ignominy and baseness. Thus the sage, peace be upon him, said (Prov. xxvi. 15), "A slothful man hideth his hand in his bosom, and will not so much as bring it to his mouth again." This is the uttermost that can be said of the shame thereof. The slothful coward is known to say: "I will not travel, for fear of highwaymen and wild beasts. I will not engage in business, lest I meet with losses. I will not fast, lest I become ill. I will give no alms, lest I become poor," and similar words that put an end to all activity, until there remains nothing for him to do, but living on without moving from his place, as it is said (*id.*, xxvi. 14), "As the door turneth upon its hinges, so doth the slothful upon his bed." A wise man should not choose this quality of cowardice or make use thereof in preference to his other qualities, lest he become known thereby and be as one who fancies that he will be killed before the expiration of the appointed time, as was said exaggeratedly of the slothful coward by the poet, who spake thus:

"If a little bird merely raises its voice, the heart of the coward is consumed (leaps with terror). But his teeth are sharp as iron,—at meal times."

But in a case where escape is impossible, it is permissible for the quality of cowardice to come into play—as in the case of him, concerning whom it is said: "The king dispatched him to a dangerous place. He refused to go. The king reviled him, whereupon he said, 'It is better that thou revile me when living than bless me when dead.'" It has been said that this quality has been made use of by those who prefer repose in this world to all other qualities, not knowing that repose can be enjoyed to the full, only after zealous care in the regulating of affairs and the attainment of whatsoever be needed. Thus it is said (Prov. xxiv. 27), "Prepare thy work without, and make it fit for thyself in the field." Repose in and of itself signifies slothfulness and cowardice. Thou knowest what happens to a man by reason of his slothfulness: namely, he is deprived of all his honor through utter poverty. Thus it is said (*id.*, xxiv. 33–34): "Yet a little sleep, a little slumber, a little folding of the hands to sleep: so shall thy poverty come as one that travelleth, and thy want as an armed man." Again this quality engenders in the body not a few ills and diseases, thus flabbiness, dulness, swelling, gout, sciatica, and elephantiasis, and similarly whatsoever results from indigestion: in fact, this quality becomes habitual to a man and he considers everything else as faulty and worthless; especially if this feeble coward be of a phlegmatic disposition and on the way to old age, then it weighs him down even more.[1]

[1] We have here a reminiscence of Saadya's distinction between the results of tranquillity and slothfulness. between the reposeful and the indolent, as found in the "Emunoth weDeoth," x.

END OF PART V.

THUS[1] thou hast, may God have mercy upon thee, all that was promised in the introduction. Because of our love of conciseness, our aversion to prolixity, and our fear of departing from the purpose of the book, we have much curtailed the discourse in the individual chapters and in the various parts. We have not united every one of these qualities to its nature and its sense, nor have we referred the senses to their natures, although we ought to make clear the situation of every quality in the body and give much of the science of the temperaments, anatomy and physiognomy. We think, however, that this must be deferred to some other time, when it may please God, exalted may He be, for He is the One from whom to seek help. Having finished as much as we could, and having said enough in the chapters of this book, we would hold it to be possible that there exist in man qualities other than those which have been classified, and still other natures. We say—yes. We have been brief with regard to the others for two reasons: First, we know that among the qualities of men are those of vexation and weariness. We feared that these might occupy as much space as the whole book, and therefore we did not go to the length of collecting many verses from the Hebrew and Arabic. Furthermore, because we knew that there is no quality which we have avoided mentioning, that is not implied among those which have been mentioned. It would bear the same relation to them that the branches do to the root. If any one should happen to say, "Thou must not exhort men to improve their qualities, nor arouse them concerning the betterment of their moral status, unless this be characteristic of thine own self—because thou wouldst be as he who recommends piety and forgets himself"

[1] This concluding paragraph is omitted in the Hebrew translations, to which is appended a Hebrew poem.

—we would reply, "Every vessel gives forth whatever it contains." How foolish is he who seeks to measure this world and does not know the value of the parasang wherewith it is measured. We have not mentioned any excellence which we have not emulated; nor have we extolled any quality which we have not tried to make part of our own nature. He who adorns himself with what is not in him, will find his claims laid bare after a time.

To Him that giveth understanding do I owe thanks: with Him do I triumph: in Him do I greatly glory: with Him do I take refuge against such things (as those aforementioned). Him do I praise for he is worthy of praise; to Him it belongs and Him praise behooves. Thus spake His saint, peace be upon him (Ps. cix. 30, 31), "I will greatly praise the Lord with my mouth; yes, I will praise Him among the multitude. For He shall stand at the right hand of the poor to save him from those that condemn his soul."

Thus is ended what I sought to establish in the book on "The Improvement of the Qualities," with the help of God and His assistance. He is my lot and my fortune, the Helper and the Giver of aid. Praise be to God, the Lord of both worlds! Blessed be the Merciful who hath helped us!

APPENDIX A.

PREFACE OF THE HEBREW TRANSLATOR OF THE "ETHICS."

LETTER of Rabbi Jehuda ibn Tibbon[1] to Rabbi Asher ben Meshullam of Lunel:

To the sweet comrade and the brother-ever-near, whose words are as a light to my path, and whose memory is sweet to my palate, my bundle of spices, my honey, and my honeycomb. R. Asher, may God direct thy heart in the ways of wisdom, and lift thee up to the inheritance of the most high excellences. For thou art so precious in my sight, that I have made my aim the doing of thy will. I have lightened for myself the burden of translation, touching (the difficulties of) which I was warned, because of the things which I have mentioned in the introduction to my translation of the chapter on "Unity," made by me for our Master, the holy Rabbi, thy father (may his light shine), from out the book "The Duties of the Heart." For remember when thou and I were studying that chapter in his presence, I told thee in the course of conversation of the existence of a small work on the "Improvement of the Qualities of the Soul," by the wise philosopher, Solomon bar Rabbi Jehuda (may his memory be blessed) bar Gabirol (may his memory be blessed), which contains all the subjects discussed in the nine chapters of that book, and adds something concerning these things. His words are spoken rightly

[1] Appended to the manuscripts (Neubauer, 1402, 2, Michael, 401) of the Hebrew translation of the "Ethics." Steinschneider published it for the first time (pp. 366, 367, of the "Katalog der Michael'schen Bibliothek," Hamburg, 1848); it was reprinted in the Lyck edition, 1859; cf. St. ("H. U.," p. 381) and H. Gross, Gallia Judaica (Paris, 1897, p. 289).

in a wise manner[1] they lean[2] on Scripture, and are based on the words of the sages, the parables of the ancients, and the ethical sayings of the philosophers. The arrangement of all the chapters is good, the author attains his object in briefest[3] terms, his expressions are well chosen, and the problems he raises are wholesome. He fills them with the wisdom of the heart, with rare ethical sayings, with thoughts like pearls and words like sapphires. When thou didst hear this, thy soul did long to behold it, and to examine it carefully, and thou didst say that if that work should come into our hands with that chapter, it would suffice for us, as if it were the whole work on the "Duties of the Heart," and even take its place. It would spare us the trouble of over-much elaboration, and we should be the better able to remember his words according to the arrangement of his chapters. For such things as are long drawn out, no man can master in good order. I promised thee at that time to translate it after the completion of the first chapter. Behold, I have translated it for thee, to the best of my knowledge and power, all its words and its poetical expression, its parables, its ethical maxims, and its problems. But the place of the verses which are noted therein is left vacant in every chapter because of the word of our master, thy father, Rabbi (may his light shine), who urged me to complete the task before undertaking to give the verses in poetic paraphrase.

If I should find the words of the ancient poets like unto the words of the author of this book, and the words of the Prince (Samuel ha-Nagid), or of those who conducted themselves as these did in matters similar to and relating to them, I will write them in the book with the names of the respective authors. Whatever I cannot find, I shall render to the best of my own judgment, as well as with the aid of the opinion of a friend. I will put every verse in its place on the page. Thou in thy

[1] Cf. Dukes (p. 119, note 1).

[2] The use of this term in this way shows that Ibn Tibbon regarded the Scriptural citations of Gabirol as mere mnemonics; cf. Introduction, p. 13, note 4.

[3] Cf. Rosin (p. 166, note 1).

grace, take thou the trouble to correct its errors, to explain its terms, and to elucidate its meaning, for no one is free from error and sin. Thus said our master, David (Ps. xix. 13), "Who can understand his errors?" As for our God, may He teach us to profit, instruct us that we may understand and become wise, so that wisdom become remembered of us and treasured in our hearts. May He conduct us in the good and right way, and enlighten our eyes with the light of the law as it is written (Is. xlviii. 17), "I am the Lord, Thy God, which teacheth thee to profit"; and, as it is written (Ps. xxxii. 8), "I will instruct thee and teach thee in the way thou shalt go." Blessed is He that giveth strength to the weary.

APPENDIX B.

A COMPARISON OF SOME PROVERBS AND MAXIMS IN THE "ETHICS" WITH PARALLEL SAYINGS IN OTHER ARABIC, MAINLY JUDÆO-ARABIC, WORKS.

THE attempt has not been made to find out all the sources whence Gabirol derived his maxims and apothegms, seeing that, according to his own statements, these are merely cited as illustrative of his ethical teachings. The parallels between the "Ethics" and "Choice of Pearls" are pointed out with some care, because the comparison may tend to throw some light on the moot question of the authorship of the latter. Steinschneider ("H. U.," pp. 387, 388) after pointing out the similarity between the "Choice" and "Ethics" (with some slight variants), makes mention of the surprising circumstance that in the "Choice" no authors' names nor titles are cited, whereas in a number of cases the "Ethics" gives authors and titles in connection with quotations to be found in both works. Even though Gabirol compiled the "Choice" for his personal use when young, it is difficult, as Steinschneider remarks, to see the reason for this omission.

A work by Honein, an Arabic florilegium of the ninth century, translated into Hebrew by Ḥarizi under the title מוסרי הפילוסופים, was published in a Hebrew text together with a German translation by Löwenthal, who has performed with much diligence the task of collating the maxims of Honein with those of the Ethics and other mediæval collections of apothegms—hence the frequent references to Löwenthal's German transla-

tion of Honein. Löwenthal holds that Gabirol made use of the collection of Honein ibn Ishak in the Arabic original, and (pp. 33, 34) points out the agreement of Gabirol with Honein whenever Gabirol cites maxims and gives the authors' names (with occasional exceptions); and also shows that many of the anonymously given proverbs in the Ethics are identical with those cited by Honein. Steinschneider ("H. U.," p. 350, note 658) thinks that Honein's work was known to the Spanish Jews of the eleventh century, but that the maxims in the "Ethics" and "Choice," and also those of Honein, may be derived from a common (earlier) source.

Page 30.—On the question of man's preference for ethical practice, cf. "Choice" (xlii. 429).

Page 44.—The saying of the philosopher, "Habit is master over all things"; cf. Steinschneider ("Erm.," p. 5 and p. xiv., Anm. 36, and "H. U.," p. 353, note 687), Dukes ("Blumenlese," p. 96, no. 44; p. 156, no. 275; p. 244, no. 657), "Choice" (xliii., 480), Dukes ("Phil.," p. 75 and note 2), who quotes the words of Publius Syrus, "*Gravissimum est imperium consuetudinis*," attributed by Honein to Plato (i., chap. v., no. 7, p. 55 and note 7, and ii., chap. ii , no. 1, p. 101 and note 5), and to Aristotle (i., chap. x., no. 59, p. 67); cf. Honein, pp. 10, 11).

Page 45.—On directing men "between the periods of childhood and youth unto good habits," cf. p. 45, note 1, Dukes ("Spruchkunde," p. 58, no. 3, and "Blumenlese," p. 133, no. 171).

Page 48.—Respecting compulsion to obedience and freedom of will, cf. p. 48, note 1, and "Choice" (p. 170, note 491).

Page 51.—The fruit plucked from wisdom, etc.; cf. Steinschneider ("H. U.," p. 978, from Bonsenyor's "Paraules").

Page 56.—On abiding by one's own opinion, cf. Burckhardt (p. 102, no. 259).

Page 57.—On the need of domination for the adjustment of affairs, cf. p. 57, note 1, and "Pirke Aboth," iii. 2.

Page 58.—On the danger of stumbling because of reliance upon one's own opinion, cf. "Choice" (lv. 623).

Page 58.—The saying of the divine Socrates, "From whom doth disappointment," etc.; cf. Steinschneider ("Erm., p. 20, n. 36) and "Choice" (lvi. 629).

Page 58.—"He who sets himself up," etc.; cf. Honein (ii., chap. i., no. 6, p. 88).

Page 58.—The saying of Socrates with respect to aversion; cf. Honein (ii., chap. i., no. 72, p. 97).

Page 59.—Aristotle's comparison of beauty of form with beauty of character; cf. "Choice" (xliv. 551, and note on p. 178), Honein (ii., chap. iii., no. 9, p. 109, and note 4). and Steinschneider ("H. U.," p. 882).

Page 59.—Aristotle's testament to Alexander; cf. Honein (ii., chap. iv., no. 9, p. 115 and note 4), and Journal of American Oriental Society, vol. xv., "Arabic Proverbs and Proverbial Phrases," by J. R. Jewett, p. 73, no. 130.

Page 59.—The saying of Ardeshir; cf. p. 59, note 2: this tale is cited (together with twelve other extracts from the "Ethics") in the Hebrew, together with a German translation in "Proben Morgenländischer Weisheit," by D. Ottensoser, Furth, 1851, p. 26.

Page 60.—Honor, the recompense of meekness; cf. "Choice" (xliv. 514), and Fleischer (p. 67, no. 32).

Page 61.—"Lowliness consists," etc.; cf. Dukes (p. 67, no. 13, and "Spruchkunde," p. 17, no. 47).

Page 61.—The fruit of contentment; cf. p. 61, note 3, and "Choice" (x. 170).

Page 61.—"He who desires of this world," etc.; cf. "Choice" (x. 161, and note on p. 148), Honein (ii., chap. vi., no. 19, p. 124 and note 5), and Steinschneider ("Erm.," p. 21, no. 81).

Page 61.—"He who cannot bear with one word," etc.; cf. "Choice" (iii. 95, and note 79, p. 145), and Dukes ("Blumenlese," p. 164, no. 305).

Page 62.—"A wise man lost among fools"; cf. "Choice" (i. 66, 67, and note 488, p. 170), and Steinschneider ("Manna," p. 90, "Erm.," p. 20, no. 46, and "H. U.," p. 978, from Bonsenyor's "Paraules").

Page 62.—The saying of Lokman; cf. Honein (ii., chap. xii., no. 13, p. 141 and note 6), and Dukes (p. 78).

Page 63.—On the kinship of modesty and intelligence; cf. "Choice" (iii. 78).

Page 63.—"The faults of him," etc.; cf. "Choice" (xii. 177).

Page 64.—Pudency when alone; cf. "Choice" (xxxi. 328, 332 and notes on p. 159), Honein (ii., chap. v., no. 9, p. 118 and note 3, chap. vii., no. 5, p 126, chap. xix., no. 23, p. 156 and note 3). Dukes ("Blumenlese," p. 105, no. 86, and "Spruchkunde," p. 25, no. 78), and Steinschneider ("Erm.," p. 22, no. 139, and "H. U.," p. 979, from Bonsenyor's "Paraules").

Page 64.—The interdependence of pudency and faith; cf. "Choice" (xii. 178 and note on p. 150), and Dukes ('Blumenlese," p. 106, no. 86).

Page 64.—"Pudency marks the countenance of a nobleman"; cf. "Choice" (xii, 176 and note on p. 150).

Page 64.—"If thou art not pudent," etc.; cf. Fleischer (p. 91, no. 24), and Burckhardt (p. 188, no. 643).

Page 64.—"Upon him reposes," etc.; cf. Fleischer (p. 69, no. 54).

Page 64.—The saying of Aristotle, "as a result of modesty," etc.; cf. Honein (i., chap. x., no. 15, p. 65 and note 7) where it is said "Through long-suffering one's helpers are increased."

Page 64.—Modesty in the midst of wrath; cf. Honein (ii., chap. xxi., no. 57, p. 167 and note 9).

Page 64.—"The enmity of the modest man"; cf. Fleischer (p. 79, no. 175), Burckhardt (p. 110, no. 415), Steinschneider ("Erm.," p. 22, no. 117) and Haarbrucker (ii. p. 150): this proverb is to be found in some form in almost

every Arabic collection, cf. "Choice" (xx. 266) and Honein (ii., chap. xxi., nos. 47, 48, p. 167 and note 2).

Page 64.—On trifling away one's dignity; cf. Honein (ii. chap. xxi., no. 24, p. 165 and note 14).

Page 66.—On consideration for the wise, cf. Honein (i., chap. x., no. 62, p. 68).

Page 68.—"None such exists," etc.; cf. Honein (ii., chap. xi., no. 50, p. 138).

Page 68.—"The penalty of misfortune"; cf. "Choice" (xv. 190).

Page 68.—"Fickle of speech"; cf. "Choice" (xv. 192).

Page 69.—"Passion is an enemy of the heart"; cf. "Choice" (xv. 195), and Honein (ii., chap. xvi., no. 12, p. 151, and note 2).

Page 69.—"He who is submissive to his lust," etc.; cf. "Choice" (xv. 199) and Burckhardt (p. 98, no. 249).

Page 70.—On being blind to the object of one's love, cf. Honein (ii., chap. xxi., no. 59, p. 167), and Dukes ("Blumenlese," p. 88, no. 13).

Page 70.—"Thou shalt not attain what thou lovest," etc.; cf. Honein (ii., chap. xix., no. 29, p. 157, and note 3), and Steinschneider ("Erm.," p. 22, no. 140, attributed to Gregorius in the Æthiopic version of Honein; cf. Cornill, "Buch der Weisen Philosophen," Leipzig, 1875, p. 48, and in German translation, p. 24.

Page 71.—"He who loves thee for some reason," etc.; cf. Honein (i., chap. v., no. 5, p. 55 and note 5, and *ibid.*, nos. 18, 19, p. 57 and note 5, and nos. 23, 24, p. 58 and note 2), being attributed in these five passages to Diogenes, Apollonius, Solon, Gregorius, and Pikorus, respectively; cf. Dukes (p. 45, and "Phil.," p. 140), "Choice" (xxv. 288), and Steinschneider ("H. U.," p. 979, from Bonsenyor's "Paraules").

Page 72.—"He who sows hatred," etc.; cf. "Choice" (liii. 616, and note on p. 182).

Page 72.—"Beware of whomsoever your heart hate," etc.; cf. Honein (ii., chap. i., no. 31, p. 90 and note 7), and Steinschneider ("Erm.," p. 21, no. 76).

Page 72.—The most persistent form of hatred caused by envy; cf. Dukes ("Phil.," p. 135 and note 2) and Fleischer (p. 83, no. 224).

Page 72.—"Thou canst cure," etc.; cf. "Choice" (xlviii. 594, and note on p. 181).

Page 75.—The best revenge upon one's enemies; cf. "Choice" (liii. 617, and note on p. 182), Honein (ii., chap. ii., no. 47, p. 107 and note 5). Dukes (p. 71, note 21, and "Phil.," pp 132 and 134, note 17), Steinschneider ("H. U.," cited as found in Bonsenyor's "Paraules"), and Brüll (vol. ix., p. 46, no. 8,—in part 21, "Sprüche des Aristoteles" of a manuscript discussed under the caption, "Beiträge zur Jüdischen Sagen- und Spruchkunde im Mittelalter"); attributed to Homer in Shahrastani (Haarbrucker, ii., p. 144)

Page 76.—Description of joyous souls; cf. Honein (i., chap. vi., p. 59).

Page 77.—"For him who laughs much," etc.; cf. "Choice" (xviii. 234 and note on p. 152, xlii. 425, and note on p. 167), Honein (ii., chap. xiii., no.

17, p. 145 and note 10), and Dukes ("Spruchkunde," p. 70, no. 23, and p. 61, no. 12).

Page 77.—Diogenes on the effects of joy and grief; cf. Honein (ii., chap. vi., no. 19, p. 124, and chap. xii., no. 32, p. 143) and Steinschneider ("H. U." p. 979, from Bonsenyor's "Paraules").

Page 79.—"If it be impossible for a man to have what he desires," etc.; cf. Steinschneider ("Erm.," p. 20, no. 37, and "H. U.," p. 979, from Bonsenyor's "Paraules"), Dukes (p. 88) and Marcus Aurelius (vii. 27).

Page 80.—"Socrates was asked," etc.; cf. "Choice" (vi. 118 and note on p. 147), Honein (ii., chap. i., no. 64, p. 95 and note 3) and Dukes (p. 64, note 6).

Page 80.—"Grief is greatest on the day it comes into being"; cf. Dukes ("Spruchkunde," p. 64, No. 9), who cites parallels from בן המלך והנזיר, in which, according to Guttmann (p. 48, note 2), there are many points of agreement with the "Ethics" and "Sayings of Aristotle." Attributed to Alexander by Honein (iii., chap. i., p. 173 and note 1; cf. p. 23).

Page 80.—Alexander's attempt to console his mother; cf. Honein (iii., chap. i., p. 173 and note 2, p. 174 and note 1) and Dukes (pp. 46, 47).

Page 80.—"Alexander had heard from Aristotle"; told of Alexander in Honein (ii., chap. v., no. 2, p. 117 and note 1), and of Galen (*ibid.*, chap. x., no. 2, p. 133 and note 1).

Page 81.—Galen on apprehensiveness and sadness; cf. Honein (ii., chap. i., no. 11, p. 88 and note 5), and Steinschneider ("Erm.," p. 20, nos. 28 and 38, and "H. U." p. 979, from Bonsenyor's "Paraules").

Page 81.—On the difference between sadness and apprehensiveness; cf. Honein (ii., chap. viii., no. 2, p. 128 and note 5, and chap. ix., p. 131 and note 2).

Page 81.—On the second version of the difference between sadness and apprehensiveness; cf. Honein (ii., chap. ix., p. 132 and note 1).

Page 81.—On the benefits to be derived from apprehensiveness; cf. Honein (ii., chap. xvii., Nos. 6 and 7, pp. 151, 152 and notes).

Page 81.—Socrates on sorrows; cf. Honein (ii., chap. i., no. 12, p. 88 and note 6) and Dukes ("Blumenlese," p. 68, no. 3).

Page 81.—Saying of Ptolemy; cf. Honein (ii., chap. xi., no. 26, p. 136 and note 9); Steinschneider ("Erm.," p. 20, no. 40), and Brüll (vol. ix., p. 47, no. 17, as above cited).

Page 83.—On regretting what has been said and retracting; cf. "Choice" (xxx. 327, and note on p. 159, and xxv. 290).

Page 84.—On indignation being praiseworthy at the sight of wrong-doing; cf. Frankel-Grün (p. 25, note 1).

Page 84.—On the right mean, or "middle way," cf. p. 84, note 1, and Honein (ii., chap. i., no. 10, p. 88 and note 4).

Page 84.—Galen on anger and wrath; cf. Honein (p. 19).

Page 85.—Al-Ḳuṭi on the man of wrath; cf. Honein (ii., chap. iii., no. 1, p. 108).

Page 85.—"Wrath is a disease of the soul," attributed to Galen in Honein (ii., chap. x., no. 5, p. 133).

Page 86.—"Nor must he be so gentle as never to become wrathful"; cf. p. 86, note 1, and Honein (ii., chap. iv., no. 5, p. 114).

Page 86.—Ptolemy on wrath; cf. p. 86, note 2, and Honein (ii., chap. xi., no. 32, p. 137 and note 4).

Page 87.—On the acceptableness of the righteous man; cf. p. 87, note 1, and "Pirke Aboth" (iii. 13).

Page 88.—The story of the king; cf. "Choice" (i. 28, and note on p. 138, iv. 112, and xxvi. 295).

Page 89.—The noble man is never envious; cf. Burckhardt (p. 98, no. 246).

Page 90.—"His name is friend, his intention unfriendly"; cf. Honein (ii., chap. xiii., no. 21, p. 146 and note 4).

Page 90.—The envious man, "created in order to be angered"; cf. Honein (ii., chap. xiii., no. 33, p. 147 and note 2).

Page 90.—"The envious man is grieved at the time of thy joy"; cf. Honein (ii., chap. xiii., no. 34, p. 147, and note 3), and "Choice" (xlviii. 598, and note on p. 181).

Page 92.—"Hastiness the very worst of evils"; cf. p. 92, note 1; "Choice" (v. 114–116, vi. 145, and lxiv., nos. 648, 649, and note on p. 184); Honein (i., chap. x., no. 53, p. 67, and ii., chap. i., no. 18. p. 89 and note 4); Steinschneider ("Erm.," p. 20, no. 7), and Ibn Ḥasdai (W. A. Meisel, "Prinz und Derwisch," Pest, 1860, p. 201).

Page 92.—"The man of hastiness is not secure from disappointment"; cf. Brüll (p. 78, note 2).

Page 92.—"On the value of deliberation; cf. Honein (i., chap. x., no. 54, p. 67).

Page 95.—Bestowing kindness on the worthy and unworthy; cf. "Choice" (xvi. 207).

Page 95.—"Beware of hastily promising," etc.; cf. Burckhardt (p. 243, no. 530).

Page 96.—Religion incompatible with inordinate desire; Saadya speaks in similar terms of undue greed (Emunoth we-Deoth, x.).

Page 97.—"Knowledge is not lessened by imparting it"; cf. p. 97, notes 1, 21; ascribed to Plato in Honein (ii., chap. ii., no. 6, p. 102 and note 3); cf. Löwenthal ("Pseudo-Arist.," chap. vi., p. 108), Dukes ("Blumenlese," p. 178, no. 370 and note 1, and "Spruchkunde," p. 31, no. 103, and p. 91, note f).

Page 99.—"Crave death and life will be granted thee"; cf. Honein (ii., chap. i., no. 13, p. 88 and note 7), Steinschneider ("Erm.," p. 20, no. 43) and Dukes ("Blumenlese," p. 180, no. 377).

Page 108.—"Every vase gives forth whatever it contains"; cf. Dukes ("Blumenlese," p. 149, no. 242, and note on p. 275; p. 153, no. 255; p. 182, no. 389).

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.

In the citation of the principal authorities, the following abbreviations have been used:

Bacher.....W. Bacher, "Die Bibelexegese der jüdischen Religionsphilosophen des Mittelalters vor Maimuni," Budapest, 1892.

Beer.....B. Beer, "Philosophie und philosophische Schriftsteller der Juden," Leipzig, 1852.

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Jellinek.....A. Jellinek, "Der Mensch als Gottes Ebenbild von . . . Rabbi Schabtai Donolo," Leipzig, 1854.

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"M. G. W. J.".....Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judenthums."

Munk.....S. Munk, "Mélanges de philosophie juive et arabe," Paris, 1859.

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Rosin.....D. Rosin, "J. Q. R.," iii., pp. 159–181.

Rosin (" **Maimonides** ").....D. Rosin, " Die Ethik des Maimonides," Breslau, 1876.

Sachs.....M. Sachs, " Die religiöse Poesie der Juden in Spanien," Berlin, 1845.

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Steinschneider (" **H. U.**").....M. Steinschneider, " Die hebräischen Uebersetzungen des Mittelalters," Berlin, 1893.

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

CORRECTIONS OF THE ARABIC TEXT.

THE editor has closely followed the MS. and has allowed the peculiarities of the Judæo-Arabic Script to remain unchanged. In the following list he offers a number of suggestions in correction of what are evident errors of the copyist. A renewed collation of the MS. has enabled him to correct in a few places his own previous readings. These have invariably been indicated by the addition of "MS."

p. 3, 3..MS.	انسانًا	p. 15, 9.....	الماخذ
p. 6, 13.....	قدرًا	p. 17, 21..MS.	الكتاب
22.....	فينبغي ان	p. 19, 20.....	تبعوا
22.....	ولا تبين	p. 20, 16..MS.	هاولا
24.....	تنالها	p. 21, 11..MS.	ابن
p. 7, 25.....	والقسوة	12..MS.	والثغر
p. 8, 11..MS.	اللذين	16.....	فلست
24..(?)	ومنصوب	p. 23, 25..MS.	فاحفظه
p. 10, 3.....	كثيرًا	p. 24, 21.....	اختاره
10..(?)	قبل ان	p. 26, 22..(?)	عدو
13.....	قبل	p. 27, 2.....	قريبًا
p. 14, 12.....	الظالمون	p. 18.....	منهما
p. 15, 1..MS.	اخلاق النفس		
read.....	اخلاق النفس		

CORRECTIONS OF THE ARABIC TEXT.

الاخوان	p. 38, 9. .MS.
امتلأت	25.....
الذكية	p. 39, 23. .MS.
خلق	24.....
وخيمة	p. 40, 23.....
محمودًا	p. 41, 11.....
اعطى	22.....
المذكورون	p. 44, 1.....
المخاطرة	10.....
ميّت	p. 45, 24.....
الضجر	p. 46, 20. .MS.
واجزل	p. 47, 4. .MS.

فيا له	p. 31, 20...٠.
ترفا	23.....٠
يكاثر	p. 32, 18.....
كلبًا	p. 34, 17.....
محمود	20.....
جميع	p. 35, 13. .MS.
الكامل	p. 36, 4.....
محمودًا	ib.....
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وكما	25.....
كثيرًا	p. 37, 3.....
لم يرض بحاله اختيارًا	p. 38, 5.....

كتاب

اصلاح الاخلاق على راى افاضل الحكما المتقدمين

تاليف

العالم الفاضل العارف سليمان بن جبيرول
الاسرايلى الفيلسوف

בשם המלמד אדם דעת

59 b. ‖ هذا كتاب اصلاح الاخلاق على راى افاضل الحكما المتقدمين تاليف العالم الفاضل العارف سليمان بن حبيرول الاسراييلى الفيلسوف قدس الله روحه. الفه بمدينة سرقسطة فى شهر نيسن سنة תתכה للاسكندر: قال تبارك الله العزيز الحكيم القريب المجيب الواحد الازلى الاول المبدع وتعالى علوًا كبيرًا.

اما بعد فانا لما شاهدنا الانسان افضل مخلوقات البارى جل جلاله علمنا بذلك انه الغرض المقصود الى خلق جميع الجواهر والاكوان ثم انه اعدل الحيوان كله مزاجًا وهو مع ذلك اتقنها صورة واحسنها واتمها صنعة ذو نفس ناطقة جوهرية حكيمة خالدة لا تفسد بفساده وعلى جميع ذلك قامت له البراهين جميعها الواضحة العقلية والكتابية التى لا تخفى على ذى لب.

60 a. فنقول ان ما اكد الاشيا على الاقرار بانه ‖ افضل الخلايق وحدانيا اياه مشاركا للحال الملايكه فى النطق والعقل. وهاتان خلتان هى الحيتان روحانيتان. بل نرى مع ذلك الملايكة تتصرف للانسان الصالح كما علمنا من حال אברהם ע"ה فى بشارتهم له وانذارهم ايضا وكذلك יצחק ثم יעקב ابائنا. قال فى دعوته الصالحة لابنه. המלאך הגואל אותי وقال الكتب فيه וישר אל מלאך וגו'. ודניאל אלהי שלח מלאכה. وفى نصر الاولياء وهلاك اعدايهم قال ויהי

בלילה ההוא ויצא מלאך. وكثير مثل هذا لا اطيل بذكره. وقد علمنا ان ثم انسان يفضل على انسان اخر لا محالة. بل حتى ان انسان واحدًا يساوى عددًا كثيرًا من الناس. وعلى انهم من استقام[1] واحد وتركيب واحد لا ان نفس هذا سمت الى الشرف الناسوتى مع اعانة الاحرام الفلكية له وايثاره للادب وانقياد الجزو الادنا منه للاعلى اعنى حكم عقله على طبعه. || وهذا متى انحطت همته ولم تستحق منزلته الوصول الى ذلك الشرف فلم يرتق لما لم تعده الاجرام باثرها ولم يساعده الادب فينبغى اذًا للانسان الحكيم اللبيب ان يصرف مجهوده فى الوصول الى الغاية التى ينحو اليها من السودد وليكن كما قال بعض الحكما اعينو الامور الفلكية بنفوسكم كما يعين الزرع الحرث والسقى على نموه وذلك من طبعه بتوسط الارض وليسع فى الكون من جملة الافاضل وان يدخل مدخلهم جهده وينبغى ان يتلطف فى اخلاقه حتى تنصلح له ولا يصرف حواسه الا فى ما ينبغى من الواجب حتى يكون من المعروفين بالشرف والمشهورين بالفضل اذ هذه هى السعادة الدنوية فاذا نالها لا تزال عيناه شاخصتان الى نيل ما فوقها اعنى السعادة الدايمة التى تنحو اليها فى عالم العقل اعنى دار الاخرة فهى نهاية نعمة الله على عباده بعد الفضل الذى شملهم || بوجدانهم مخلوقين[2]. ولقد سال الولى דוד ע"ה فى نيل نعيم الدنيا נעשה עמי אות וגו' وتمنى ايضا ان يكون ممن تهيا لنيل نعيم الاخرة اذ قال מה רב טובך אשר צפנת וגו' ירוין כדשן ביתך וגו' وهذه منزله لا يوصل اليها الا باستحقاق. وكما قال י"י מי יגור וגו' وقال הולך תמים וגו' ثم انا لما وصلنا من كلامنا الى هنا من ذكر فضل الانسان راينا ان نصرف قولنا الى ذكر غرض كتابنا هذا. ووجه الوصول الى منفعته. فنقول انه يكون ذلك بعد ان ننظم الكلام

60 b.

61 a.

1 Ms. استقم.

2 Ms. مخلوقون.

فى جمع فنونه على ما ينبغى وحينيذٍ نحصل على فايدته. وشبيهٌ بقوّ سليمان الحكيم ع"ס ראה זה מצאתי אמרה קהלת אחת לאחת למצא חשבון. اراد بهذا القوّ ان بايتلاف الاشيا حينيذٍ توجب ان تكون ويقع عليها العدد وكذلك بنظام الكلاء ينفهم.

وذقول ان الله عز وجل خلق استمداد[1] العالم الصغير[2] || جاريًا 61,b.
على طبايع اربع: جعل فيه الدمْ بازآ الهوا والصفرا بازآ النار والسودا بازآ الارض والبلغم بازآ الما. ثم انه خلقه الله تعّ اعنى الانسان تام الصورة كامل الالة لا يعجزه شيا. وخلق فيه خمسة حواس كما سنذكرها. وقد اشار سليمان الحكيم بذكرها فى قوله שבתי וראה תחת השמש [معنى اعتبار وهو عام اخرجه مخرج الخاص اذ قوله תחת השמש][3] اراد به ما يحيط به المحيط. وقوّ כי לא לקלים המרוץ رمز بذلك الى حاسة الشم التى.هى الانف لان التجرى انما هو باستنشاق الهوى من خارج ليروح عن الحرارة الغريزية التى فى باطن الانسان والاستنشاق يكون بحاسة الانف ولولا الانف لم يكن النفس الموجب للحركة. وقوّ ולא לגבורים המלחמה. اراد به حاسة السمع كما نشاهد الحرب انما يكون بالسمع والتقريع على ما قال קול מלחמה במחנה. وقوّ ונם לא לחכמים לחם. اراد به [حاسة][3] الذوق والكلام[4] على || ظاهره. وقوّ ונם לא לנבונים עשר اراد به حاسة اللمس التى هى من 62 a.
[نوع][3] الفهم وهو من جنس الحواس الباطنة المكنونة فى فطرة النفس نحو الفطنة والفكرة والفهم وقوّ ונם לא ליודעים חן. اراد به حاسة النظر التى لا تكون دوة الا باطالة النظر فى الكتب ودوام الدرس للدواوين. ولو لا كثرة التطويل وحب الايجاز لكنا نجلب على هذه الرموز حجتًا واضحة من القياس العقلى والعلم التقليدى

1 Ms. استيمدار.
2 Cf. translation.
3 [Margin].
4 Ms. الكلام.

حتى كانت تكون سهلة قريبة الادراك. ومن كان من ذوى القرايح المشهرة والهمم النفيسة فهذا اليسير يقنعه من البرهان. على ان الولى الحكيم انما كانت اشارته بهذه الاية الى الحواس الظاهرة. وطوى ذكر الباطنة. فاذا كان الانسان حكيمًا صرفها فى وجهها وقمعها عما لا ينبغى له ان يصرفها فيه بل يكون كالطبيب الماهر الذى يدبر النسخه فيجعل من كل دوا كمية محدودة وتكون العقاقير مختلفة الاوزان مثل ان ‖ يجعل من هذا دانقًا ومن هذا قيراطًا وما نحا هذا النحو بتقديره تاثير كمياتها ولا يقنعه ذلك حتى تجعل بينها حجابات فاصلة تحجب من ضررها وكل ذلك بتدبير. فاذا كان ذلك كذلك فينبغى للانسان ان يقدر اخلاقه التى هى من حواسه ولا يصرفها الا فى الواجب لان الله تع ركبها فى الانسان ليحكم تدبيرها اذ بها يحرس قوام حياته لان بها ينظر الالوان. ويسمع الاصوات. ويذوق الطعوم. ويشم الارابيح. ويميز بين الخشن واللين. وما اشبه ذلك مما يكون به السبيل الى الحيوة. وكثيرًا ما فيها من وجوه المنافع التى سنذكرها فى ما نستانفه ان شآ الله تعالى: فنصف الآن الحواس ووجوه منافعها والنهى عن تصريفها فى وجوه المضار:

فنقول اول الحواس واشرفها حاسة العين اذ منزلتها من البدن كمنزلة الشمس فى العالم وهى حاسة لا تزال مدركة محسوسها ابدا بلا زمان ‖ اعنى ان ادراكها ما قرب منها كسرعة ادراكها ما بعد عنها وليس بين ادراكها القريب وادراكها البعيد زمان كما لساير الحواس. والعين واقعة على محسوسها ما دام كونها مفتوحة. ولذلك لم يمكن النوم الا وهى مطبق عليها. وما اعجب قو بعض الفلاسفة فى حاسة العين اذ قال للنفس اصبغة روحانية قد تظهر فى حركات احرف العين وقال تحفظ من حاسة النظر فانها تودى الى انواع من الفتن. وقد تشهد عليك فى بعض الحركات بالكبر والعجب وفى بعضها بالورع

والتواضع فالزمها افضل الحركات وجنبها ارذلها. وقال ليس
الخلطة لملاذ العين بل لملاذ الفهم وهذا الكلام لا يتخفى على
الاديب. وما احسن موافقة هذا القوَ لقوَ الله عز وجل ולא תתורו
אחרי לבבכם ואחרי עיניכם. ويتلوها حاسة السمع فى الشرف وان كانت
هذه الحاسة قريبة الفعل فى النفس من ‖ العين فليس يصغى 63 b.
لها الانسان كما يصغى للعين. ومن حسن الادب فى هذه الحاسة
ليميلها الانسان عن سماع الامور الفاحشة ولا يقضى بما يسمعه
من النغمات الشجية بما يشاكل الصوت ولكن بما يشاكل المعنى
والارادة ولا يصطاد بمسموعه كالطاير الذى يصطاد بما يانس الى ما
يعجبه من الاصوات. وان يعرف المواضع التى يجب فيها حسن
الاصغا اليها والتى لا يجب ان تسمع اصلًا. وشبيه بمن قيل فيه
אטם אזנו משמע דמים ومحسوس الاستنشاق يتلو محسوس السمع اذ
محسوس الصوت فى الهوا وهو اقل قدر من محسوس السمع.
ولذلك الرياضة فيه اقل اذ ليس فيه طاعة ولا معصية. واما
الذوق فان كان فى المنزلة دون المحسوسات المتقدمة فان
سبيل الرياضة فيه اكثر اذ لا يقوم البدن دونه كما يقوم دونها
وسبيل الرياضة فيه ان يلجم عما يحرم. ويطلق لما يحل. ويحكم
فى جميع ذلك ‖ العقل على الشهوة. واول ما يظهر به ملكك 64 a.
لشهوتك ففى الطعام والشراب كما ان ذلك اول ما اخطا به
الانسان. والمحسة تتلو حاسة الذوق وهى من جنسها وملاذها
من خواص جوارح البدن المعتدل المزاج ولا حاجة للنفس البرهانية
فيها غير تدبير البدن بها: واما وجه الرياضة فيها ان تعلم
ان تلك الشهوات علل فى البدن تشفيها ودوا تداويها ولا تبن
انها من خواص النفس العقلية. ولا تقدر ان ينالها النعمة
التامة. والسعادة الكاملة. كمثل نيل الفضايل التى تستحق
بها الكرامة فى حكم العقل: وبعد فانا لما شرعنا فى وصف الحواس.
فنقول الان انا انزلناها منزلة التجنس ثم نذكر بعدها ما تحتها

من الانواع التى هى اخلاق الانسان ثم نسمى بعد ذلك كل شخص من النوع ونصف وجوه منافعه ومضاره. وكيفية الوصول الى وجه اصلاحه. ونقول انا لما اخذنا فى نسبة الاخلاق الى ‖ الحواس 64 b.
على طريق العدد. صار منها لكل حاسة ٦ اخلاق فنسبنا اولا الى حاسة النظر ٦ وكذلك لسايز الحواس فصار العدد ٥ خلقًا لله 5
حواس.

فمن ذلك للعين الشمخ الخشوع الحيا القحة. فاما ما نراه من الشمخ فى حاسة العين فظاهر وعلى ما تقدم لنا من القول فيه وايضا لانك ترى استشزار البصر فى الشامخين العظيمى النفوس. وبعكس ذلك ما نرى فى المهين الهمة 10
الخشوع. وقال الكت فى المتكبرين עיני גבהות אדם שפל וגו׳ وايضا ועיני גבהים תשפלנה. وما اشبه ذلك. فقو هنا עיני يدل على ان خلق الشمخ منسوب الى حاسة العين. وفى الخشوع قال מהור עינים מראות רע وما اشبه ذلك. واما الوقح فانك تراه على اكثر الحالات جاحظ العين لا تهوله الخزية. وكمن قيل فيهم הכרת פניהם 15
ענתה בם وكانك ترى ابصار الظالمين ذوى القحة شاخصات غير 65 a.
ساكنات. وشبيه من قيل فيهم ועיני רשעים תכלינה ‖ وقال ايضا فى الوقحين חזקו פניהם מסלע. وبعكس ذلك ترى الحيى يميل بعينيه لكى يستحق بذلك الحظ الوافر من الله ومن الناس. كما قال ולעגוים יתן חן. وكما سنشرحها فى ابوابها شرحًا شافيًا بعون الله 20
تع. وهذا الحظ انما ينال بتوسط النظر من الناظر والمنظور اليه وكما قال فى سيدنا موسى ع כי והאיש משה עניו מאד وكان تقدم بازا هذا قو גם האיש משה גדול מאד.

واما حاسة السمع فهى جنس وتحتها ٦ انواع. اعنى اخلاق. وهى الحب والبغض الرحمة القسوة. 25

فنقول قد ينبغى ان يلطف النظر فى نسبة هذه الـ٦ اخلاق المنسوبة الى حاسة السمع. فانا وان لم نظهر كلامنا مشروحًا فى غاية

من البيان فان ذوى الالباب يكتفون بالرموز والاشارات. وانه: لا يلام من اتى بيسير من الصواب لما لم يحو عليه كثيره ولعل الناظر يوسعنى عذرا فى ما لم ادرك من حلب البراهين العقلية والمنطقية || والقياسات الكتابية فى ما تناولناه. اذ القوة البشرية 65 b.
ضعيفة لا سيما لشبهنا لما نحن عليه من دوام فرط التنغص. وقلة البلوغ الى الامال:

ونقول ان فى مواضع وقع السمع فى الكتاب وتلاه بعد ذلك البحث نحو قوله שמע ישראל וגו' وقال بعد ذلك ואהבת את יי אלהיך וגו' وايضا כאשר שמע עבד אברהם وقال بعده וישתחו ארצה ליי. وايضا ויהי כשמע לבן את שמע וגו' وبعده ויחבק לו. וינשק לו. ويقع ايضا السمع على القبول والرضا الذين هما عنصر المحبة كقو נעשה ונשמע. والعمل للشى يكون بمحبة الانسان له. وشبيه بقو ועשה לי מטעמים וגו' وقد يقع ايضا الرحب والبشر بعد السمع. بقو וישמע משה וייטב בעיניו. كما انه يقع الغضب دون القبول والسمع. بقو ולא שמעו אל משה .....; ויקצוף עליהם משה. وبلى ايضا السمع البغض كما علمت فى עשו. بقوله כשמע עשו את וגו'. ثم تلاه וישטום עשו את יעקב
|| فاما الرحمة فمعلوم انها تكون بعد السمع منها قو الله ושמעתי 66 a.
כי חנון אני وقو فى الصالحين المرحومين. ושומע לי ישכן בטח. وبعكس هذا ما قيل فى الظالمين. קול פחדים באזניו בשלום שודד יבואנו وما اشبه ذلك. واما القسوة فهى من قلة القبول. كما قال فى فرعون فى كثير من المواضع ואחזק יי את לב פרעה ולא שמע وقال فى الامة القاسية נוי עז פנים وايضا قال فيه נוי לא תדע לשונו ולא תשמע מה ידבר وما اشبه ذلك:

واما حاسة الشم فلها من الاخلاق ד الغضب الرضا الغيرة النشاط. فاما الغضب منسوب الى حاسة الشم. من قو ויחר אפו. واكثر ما يظهر الغضب والانفة والبحرد ففى الانف. وكما قال באדין נבוכדנצר התמלי חמא וצלם אנפוהי אשתני. وانما الرضا يكون بسكون الخواطر

التى هى فى الدماغ ولا يغيرها عرض من حاسة الشم التى هى
66 b اقرب الحواس الفاعلة فيه ‖ وفى الرضا يقوّ באור פני מלך חיים ורצונו כעב
מלקוש: والغيرة والنشاط قد يكونان بحاسة الانف. والغيرة شعبة
من الغضب وشبيه بقوّ כי קנאה חמת גבר فقد بان بهذا مشاركة
النحمية التى هى الغضب للغيرة فى حال الحاسة: واما النشاط
فهو حركة الانسان وتكون بقوام الات التنفس التى هى فطب
حاسة الشم وكما قلنا انفا فى فصل כי לא לקלים המרוץ:

واما حاسة الذوق فتحتها من الانواع ד اخلاق. وهى الفرح والهم
والندم والاطمانية. الا ترى ان افضل المسرات ما استعملت
بالماكل والمشارب التى تنال بتوسط حاسة الذوق. الم تسمع
الولى يقوّ הגישה לי ואכלה מציד בני وايضا ויאכל בעז וישת ויטב לבו. وقد
يفرح الكلام الذى هو باللفظ الذى هو من جنس الذوق. بقوّ שכחה
לאיש במענה פיו. وبعكس هذا قد يتلو عدم فعل هذه الحاسة. اعنى
67 a. الهم. كقوّ ותבכה ולא תאכל. وايضا ‖ قوله فى יהונתן. ולא אכל ביום החדש
השני לחם כי נעצב אל דוד. وكثير مثل هذا مما استعمله شاول وغيره:

واما خلق الندم الوجه فى نسبته الى الذوق بالتوبة والندم على ما
سلف ومنع النفس من انواع اللذات التى تكون بالذوق كما قال
شوبه ישראל وما اشبهها: ونسبة خلق الاطمانية ايضا الى الذوق
فى قول סנחריב. ועתה אלי ואכלו איש גפנו ואיש תאנתו. وايضا וירא את העם אשר
בקרבה יושבת לבטח:

واما حاسة اللمس فلها ايضا ד اخلاق وهى السخا والبخل والشجاعة
والجبن. فانما نسبة السخا الى اللمس لا يكون الا فى باطن الكف
والسخا لا يكون الا باطلاق اليد كما يكون البخل بقمعه. وقيل فى
العطا מתן אדם ירחיב לו ולפני גדולים ינחנו. وقيل فى البخل. וקובץ על יד ירבה.
67 b. واما نسبة الشجاعة الى اللمس فبيّن من ايثار ‖ البطش فى
اليد. نحو قوّ ידה ליתד תשלחנה وبعكس هذا ما قيل فى الجبن חזקו
ידים רפות. وايضا כל הידים תרפינה وما اشبه ذلك.

فاذ قد تبين ان جميع اخلاق النفس هى منسوبة الى الـ
حواس. فلنرجع الان الى كلامنا الاول الذى قلنا انه غرض الكتاب:
فنقول انا راينا كثير من الناس لا يحسنون سياسة اخلاقهم
ليجروها على القانون الادبى والمنهاج العقلى. راينا من وجه
5 الحزم ان نولف فى ذلك كلامًا مقنعًا يحتوى على كثير من
وصف الاخلاق. ووجوه استعمالها وكيفية البلوغ الى الصالح
منها معما صادفه فى ذلك النجاح عظيم من بعض اخوانى رغبنى
فى ذلك ليكون لنا وله تذكرة وعدة لاختلاف الاحوال بحسب
الازمان واضطراب المكان واختلاف الانسان. ورغب الىّ ان يكون
10 ما اثبت له من نسبة الاخلاق الى الحواس قبل نشرح شى منها
لابينها له على طريق الشكل الهندسى والبرهان الظاهر للحس.
فراينا ‖ ان نرسم قبل ذلك شكلًا فى الطبايع الـ التى كنا قد ذكرناها 68 a.
قبيل. ثم رسمناها فى صدر كتابنا هذا على هيئة شكلية لتكون
الاوهام الى فهمها انشط. والخواطر الى تدبيرها ابسط. ورسمنا فى
15 كل طبيعة ما لها من العناصر. ثم اضفنا الى كل طبيعة منها ه
اخلاق حسب ما يوجبه العدد. واضفناها الى ما لها من الاخلاق
فيها اثرة. بعد تقدم تصنيفها فيه ايضا اعنى فى الشكل ما منها
حارا. وما منها باردا. وفى اى شكل هى من العناصر. وكذلك ما
منها رطب. وما منها يابس. وايتلافها واختلافها. كل ذلك على
20 طريقة الشكل ومن الله نسل ان يحسم اعتراض مناظرينا
بشعورتهم. واين يطسس افواه مكالمينا برعونتهم. لانى غير امن
ان يبلغ بهم حسدهم. الى اخذ من موضعنا وانى لا ارتدع من
تشويشهم. ولا انكسر لتوحيشهم. وكفى وربى حسبى وبه توكلت
الا هو منجا للمعتصمين. وخير ملجا للملتمسين نصرته. وكفوّ
25 טוב ״ לקוו ונ׳ ‖ وانى لبرى من مطالبتهم. ان تتجبرو. وتتقى من 68 b.
مكابرتهم ان تصدرو. لانه ليس بيدى مساة احتمل سطواتهم
عليها غير انى اقوّ ישטנוני תחת רדפי טוב. وقد علم الله انى لم اشارك

فى تاليفى غير خاطرى وكتابى . ولا باشرت سوى هاجسى . ومن كان من ذوى النفوس الفاضلة والهمم العالية وشغفة كلامنا يستدل به على نفسنا فان وجد فيه غلطًا سيجد لاعذارى أعلامًا بينة فى رووسها نار وهذه حكاية الشكل الاول الذى هو العناصر والطبايع.



69 a. ‖ فقد نظمنا نسبة كل طبيعة الى عنصرها وكل خلق الى طبيعته على ما يوجبه البرهان وكما سنبينه فى غير هذا المكان بمعونة الطايق الكافى تع

وبعد رسمنا لهذا الشكل على هذا البيان نقول الان ان جملة ما حصلنا من اخلاق الانسان د خلقًا منها محمودة بذاتها. ومنها مذمومة بذاتها. فينبغى لمن اراد ان يحصل على اصلاح اخلاقه ان يسير بنفسه على السيرة الجيدة حتى تصير له الاخلاق المحمودة كالجدا يالفها ولا يفارقها من حال صبايه وينبسط لها رويدًا رويدًا حال بعد حال. وكما قال الحكيم חנוך לנער על־פי דרכו. وقد قال الفيلسوف المعقول مواهب. والادب مكاسب. والعادة على كل شى سلطان. واعلم ان جميع اخلاق الانسان التى تظهر فيه فى حال الشباب والتحول فهى فيه فى حال الطفولية والصبا. وان كان ليس فى قوته ان تظهر فيه وانما هى فيه بالقوة لا بالفعل. وكما ترى بعض الصبيان ‖ يظهر فيهم خلق الحيا. وبعضهم القحة. وبعضهم 69 b. يميل الى اللذات. وبعضهم الى الفضايل. وبعضهم الى الرذايل. فهذه واشباهها هى فى اخلاق النفس البهيمية. فاذا صارو الى حال الشباب ظهرت قوة النفس الناطقة فعلها. واصرفت فاعلها الى حسن الراى فى اصلاح الاخلاق. اذ لم تكن من عادة النفس البهيمية صلاحها. وهذا الكلام وعلى انه برهانى. فانا قد انتحلناه تقليديًا. من قول الولى גם במעללין יתנכר נער. واما الصبيان اللذين غمرتهم حال الدناية. انما يمكن تنقلهم الى الحالة الشريفة مهما لم يتجاوزون حد الصبى. فان تجاوزو الى حد الحداثة والشيخوخة وهم مقيمون على حالهم عسر تنقلهم الى حسن السيرة. بما مثل من قوام الغصن قبل ان يعظم. فاذا صار شجرة عسر تنقلها وحركتها. ومن ذلك ترى ان اكثر الناس فى حال شيخوختهم لم ينتقلو عما كانو عليه فى حال شبابهم. كما ان اكثر الناس ينتقلون ‖ من حال صبايهم. الى حال حداثتهم. الى 70 a.

حسن العادة. وهذا هو محض معنى חנוך לנער על פי דרכו גם כי יזקין وكقوله احبارنا ع ت بن عشرים בה ימות. واقو ايضا ان من الممتنع ان يكون فعل الشر فى طبع نفوس الناطقين اذ ليس ذلك من الحكمة. خلق الله النفس خالصة نقية سادحة. كما قال الحكيم לבד ראה זה מצאתי אשר עשה האלהים את האדם. وانما ما جا منها من غير الجميل فانما هو من عارض النفس النباتية. اعنى فعل الطبع. وقال بعض الفلاسفة من لم يلتزم الفضايل لما يدرك بها من ملاذ حواسه واوحوايج بدنه فليس بعالم بحقيقة الفضايل. لكن الذى يلتمسها لمعرفته بفضلها وفايدتها. وان الموت عليها خير من البقا مع اضدادها ومن نزه فكره عن الرذايل رفعه الى الفضايل: وبقدر بعد الانسان من الرذايل يكون قربه من الله تع. وبقدر قربه من الرذايل. يكون بعده منه. ‖ ثم 70 b. نقو فى اخلاق الانسان الد. ان דוד ع ت اشار الى ذكرها ورمز الى عيونها فى מזמור לדוד. אל תתחר במרעים וגו فمنها ما فصح بذكرها على ظاهر الاية. ومنها ما رمز اليها باشارة فقط. ومنها ما امر بالطاعة بتوسط الاخلاق المحمودة. ومنها ما نهى الا تستعمل من الاخلاق المذمومة. ومنها ما ذم قومًا اخطوء السبيل فى كيفية ترتيبها. ومنها ما مدح قوما اصابو فى تدرجهم على حسن العادة. فقو اولًا אל תתחר במרעים يريد به النهى عن الاغتباط بالاشرار. فاذا لم يغتبط بهم فيجب على الانسان ان يبغضهم لا محالة: ثم انه نهى عن حسدهم. والغيرة لحالهم. هو قوله אל תקנא בעשי עולה. ثم امر بالثقة بالرب والاطمانية به هو قو בטח ביי ועשה טוב. ثم اشار باستعمال خلق الحيا والحلم فى قوله שכן ארץ ורעה אמונה. فقو قبل שכן ארץ وبعد ורעה אמונה. يدل على ان ثمرة ‖ البقا فى البلاد 71 a. باستحقاق الحلم والحيا الذى لقب אמונה. كما علمت من قو בכל ביתי נאמן הוא. وما تقدم قبل هذا من وصف الحلم. واما ما قلنا من استحقاق الحياة والبقا فى البلاد هو نظير قو וענוים יירשו

ארץ. וקוֹ ותתענג על " اشار به الى خلق الفرح الذى يصرفه الصالح
فى طاعته لربه اذا التذّ بها. وكما قال هناك שמחו בי׳ וגילו צדיקים.
وايضا قيل فى وقت البشرى. שוש אשיש בי׳ וקוֹ ויתן לך משאלות לבך.
اشار بذلك الى خلق الشهوة الذى هو الحب. فان الله يوفق
5 شهوة الصالحين. وكما وعدهم فى قوله ימלא " כל משאלותיך. וקוֹ הרף
מאף هو على ظاهره. وهو النهى عن استعمال شدة الحرد والغضب
وفى קוֹ ועזוב חמה الاول يقتضى الاقلاع. والثانى الندم. على ما سلف.
וקוֹ וענוים יירשו ארץ وهم الخاشعون. على ظاهر الاية. וקוֹ וזמם רשע
לצדיק וחורק עליו שניו. اشار به الى ما يستعمله الظالمون ‖ من القحة 71 b.
10 والتعاطى. וקוֹ " ישחק لا يعنى بذلك انه يهلك هذا الوقح ويفرح
بهلاكه الصالح. وكما قال ישמח צדיק כי חזה נקם וקוֹ חרב פתחו רשעים اشار
به الى ما يظهر به الظالمين من المحاماة والشجاعة. וקוֹ למבוח
ישרי דרך اشار به الى خلق القسوة التى هى اغلب على جميع
اخلاقهم וקוֹ וקשתותם תשברנה. رمز به الى خلق الشمخ نظير קוֹ فى
15 נוי עז פנים. קשת וכידון יחזיקו וקוֹ כי זרועות רשעים תשברנה. اراد به ما يصيرون
اليه اذا ضعفت حدّتهم وقواهم من خلق الجبن ولم يرتفع لهم
ذراع لشى. וקוֹ לוה רשע ולא ישלם اشار به الى خلق البخل. וקוֹ
וצדיק חונן ונותן. ذكر الخلقين اللذين فى نفس الصالح وهم الرحمة.
والسخاء. فلما فرغ من تحريرهما ختمهما بخلق الرضا. كما
20 نقول اذا كان الانسان يجرى على السيرة المستقيمة فى هذه
الاخلاق. على ما وصفناها من استعمال الممدوح منها وترك المذموم.
فحينيذ يرضا الله عنه. كقוֹ מי׳ מצעדי גבר כוננו. ولا يكون ظانًا ان 72 a.
قوله מי׳ מצעדי גבר يدل على الجبر فى الطاعة والمعصية. بل هو فى
السعادة والشقا. فقוֹ מי׳ מצעדי גבר. اراد به انه خلق النفس تامة لا
25 يعجزها شى. فاذا مالت الى الفضايل والعادة الحسنة والسيرة
الجميلة هو قוֹ כוננו فحينيذ يستحق ان يرضا الله عنه. هو
قוֹ ודרכו יחפץ. فقد تبين مما ذكرنا فى ان דוד ע״ה اشار بهذه الرموز

الى وصف كيفية اصلاح خلاق نفس الانسان واجرايها على حسن العادة. وسوى ما قد ذكرها سليمان الحكيم فى كتبه وحثّ على الوصول الى اصلاحها باى وجه يمكن. وكما سأذكرها ان شاء الله تعالى. ثم انا نتبع كلامنا هذا الى الخروج الى وصف كيفية الشكل المستنبط للحواس والاخلاق. ونبيين فيه كيف تتفرع الاخلاق من الحواس ونضم كل شخص الى نوعه وكل نوع الى جنسه اعنى ان نبيين ‖ ماهية الاخلاق المتفزعة من حاسة النظر وكميتها. وكذلك من حاسة السمع. وساير الحواس على هذا القانون. وسيكون شكلا منجدولا لكى يكون سهل الماكد قريبا للمبتديين فى علم هذا الفن والمبتغيين منال منفعته المستعينين بالله على بلوغ مصالحهم فى العلوم الرياضية والدنوية: وهذه صورة الشكل المنجدول المستنبط لتفريع الاخلاق الـ من الحواس الـ

72 b.

النظر	السمع	الشم	الذوق	اللمس
الشمم	الحب	الغضب	الفرح	السخاء
الخشوع	البغض	الرضاء	الهم	البخل
الحياء	الرحمة	الغيرة	الطمانينة	الشجاعة
القحة	القسوة	النشاط	الندم	الجبن

73 a. ‖ فاذ قد اتينا على ما اردنا من تمثيل الاشكال. فلنختم الان صدر كتابنا بذكر فصيلته وابوابه. ونقول انا سمينا كتابنا هذا اصلاح الاخلاق تلطيفًا بكثير من العوام حتى يصلو الى معرفة طبايع الحواس ويفهمو ذلك بانواع من الكلام. واثبتنا فيه ما حضرنا من الحجج العقليّة. والبرهانيّة. واستجلبنا ايضا ما امكنّا من

الايات الكتابيّة. ولم ار باسًا بان اثبت بعد تقدمة هذه نزرًا من منثور الفاظ الحكمة: واتبع ذلك بتحف من منظوم رجز الادبا. وشعر الشعرا. وما حضر من نادرة. وما امكن ذكره ليكون كتابنا كاملًا فى جميع الفنون. ولعل الناظر فيه بعلاه ومكارمه يبسط عذرى فيما لم ابلغ فيه الغاية. ولا اقصى النهاية. اذ لم يكن قصدى فى تاليف هذا الكتاب ان افيد ما يفوقنى فى فطنة
73 b. فى زماننا هذا. اذ لم ادع معاذ ‖ الله الفوز بشى من فنون العلم. بل اىّ ثمرة اجتنيتها من العلم. علمى انى لست بعالم. ولم ادع مشورة اقرانى واقر له بالعجز. وانا كقول القايل انى كمن حيا الرياض بزهرها. او كغالب* الوشى الى صناعها واهلها. ومن الوح الامور على اعذارى فى ما لم ابلغ الغاية واوكد الاسباب لترك ملامة فى ما لم انتهى النهاية ما نحن عليه فى زماننا من الضر والضيقة وترادف الشقا واضطراب الاحوال ولست بشاك بل مع هذا لا ادع شكر بارينا تعالى على ما منحنا من نعمة وانار ابصارنا وبصايرنا بايجادنا السبيل الى فهم شى من العلوم: وقد قسمنا كتابنا هذا على π اقسام يحوى كل قسم ٦ ابواب الى تمام ٥ بابًا حسب ما تضمنه الشكل. وضممت الى كل قسم ما له من الحواس. ولكل حاسة ما لها من الاخلاق. وهذه اقسام الكتاب وهى π بازا الπ حواس التى تقدم ذكرها.

74 a. ‖ القسم الا. فى حاسة العين

ويحوى ٦ ابواب

الباب الا. القول فى خلق الشمخ
الباب الا. القول فى خلق التخشوع والحث على استعماله
الباب الا. القول فى الحياء والحلم
الباب الا. القول فى القحة والنهى عنه

القسم الـ٠ فى حاسة السمع

يتضمن ٦ ابواب

الباب الـ٠ القول فى الحب ووجوه استعماله
الباب الـ٠ القول فى البغض ومجانبته وترك ايثاره
الباب الـ٠ القول فى خلق الرحمة والرافة ومدح اولياها والحث على ايثارها
الباب الـ٠ القول فى القسوة وترك ايثارها

القسم الـ٠ فى حاسة الذوق

يتضمن ٦ ابواب

الباب الـ٠ القول فى خلق الفرح واستعماله
الباب الـ٠ القول فى الهم والتسلى عن الحزن
الباب الـ٠ القول فى الاطمانينة
الباب الـ٠ القول فى الندم والحذر عنه

القسم الـ٠ فى حاسة الشم

74 b.

يحوى ٦ ابواب[1]

الباب الـ٠ القول فى خلق الغضب والحرد
الباب الـ٠ القول فى الرضا والبشرى
الباب الـ٠ القول فى الغيرة والحسد
الباب الـ٠ القول فى خلق النشاط

القسم الـ٠ فى حاسة اللمس

ويشتمل على ٦ ابواب وبها يكمل الـ باب من لكتاب

الباب الـ٠ القول فى السخا والجود
الباب الـ٠ القول فى خلق البخل وذمه
الباب الـ٠ القول فى الشجاعة واستعمالها
الباب الـ٠ القول فى الجبن والحذر عنه

[1] Ms. ابوب.

فاذ قد اكملنا تعديد اقسام الكتاب وابوابه. فلنبدا الان بشرح جميعها بعون الله تع ومنه نسل ان يسلك بنا طرق السداد. ويزلفنا سبل الرشاد بمنه. وكما ساله وليه הדריכני באמתך וגו׳

75 a. ‖ الباب الـ من القسم الـ

القول فى السمنج.

ما احسن ما اتفق هذا الباب ان يكون اولًا لجميع الابواب على ما اوجبته النسبة: ثم اقوّ انى شاهدت كثيرًا من الخواص يستعملون هذا التخلق فى غير الواجب ويوثرونه على ساير اخلاقهم بل حتى انتحلوه العوام وصرفوه فى ما لا يشاكلهم تصريفه فى احوالهم حتى صار من غالب طبعهم. وايضا ارى هذا التخلق كثير الوجدان فى اصاغر[1] الانسان فى[2] الصبا والشباب. لا سيما ان وافق هذا مزاج صفراوى حار. لان من شان الصفرا الارتقا. فبهيجانها تعيد طبيعة الانسان فى استعمال هذا التخلق. حتى يكاد ان يستعمله الانسان فى حال لا ينبغى ان يظهره فيه. ومن جزايات فروع هذا التخلق العجب والصلف والكبريا. وهذه الفروع ليست من اخلاق الافاضل السالفين الذى شهدت لهم المناقب الشريفة التى هى عكس ‖ هذه. وكما علمنا ان اقوام 75 b. عرفو بهذه الاخلاق يستعملونها فى غير وجوهها. فصارو بذلك مذمومين. وقوم اخذو فى استعمال الانواع المحمودة من هذا التخلق فمدحوا على ذلك. ولا اطيل بذكر اسمايهم اذ ذلك معروف. واذا كان ذلك بذلك فينبغى ان نتلطف فى الوصول الى كيفية التحيلة فى استعمال هذا التخلق فى وجهه. وقمعه من غير وجهه. وذكر ما يتولد من مذموماته من المكروه:

فنقوّ انا اذا راينا هذا التخلق قد اثر فى طبع الانسان. فينبغى لنا

[1] Final letter wanting in Ms.
[2] Ms. فى اصاغ الانسان فى.

ان نواسه بسمع الامور المفزعة الداعية الى الفكرة فى اوايل الموجودات وفى اواخرها. اعنى حدوث الاكوان وابتداها وفناها وتلاشيها. فاذا علم ان جميع الموجودات متغيرة. فبالاحرى ان يتغير وجدانه ويضمحل جسمه. فعاد خلق النفس الذى كان شامخًا فى حال الحياة. خاشعًا نادمًا فى حال الممات. فاذا كانت الضرورة توجب هذا القياس || العقلى والعلم التقليدى. وجب 76 a.
ان يكون الانسان الحكيم يروم الانصراف عن ايثار هذا التخلق من ذاته اذ هو مذموم وليس فى طوقه استجلاب منفعة فى حال من الاحوال. بل هو سبب لكثير من المهالك لا سيما ان دعاه عجبه الى ان لا يميل الى مشورة احد من الناس وعلى ان فى المشورة عين النصح ويعرض عنها ويستمسك برايه. وفى مثله يقول الحكيم سليمان ع"ה דרך אויל ישר בעיניו.

وقد علمت ما ناب קרח ועדתם وشبههما بانفرادهما برايهما. وينبغى ان يفكر ذلك الانسان انه اذا كان لا يعرف بخطايه بل يرى ذلك صوابًا فانه يناله ما نال الايك لا محالة. وفى ذلك قال الحكيم כל דרכי איש זך בעיניו ותוכן רוחות יי. وقال فى الشموخ לפני שבר גאון اعنى ان عقيب التشامخ والاقتدار الكسر والانحطاط مثل ما عوقب فرعون لقوّ מי יי. ونلت لقوّ אני חרפתי את מערכות וגו' وסנחריב بافتخاره || بقوّ מי בכל אלהי הארצות ונבוכדנצר فى قوّ ומן הוא אלה דיישיזבנכון מן 76 b.
ידי وما ماثلهم الذى كانو تبع مثل اقوالهم غاية الذل ونهاية الكمول لمن كان على هذه الحالة فلن يعصم عن الخطا والذنوب وكقوّ الحكيم זד יהיר לץ שמו. ذكر هنا الدهاة لانه مادة الصلف. فليستحى فاعل هذا ويتذكر ان بحسب تشامخه يوافيه الهوان وبقدر اقتداره تفاجيه الضعة. وكقوّ الحكيم גאות אדם תשפילנו يعنى ان اكثر الاسباب التى تضع من الانسان الصلف والعجب. وذلك لعمرى من شيم الظالمين. كما قال רום עינים וגו' والذى دعا بعض المتكبرين المترايسين الى استعمال

هذا الخلق المذموم هو تلذذهم به ويحتجون بان النفس تنحو نحو الشرف وتصعب عليها الذل. وقالو ان الرياسة تشدها والذل يضعفها. ولو لا الترايس لم يستوى العلم. وقوّ انّ دعا الافاضل انما هو الوصول اليها بقوّ יעבדוך עמים נעם ונהנו

5 خص الله نبيه اذ قال له ומלכים מחלציך יצ׳ ובعكس هذا ‖ اذا احل 77 a.
العقوبة بمستحقيها بتعانيهم الرياسة. كقوّ ויכרת י׳ מישראל ראש וזנב وما اشبه ذلك. ولم يفكر الغافلون القايلون بهذا الشمخ ان اذا استعملوه عظمت نفوسهم وتعدو طورهم وسطو على اقربايهم واعرضو عن اقرانهم وازدرو براي كلّ انسان لما يستمسكون برايهم

10 وينفردون به. واما اذا استعمل فى التنزه عن الرذايل والترقى الى الفضايل والوثوق الى عبادة الله تعّ الذى هى افضل منه له عز وجلّ على عبادة. اذ كان ذلك سببًا لايصالهم الى النعيم الالاهى وبلوغهم الى الخلد الملكوتى. ففيهم قال לא ינרע מצדיק עיניו ואת מלכים לכסא וישיבם לנצח וינבהו. واما فى استعماله على غير

15 الواجب اعنى الشمخ وينفرد برايه شبه بقوله בכל תושיה יתנלע فذلك الذى غفلو عنه ولم يشو بقبوله. وفى مثل هاذا يقول الحكيم חכם עצל ‖ בעיניו משבעה משיבי טעם وربما ال به اعجابه الى 77 b.
الدخول فى غير مذهبه ثقة منه برايه انه يخلصه وتدبيره انه يصونه وهو الذى اوهقه وكما يقوّ מפר מחשבות ערומים ולא תעשינה

20 ידיהם תושיה واذ قد وصلنا من كلامنا الى هنا من وصف خلق السمخ ووجه التلطف فى استعماله على العادة الحسنة وكيفية دفع استعماله فى غير وجهه فينبغى الان. ان نذكر نزرًا يسيرًا باختصارٍ من منثور لفظ الحكما فى هذا الخلق وما يمكن من المنظوم فيه:

25 * سُقراط المتاله يقوّ من اللذين لا تفارقهم النخابة. الذى يطلب رتبة يصغر قدره عنها. وقال من انزل نفسه منزلة العاقل انزله الناس منزلة الجاهل. واقوّ يالى الشمخ سو

التخلق. وسقراط يقوّ من سات خلقه دامت بغضته. ونفرتٍ النيفوس منه. وارسطاطاليس يقوّ كما ان حسن الصورة ضيآ للجسم. كذلك حسن التخلق ‖ ضيآ للنفس. ويقول ايضا فى 78 a.
وصيته للاسكندر تلميذهٔ ليس من كبر الهمة يكون الملك معطا على الناس فضلاً للناس على الناس. ومما حكى عن بعض المتكبرين انه مر بحاجة له فانخلع فنزع الاخر ورمى به من مركبه. ويقوّ الاولين من رضى عن نفسه كثر الساخطون عليه. ولبعض الشعرا نظم فى ذم الكبر والعجب. شعر

يا مُظهِر الكُبر اعتجّاباً بصُورتهِ. أنظر
لوُ فَكرُ النَاسِ فِي مَا فِي بطُونِهُم. مَا استشعر الكُبر لَا شَابٌ ولا شيبُ
هَلْ فِي آكن آدَم مِثْل الرَاس مُخرَمه. وهو بخَمسُ مِن الاَقْذَارِ مَضْرُوبُ
انفُ يَسيلُ وإذنُ رِيحَهَا سهكُ. والعَينِ مُدمَعة وَالثَجَر مَلعُوبُ
يا بُن التُرَابُ وَمَاْكُولُ التُرَابُ غَدَا. اَقْصِر فانك مَاكُولُ وَمشْرُوبُ
‖ وحكى عن اردشير الملك انه دفع لرجلٍ كان يقوم على راسه 78 b.
كتابًا وقال له اذا رايتنى اشتد غضبى فادفعه الى وفى الكتاب امسك فليست باله انما انت حسد يوشك ان ياكل بعضه بعضًا ويصير عن قليل للدود والتراب والذهاب

الباب الد

القول فى التخشوع

هذا التخلق اقرب الى العفة من الذى تقدم ذكره. اذ من كان على هذه الصفة من التصاون والتواضع قمع نفسه من طلبها للشهوات. وبنيل هذه المنزلة النفيسة تتم الشمايل المحمو[دات][1] فى الانسان. وهذا خلة لعمرى محمود من فاز به. فانه قد انتحل حسن الثنا. الا ترى ان التواضع اعلا مراتب الشرف. والانبيا الموسومين بالمنازل الالاهية يقول بعضهم ואנכי עפר ואפר. وبعضهم

[1] Not in Ms.

يقوّ ואנכי תולעת ולא איש وما اشبه ذلك: ومدحهِ على افعالهم واستحسنت لهم. ومما ينبغى ان يعلمه الانسان اللبيب ان التذلل والخشوع
79 a. ‖ يوجبان للمر ادراك مطلوبه هذا فى الوجدان. وكما علمت ان قواد .חויה ما نالهم برعونتهم. وما نال القايد الثالث الذى تلطف بقوّ
5 ל יליהו ..... תיקר נא נפשי. فناله خلاف ما نال الاولين. وان كل من تذلل اعقبه الشرف والعز. وجزا الخشوع الكرم واليسار واستحقاق الكرامة لما قد اكرم. وكما قال עקב ענוה יראת י" وكان ارشدك الله الافاضل من الاشراف المتقدمين يتمذهبون بخلق الخشوع ويوثرونه على طبايعهم. وحكى عن بعض الملوك الاجلا انه حضر
10 عنده ذات ليلة اقوامٌ فقام بنفسه ليصلح السراج. فقيل له لم لا امرت وتكفا. فقال قمت وانا ملك وانصرفت وانا ملك: وكان يقول كل نعمة محسودًا عليها الا الخشوع: وقال برزجمهر الفيلسوف ثمرة التواضع المحبة والراحة: وقد تعلم ان كرامة الرجل اخاه
79 b. وقرينه شرف له: وقال بعض ‖ الناس التواضع بان تبدا بالسلام لمن
15 لقيته. وتنزل فى دون المنزل. ومن شكل هذا الخلق القناعة. فان الذى قد رزقها فقد ساد. ويقال ان من احبه ربه الهمه القناعة: وقال الكتاب فى العبد القنوع צדיק אוכל לשובע נפשו. وقال فى عكسه ובטן רשעים תחסר. ومن تهيا له قوة وصحة وامن فلا ينبغى له ان يحزن. وثمرة القناعة الراحة. والغنى الاكبر القنع
20 والصبر. وقال بعض الحكما من رضى من الدنيا بما يغنيه. كان ايسر شى فيها يكفيه: وكان يوصى بعض الحكما لابنه. من لم يصبر على كلمة سمع كلمات. ومن هان شانه عند نفسه عظم قدره عند الناس. واما الذى ارى من رفض هذا الخلق ان لا ينتذلل آتسار للطالع. وفى مثل هذا يقوّ בעין נרפש ומקור
25 נשחת צדיק מט לפני רשע. وكان يقوّ فى ذلك احق الناس بالرحمة عالم ضاع بين جهال. ومن ادب لقمان. الشريف اذا تزهد تواضع. والوضيع اذا ‖ تزهد تكبر. وفى كتاب القوطى كن متواضعًا فى
80 a.

. غير تسفل. ومتمريًا فى غير تكبر. واعلم ان الكبر تيه والعجب التبّى فيه وكله ضلال:

الباب الا

فى خلق الحيا والحلم

قيل للحكيم ما العقل. قال الحلم. وقيل ما الحلم. قال العقل. وهذا التخلق وعلى انه موافق فى معنى التخشوع ومطابق له. فانه اشرف منه مكانا. فانه هو شريك للعقل. وقد تبين عند كل ذى فطنة شرف العقل. وانه المفرق بين الانسان والبهيمة بقهره لطبعه وقمعه لهواه. وبالعقل يدرك الانسان منافع العلوم. وبه يصل الى علم حقايق الاشيا. وبه ادرك الاقرار بالتوحيد والعبادة لربه. وبه يصل الى كثير من التشبه باخلاق الملايكة. فاذا كان هذا التخلق النفيس بهذه الصورة من الشرف. وجب ان يكون شكله اعنى الحلم قريبًا منه. والدليل على انه قرينة لانك لن ترى على مر الزمان ‖ حليم عديم العقل. ولا عاقلًا عديم الحلم. 80 b.
فينبغى اذا كان هذا ان يصرف الانسان عنايته فى ان ينطبع بهذا التخلق العجيب العظيم الشان. ويوثره على جميع طباعه. ويفضله على جميع اخلاقه. اذ به يصل الى كثير من الفضايل. وتنستر عنه كل الرذايل. وكما قال من كساه الحلم وقار خفت الناس عيوبه والوقار والكرم يتلوانه. وكما قال ולפני כבוד ענוה. وقد يتحصل للتخاشعين رضا الله عنهم بحلمهم ويوصلهم الى النعيم الدايم. ومن تعلم طرايقه كما قال ידרך ענוים במשפט וגו׳. وكما ينبغى للعاقل ان يستحى من الناس. كذاك ينبغى ان يستحى من نفسه. وكان يقال ان الحيا والايمان مقرونان لا يتم احدهما الا بالاخر: ويقول بعض الشعرا

حَيِّاكَ فَاحْفَضْهُ عَليكِ فانمَا ... يَدِل عَلَى وَجهِ الكَرِيم حَيَاه

وكان يقول القحة وقلة الحيا شعبًا من الكفر: ومن اراد
يتطبع بالحيا فليجالس من يستحى منه. ‖ وكان يقول بعض 81 a.
العرب لا ترى من الرجال الا من كان يريك انهُ لا غنى له عنك.
وان كنت اليه احوج. وان اذنبت غفر. وكانه المذنب. وان اسيت
اليه فكانه المسى. وقال بعضهم اخر ما حفظ من كلام النبوة.
اذا لم تستحى فاصنع ما شيت: وفى وصف الحلم.

قال الشاعر

عَلِيهُ مِن ٱلتَّقْوَى رِدَآ سكِينَة وَلِلحَتِي نُورِ تَبين عَينيه سَاطِعُ

وقال الفاضل تعايشى الناس بالدين والتقوى زمان. ثم بعد
ذلك تعايشو بالحلم والحيا والتذمم. وقال ارسطاطاليس فى خطبته.
بالحلم يستكثر الانصار. وكان يقول البنون المطهرون استولى
الحلم على وجوههم. وانما سمى الحيا. لانه سبيل الحياة
الدايمة. وقال بعض الفلاسفة. الحلم يعرف عند الغضب: وقال
معاداة الحليم اقل ضررًا عليك من مودة الجاهل. ومن اراد
ان يصون هذا الخلق لا يبدل وجهه فى مسلته للناس. لانك
اذا اخلقت وجهك لم تجد من يجددهُ لك. واما ‖ اذا استعملت 81 b.
الحيا فى قول الحق والامر بالمعروف واشهار الدين والعبادة فذلك
مذموم: لا ينبغى ان يستعمل. اذ قال الولى ואדברה בעדותיך נגד
מלכים ולא אבוש. وانما ينبغى ان يكسى الانسان وجهه من
جميع الناس كسوة الحلم كما علمت من שאול حين اختفا بقوله
הנה הוא נחבא אל הכלים. اكثارهُ الله للملك. كما قال הראיתם אשר בחר
בו ה׳. وبالجملة فان هذا الخلق على مذهب الفلاسفة والحكما هو
من خصال النفس الشريفة. وهو بازا الروح فى البدن. وقال
الفيلسوف الحلم هو ايقاع الاشيا على احسن مواقعها. وتركها
على اجمل وجوهها. ومن حلم ساد:

الباب الد
القول فى خلق القحة

ان الذى وصفنا من محمودات خلق الحيا لكثير. ومقدارها
فى جانب مذمومات خلق القحة يسير. ومن كان ذا خلق
وقبيح فان ذلك عند الله قبيح. ومثل هالا الذى قيل فيهم
82 a. חזקו ‖ פניהם מסלע מאנו לשוב. وقال الولى فى الوقحين בא זרון ויבא קלון.
يعنى انه اذا غلب القحة على اخلاق الانسان. هان عند الناس
ولم يهاب. ولم ينظر اليه بعين وقار. ولا يلحظ من العيون
بالحكمة. وعلى انه عالم. كما تفعل بالحبى. لقوّ ואת ענועים חכמה.
فان كان عاقلًا واراد ان يجرى نفسه على السيرة الحسنة التى
يرضا بها الله فليزول من هذا الخلق ويستحى من اعماله
وينفيه من غريزة نفسه. وفى من كان وقحًا قال الولى זד יהיר
לץ שמו. يريد به ان من كان وقحًا فان الله يقارضه بمثل فعله.
لقوّ עשה בעברת זרון. وقد يكون المعنى עשה مصروفًا الى هذا الوقح.
الذى يصنع بالخلق من الوقاحة والسخط عليهم والضجر وما
اشبه ذلك. فاذا كانت هذه الخلة من طبع الانسان. فينبغى
لمن يالفه ان يصرفه عنها بتوبيخ ما امكنه من الضجر له.
82 b. حتى يقل عما هو فيه. وكما قال ‖ העז איש רשע בפניו. واما فقد
حمدت القحة فى نصرة الدين واظهار العبادة وقول الحق: واما
اذا قوبل بها الصالحون وانبيا الله فمذمومة. كقوّ והבנים קשי פנים.
فان كان هذا الرجل المستعمل هذا الخلق ذا مزاج صفراوى
وكان فى سن الشباب. فانه حينيذٍ يظهر منه كل الظهور.
فليقابله بالضد. وليثق الله. ويتدرج بلتنزه عن هذا الخلق
المذموم ويقمعه. تم القسم الاول.

الباب الاٍ من القسم الد

فى خلق الحب

يكاد ان لا يسلم من هذا العارض احد من الناس اللهم الا ان يكون يحكم عقله على طبعه. وهو معدوم الوجدان. فاذا وجد فهو لا محالة من الافاضل. وان الهوى مركب فى طبيعة الانسان. فاذا اراد الانسان يراس ويسود فيطرح الهوى ولا يستعمله ويله عنه ويسلا دونه. فانه من الاخلاق الدنية. وقد يعلم انه لا تتم خصال الحكما حتى تملك نفوسهم شهواتهم. ‖ ومن حكم عقله 83 a على هواه حمدت افعاله. ويعقب نيل الشهوات عقوبة البلوات. ومن علامات من غلب عليه الهوى. انه يكون كثير الاختلاف والتخلاف. متقلبا فى لسانه. لا سيما ان كان مع ذلك الغالب على مزاجه طبع الدم. وكان السن شبابا والزمان ربيعا. فحينيذ يقوى عليه. فينبغى ان يانف الانسان الحكيم من هذا التخلق. لئلا يستعمله. ويصد عنه فان فيه من حلب المضرات ما ليس بالقليل. وقد علمت ما يلقى من التذلل. والخمول والخشوع لمحبوبه. وبعد ذلك فان عاقبته ردية. وقد علمت من قصة אמנון وما ناله لما ساعر هواه. وانما ينبغى ان يصرف الانسان هذا التخلق فى طاعة الله وفى شرايعه. كما قال כי אם בתורת י׳ חפצו وايضا قو מה ׳אהבתי תורתיך וג׳ وبالضرورة فان اشتغل بطلب العلم والادب اشغله ذلك عن هواه. وقال الحكيم اذا عرض لك امر ولم يحضر لك فيه من تشاوره فتجنبه ‖ ولا تقربه من هواك فان الهوا 83 b. عدوا للقلب. وقال من اطاع هواه كسر ومن عصاه ظفر وانما يولون هذا التخلق الجهال من الناس لقرب لذاته وما يفضلونه من اللهو والزهو وسماع الاغانى الشجية وهم غافلون عما يعقبه من الالم والتنغيص. ولذلك يميلون مع طبعهم لنيل اللذة الحاضرة وعلى ما قال תאוה נהיה תערב לנפש ويعرضون عن الحكمة والطاعة لما

1 Ms. אלתדדל.

يرون من بعد لذتهما ونعمتهما بزعمهم انهما بعيدتان وليس هو بعيدا بل قريب وانما هو بعيدا فى بالهم وينبغى ان يصرف الانسان هذا التخلق اعنى التحب فى الله تعالى كقوّ ואהבת את יי אלהיך וג׳ وفى روحه كقوّ כי אהבת נפשו אהבו وفى قرابته كقوّ ויאהב יעקב את רחל וולדה كقوّ וישראל אהב את יוסף وفى بلده كقوّ כי אם לארצי ואל מולדתי وفى اخيه كقوّ דוד فى יהונתן נעמת לי מאוד وفى اهله كقوّ אילת אהבים وفى الحكمة قال איש אוהב ‖ חכמה ישמח אביו ومن ادب هذا التخلق 64 a.
ان يظهره الانسان لجميع الناس. وقيل من اراد التحابب الى الناس فليلتزم حسن الادب لهم والمنفعة توجب المحبة كما ان المضرة توقع البغضة وايضا ان من حزايات هذا التخلق الامانى والشهوات البعيدة فينبغى للانسان اللبيب ان يروض نفسه عنها ومما قالت الشعرا فى الامانى التى لا تدرك ولا يتحصل منها الا عل تعب النفوس ودوام القلق واستيلا الارق

قال الشاعر

نَهَارِى نَهَارُ الناس حَتَّى إِذَا أَتَى دُجَا اللَّيلِ مَثَّنَّى هُنَاكَ المَضَاجِعُ
أَضِى نَهَارِى بِالحَدِيثِ وَبِالمُنَى وَيَجْمَعُنِى بِالهَمِ وَاللَّيلِ جَامِعُ

ومما قيل فى الانهماك فى اللذات والشهوات وذم عاقبتهما والاسف على ما كان منه ما وفيه

قال الشاعر

‖ 84 b. شَرِبنَا مِنَ الدُّرْدِى حَتَّى كَأَنَّنَا مُلُوكٌ لَهُم بَرُ العِرَاقَينِ وَالبَحْرُ
فَلَمَّا انْجَلَا شَمسُ النَّهَارُ رَأَيتَنِى تَوَلَى الغِنَى عَنِى وَعَاوَدَنِى الفَقْرُ

وبتمكن هذا التخلق من النفس تبطل الحواس ولا يابه لما هو فيه من الانهماك. وكمن قيل فيهم הוי האמרים לרע טוב ולטוב רע. وقوّ الحكيم حبك الشى يعمى ويصم. وقد كتب حكيم الى حكيم فى باب قمع الهوى يقول. لن تنال ما تحب حتى تصبر على كثير مما تكره. ولن تنجو مما تكره حتى تصبر على كثير مما تحب.

الباب الـ من القسم الـ
القول فى البغض

ينبغى ان تعلم ان من بغض الناس بغضوه. وهذا الخلق
انما تمكن من النفس اهلكها. لانه ياول امره الى بغض الطعام
والشراب الذى بهما قوام حياة الانسان. وسوى ما يجلب من
المضرة من معادات الناس. || واذا تقدمت محبة مفرطة فى غير 85 a.
ذات الله انعكست بغضة باشد افراط. وكما علمت من قوله וישנאה
אמנון. ومن حبك لشى ولا مع انهباطه وانقضاه: ولا ينبغى
ان تومن نصيحة العدو الباغض كقوّ ונעתרות נשיקות שונא. وتتفرع
من هذا الخلق الملل. وقد تعلم ما قيل فى كثرة الملل من
القبيح وذم استعماله. ورغم النفس عليه. وقد قيل ان الملول لا
ياوى الى حال. ولا يكون له صديق. ولا تزال حالته مضطربة. ولا
تفارقه الفاقة. وشبه بقوّ לא יחרוך רמיה צידו. وقد تعلم ان كثيرا
من الناس يظهرون الصدق فى لفظهم. وربما كان فيهم عدو باغض
فى الباطن فلا تامنه. كقوّ בשפתיו ינכר שונא وعلى انه يلين لك كلامه.
فلا تانس اليه اذ قال כי יחנן קולו אל תאמן בו. وذاك كما اظهر ואב
לאבנר ועמשא خيرًا ومحبة حتى قتلهما. || وكما وافق שמעל נדליה בן 85 b.
אחיקם حتى قتله. وتيل من زرع العداوة. حصد الندامة. ومن
كان بهذه الصورة من رذاة النية بينه وبين الناس. فبالاحرى ان
يكون بينه وبين ربه كذلك. وكانه يخادعه بالصلاة. وفى ضميره غير
هذا. وكمن قيل عنهم ויפתוהו בפיהם ובלשונם יכזבו לו. وساير القصة. وكما
وصا سقراط الملة تلاميذه. اذ يقوّ اتقو من بغضته قلوبكم. اذ قلوب
الناس كالمراة. وشبه قوّ התכיום כמים הפנים לפנים כן לב האדם. والنفوس
تتكافى واضر ما يكون من العداوة واوكدها عداوة الحسد قال الشاعر

كُلُّ العَدَاوَةِ قَدْ تَرجى اَفَاقَتَهَا إِلاَّ عَدَاوَةَ مِن عَادَاكَ مِن حَسَدِ

وفى كتاب القوطى افضل ما تنظر به فى امر اعدايك ان تردهم
الى مودتك ان امكن ذلك

الباب الا من القسم الد

86 a. ‖ القول فى خلق الرحمة والرافة ومدح اولايه والحث على ايثاره وهو الباب الا من الكتاب.

لما كان هذا الخلق من شكل خلال البارى جل ثناه وتعالى علوا كبيرا اضيفت الى الاثنى عشر وصف المخصوصة له اعنى השם עשרה מדות التى تنسب الى رب العلمين وهى יי יי אל רחום וחנון וגו وساير القصة. فاما ما يمكن ان يجرى عليه الانسان الحكيم فى فعل وهو ان يكون طويل الغضب. كقوله ארך אפים وكثير الافضال كقو ורב חסד وصافح الذنوب. كقو נשא עון وساير القصة. وقد ينبغى للانسان الصالح الحكيم ان يمتثلها ما استطاع. وكما يشتهى الانسان ان يرحم اذا التجى كذلك ينبغى له ان يرحم من التجى اليه. وهذا خلق محمود فى الغاية. والله تع قد فضل عباده الصالحين بمحبتهم به. وكما علمت من יוסף حيث قال כי נכמרו רחמיו. وينبغى للعاقل ان يكون

86 b. له خلق الشفقة والرافة ‖ مغروسة فى نفسه موجودة فيه طول الزمان وقال الحكيم من الكرم والوفا تكون الرحمة وفيه يقول سليمان الحكيم وهو يحث على الرحمة والرافة הצל לקחים למות ومن حسن موقع هذا الخلق عند البارى تع وتقدس يروف باستعماله جميع مخلوقاته لقوله טוב יי לכל ורחמיו על כל. وفى كتاب القوطى قال لا تقصر فى تخليص الذين يساقون للموت جهدا وقال لا تهتضم الضعفا فان وليهم الله القوى وقال قد افلح الذين قلوبهم لا تزال راحمة خاشعة وفيه ايضا يقول من لم يرحم يكون موته على يدى من لا يرحم

الباب الה من القسم الد

القول فى القسوة وهو الباب الח من الكتاب.

لا ارى هذا الخلق فى الرجال الصالحين ولا فى الاشراف. وانما يكون فى من طبيعته مشاكلة لطبيعة الاسد. فانه الذى لا

يشبع. وهولآ هم الذين قيل فيهم נוי עז פנים וגו׳. وهذا لعمرى
خلق ‖ قبيح بالجملة كثيرة وقليلة. ويكون اذ تقوت النفس .87 a
الغضبية على النفس. وانما كان هذا التخلق لاجل انهم يبلغون
به الى الانتقام من الاعدا. ولا باس بمستعمله على هذه الصفة.
وعلى انه لا ينبغى للعاقل ان يبالغ فى الانتقام من عدوه. اذ ليس
ذلك من التجميل. وكما قال الحكيم בנפול אויבך אל תשמח: واما
مستعمله فى ان يسى الى صاحبه ويقتله ويأخذ ماله للا ذنب
فذلك هو المذموم. اعوذ بالله من مثل هولآ اذ فى مثلهم قال
الولى לולא י׳ שהיה לנו וגו׳ אזי חיים בלעונו. والدليل على انه لا يكون هذا
التخلق الا فى الظالمين قوّ ורחמי רשעים אכזרי وقال افلاطون صاحب
النواميس فى النقمة من اراد الانتقام من اعدايه فليزد شرفا فى
نفسه: تم القسم الد.

الباب الهّ من القسم الد

القول فى الفرح وهو الباب الهّ من الكتاب

‖ قد يوجد هذا التخلق فى بعض الناس على وجوه مختلفة. فمنه .87 b
ما يكون طبيعيًا. وهذا يكون فى من طبيعته حارة رطبة فى شكل
الدم. ولا سيما ان كانت امال صاحبه منتظمة غير مضطربة.
وكان مع ذلك بعيد العهد بالاوصاب قد خلا عن الرزيات. فحق
لمن كان بهذه الصورة ان تظهر اثرة هذا التخلق على طبيعته.
وتصح سحنته وتقوى صحته. ولا يسارع ادراك الهرم اليه.
وكمن قيل فيه לב שמח ייטיב נהה ורוח נכאה תיבש גרם. ومنه ما يكون
عرضيًا عند درك مطلوب ونيل مرغوب. ومنه ما يكون تبسمًا
دايمًا للا معنى. وربما انضاف الى ذلك خفة العقل. وقد قيل
فيه כי כקול הסירים תחת הסיר. وقد قيل علامة الاحمق ضحكه للا
معنى يوجب ذلك: وانا اقوّ ان اوجب ما يكون هذا التخلق دون
ساير الناس فى النفوس السليمة من الدنس الزكية التقية
النقية المنصوبة فى الملكوت ‖ المرتقية الى الروحانيات. اعنى .88 a

نفوس الصالحين. فانهم فى نعيم كامل فى حال طاعتهم وفى سرور شامل فى عبادتهم. كما قال שמחו בי וגילו צדיקים. ولا ينبغى ان يستعمل الاديب الضحك فى المجالس. لانه يقال من كثر ضحكه قلة هيبته. والمزاح يذهب بقشرة الوقار. وكما ان الهم اذا هاج احدث بكاً كذلك الفرح اذا تحرك اظهر الضحك. ومما ينبغى ان يدربه العاقل ان هذا الخلق وغيره من الاخلاق ليس فيه قبض من النفس الناطقة على راى حالينوس. وانم[ا] هى فى النفس البهيمية. والدليل على ذلك لانك ترى الضحك يعرض عند الامور المرهبة. وربما لا يقدر الانسان يتمالك عنه. وكذلك القول فى الغضب وساير الاخلاق. وبحسب هذا يروم الانسان فى ان يلزم ان يطيع[1] نفسه البهيمية لنفسه الناطقة. اعنى ان يكون عقله المدبر لطبعه. فاذا كان ذلك كذلك فحينيذٍ يلحق بالافاضل ‖ من الناس ومما قال سقراط فى الفرح المفروح به هو المحزون عليه. وفى اداب ديمجانس فى الفرح قال الفرح للقلب حياة وشرف والغم له ضغط وتلف 88 b.

الباب الد من القسم الا

القول فى الهم وهو الباب الا من الكتاب.

هذا الخلق اكثر ما يزداد من النفس تمكيناً عند فوت المطلوبات. ويبلغ منها مبلغا يكاد ان يميتها اذا فقدت المحبوبات. فى اله من خلق ما اعظم شانه اذا ظهر. وما اوحش مكانه اذا ظفر. وقد يقال ان الهم هو الموت الطبيعى. وانا ارى من وجه الحزم الصبر هنا على الكلام فى هذا الباب قليلا. فلعل الله يزلفنا عطفه. ويلهمنا فيه تافا من الكلام المسلى حزن الانسان. حتى تكون مقالتنا هذه فيها موجدة له شفا. وعلى انه ليس فى الامكان وجدان شفا لالم نفسانى الا ان يكون

[1] Ms. لا يطيع.

بالطب الروحانى: وكما ان هذا ابلغ تمكنا من النفس. كذلك
89 a. ‖ شفاه اصعب وجودًا. ومن الله نسال عصمتنا منه بمنه.

واقول ان طبع هذا الهم باردا يابسى فى شكل المرة السودا لا ينتجو منه احد من النابس بتة. وقد يبلغ منهم المبلغ العظيم الى[1] ان يمرضو منه مرضًا نفسانيًا. وكما قال רא:ה בלב איש ישחנה ודבר טוב ישמחנה. واعلم ان هذا التخلق كثير ما يظهر فى الوجه. وكما عهدت من יוסף اذ علم ما فى قلوب סריסי פרעה لما راى وجوههم كالحة. لقو וירא אותם והנם זועפים. وكمَ قال ארתחשסתא לנחמיה ..... מדוע פניך רעים ואתה אינך חולה. فقد تبيين ان هذا التخلق يظهر فى الوجه ظهورًا كليا. وينبغى ان تعلم ان اذا كان الانسان مشغوفًا بحب الدنيا التى هى عالم الكون والفساد. فانه لا يغدو من طلب القوى التحسية الكثيرة التحركة من يد الى يد. فاذا نالها وفقدها يعرضه الهم. وبعكس هذا
89 b. ‖ اذا كان لاهيًا عن هذا العالم. ومستقبلًا لعالم العقل. لانه يكاد ان يسلم من الالام النفسانية. التى هى المكاسب الدنيايةة. اذا اعرض عن المشاغل الهبايةة. ويقبل مع تملى نفسه فى العلوم الرياضية والنواميس الديانية. وينبغى للعاقل ان يطرح اخلاق صغار العوام وكبار الملوك. واذا لم يكون للانسان ما يريد يجب ان يريد ما يكون. ولا يكثار دوام التحزن. وينبغى لنا ان نلازم مداوات نفوسنا من هذا العارض. اذ قد نرى احتمال الصعوبات فى مداوة اجسامنا وشفايها من الامراض بالنار والتحديد وما اشبه ذلك. فبالاحرى ان نتدرج الى اصلاح نفوسنا بقوة العزم واحتمال يسير المونة فى ان نسير بها السيرة المحمودة. ونعلم ايضا انا اذًا صورنا فى نفوسنا ان لا تنالنا
90 a. مصيبة فقد اردنا انّ لا نكون البتة. لان المصايب انما ‖ تكون بفساد الديانات. فان لم تكن لم يكن كون. فاذا اردنا ان لا تكون مصايب فقد اردنا ان لا نكون. والكون فى الطبع. والفساد ايضا

[1] Ms. الا.

فى الطبع. فان اردنا ان لا يكون فى الطبع. فقد اردنا الممتنع. ومن اراد الممتنع. حرم مراده. ومن حرم مراده شقى. فينبغى ان نستحى من ايثار هذا الخلق اعنى الشقا. ونروم فى الترقى الى حال السعاد. ومن اراد ان لا يحزن فليمثل فى نفسه الاشيا الموجبة للحزن انها قد كانت. مثل ذلك كمن يقول انى ستتلف لى القنية الفلانية واحزن عليها. فيحسب انها قد تلفت او قد فقد محبوبه. وفى ذلك قال الشاعر الفيلسوف. شعر

يصير ذو الحزم فى نفسه. مصايبه قبل ان تنزلا:
فان نزلت بغتة لم ترعه. لما كان فى نفسه مثلا.
راى الامر يفضى الى اخر. فصير اخره اولا:

وان لم يوجد البتة لذوى النفوس العالية والهمم ‖ الشريفة 90 b.
اثر هم. وقد قيل لسقراط لم لم تر عليك اثر هم قط. فقال انه لم املك شيًا وعدمته فاحزننى. ومما ينبغى للعاقل ان يفكر فيه انه ليس شى فى الدنيا مما ينمو الا يكون اولًا صغيرًا ويوشك ان يكبر. الا الهم فانه اعظم ما يكون فى يوم وقوعه. وكل ما مر نقص حتى يتلاشا. والحازم العازم الذى يتجلد فى وقت مصيبته بحسب عظمته. وكان الاسكندر كتب الى امه بتعزيته لها بنفسه. وقال لها امرى يا امى ببنا مدينة عظيمه حصينة حين يرد عليك موت الاسكندر. واعدى فيها من الطعام والشراب. واحشرى الناس اليها من جميع البلاد لليوم المعلوم الى الطعام والشراب. فاذا تم ذلك وتقدم الناس كافة لمحضر الطعام والشراب الذى اعدته الملكة ينادى فى الحين ان لا يدخل دارها من اصابته مصيبة. فصنعت ذلك عند موت ‖ الاسكندر فلما امرت 91 a.
ان لا يدخل دارها من اصابته مصيبة لم تر احدا. فايقنت انه انما اراد تعزيتها بنفسه. وسمع الاسكندر من ارسطاطاليس استاذه ان الهم يقلل القلب ويلاشيه: فاراد ان يعرف حقيقة ذلك. فعمد الى حيوان يقارب الانسان فى الطبع. فحبسه فى

موضع ظلم واجرى عليه من القوت ما يقيم جسمه. ثم اخرجه فذبحه فوجد قلبه قد تماسى وذاب. فعلم ان ارسطو لم يقل له الا الحق. ومن كلام جالينوس فى الهم قال الهم فنا القلب. والغم مرض القلب. ثم بين ذلك وقال الغم بما كان. والهم بما يكون. وفى موضع اخر الغم بما فات والهم بما ياتى. فاياك والغم فان الغم ذهاب الحياة. الا ترى ان الحى اذا غم وجهه تلاشى من الهم. وقال بعض الحكما شرب السم اهون من الهم. وان قال قايل ما النفع فى ايثار هذا التخلق ‖ عند حدوث 91 b. المصيبة واظهاره فاقول ليستفرغ العبرات التى قد فسدت واستحالت فعجزت الطبيعة عن ردها الى موضعها. كما نستفرغ الاخلاط المتعفنة المستحيلة الى الفساد التى هى الكيموسات. تستحيل بالادوية المنقية. وكما نستنظف المادة بالحال التى سبيلها ان تبعث اليه اودها. وكما هو معلوم ان بعض الاطفال فيهم فضل ردى لا يتحلل الا بالبكا. فهذا النفع الطبيعى للبكا. ومما قال سقراط فى الحزن. الاحزان اقسام اسقام القلوب. كما ان الامراض اسقام الابدان. ومن كلام بطلميوس فيه من احب البقا فليعد للمصايب قلب صبورًا:

الباب الا من القسم الد

القول فى الطمانينة وهو الباب الا من الكتاب

هذا التخلق محمودا اذا صرفه الانسان فى التقة بربه والتحصن به والاستركان اليه كقوّ ‖ להיות ביי מבטחך. وهذا طبع محمود يستحق 92 a. صاحبه الحظ الجميل الوافر والفضل الجزيل من الله. كقوّ והבוטח ביי חסד יסובבנו" وحق لمن كان على هذا الحال ان يبارك فيه. . . كما قال ברוך הגבר אשר יבטח ביי וג. واكثر ما يكون هذا التخلق فى الصالحين المتقيين لله. وكما تسب اليهم ذلك بالامر بقوّ יראו" בטחו ביי. ومن فضيلة هذا التخلق وشرفه عند الله تع وعد به יעקב

عند القيلولة كقوّ אל תירא עבדי יעקב وكما قيل فى الانسان الصالح الذى يتوكل على ربه ويامن به משמועה רעה לא ייראה׃

الباب الح من القسم الد

القول فى الندم والتحذر عنه وهو الباب الد من الكتاب

يكون هذا التخلق عند رجوع الانسان من حال خطابة ويتوب. فانه اذا ظهر منه خلق الندم تمت حينيذ توبته مع تقدم الشروط الثلاثة اعنى التوبة والاستغفار وضمان ترك المعاودة. ‖ وكما شرحها רבנו סעדיה אלפיומי رضى الله عنه. وكان 92 b. يقول بعض الصالحين من ندم على ما سلف من خطايه فكانه ما اخطا. فهذا خلق محمود على هذه الطريقة. واما وجه القبيح منه فكمن يقول اليوم نعم فى شى من الاحوال. ويندم فى قوله بعده ويخلف. او كمن انذر انه يصوم او يتصدق ويندم على نذره. فان جميع هذا مذموم. ووجه العقل عندى ان يتحرى الانسان من ان يقع موقعًا يندم فيه. وعلى ان ليس فى قوة البشريين هذا اعنى ان يملكو انفسهم من ايثار اخلاقهم لكنْ بحسب هذا يرومون فى التدرج من السيّر الدنية الى السنية ومن الاخلاق الرذيلة الى الجزيلة. فذلك هو من غاية السعد اذا قدر الانسان يلجم نفسه ويملكها ويجريها على حسن العادة. ومن انقاد طبعه الى عقله ساد. وجاد فضله وفاد وحمد فعله. تم القسم الد׃

الباب الط من القسم الد

القول فى الغضب وهو الباب الد من الكتاب.

‖ هذا التخلق وعلى انه من قوى النفس الحيوانية فقد 93 a. جعلناه خلقًا من اخلاق الانسان لموافقته لاخلاقه. ولناخذ فى وصف منافعه وعلى ان منافعه لا تتجزا من مضاره. فانه ما من خلق مذموم الا وله منفعة فى بعض الاحيان. كما ان ما من

خلق محمود الا وله مضرة فى كثير من الاوقات. كما علمت ان الصمت خلق محمود. فاذا استعمل فى سمع المحال صار مذمومًا. والغضب خلق مذموم. فاذا استعمل لتاديب او لتوبيخ او لانفة من ارتكاب المحارم صار محمود. وقد ينبغى للعاقل الكمال والاديب اللبيب ان يترك الطرفين ويأخذ فى الاوسط باعتدال. وجالينوس يقول فى كتاب اخلاق النفس. ان الغضب والحرد هما اسمان لمعنى واحد. وقد يظهر فى وجه الغاضب كانه مغموم ويسخن بدنه اسخانًا قويًا ويخفق قلبه خفقانًا قويًا ‖ ويكون 93 b. نبض العروق قويا سريعًا. وقال فيه من استعمل الغضب بالفكر ظهر منه الوقار ومن استعمله بلا فكر ظهر منه الخرق. ومن قوّ القوى الغضب الشديد الحرد ليس بعيد من الجنون. وفى كتّ القوطى لا يوجد الغضوب مسرورًا. ونقوّ انا انزلنا النفس الغضبية على اربع منازل. فالسريع الغضب السريع الرضا حالة معتدلة. واكثر ما تكون هذه الصورة فى انسان ذى مزاج صفراوى. والبطى الغضب البطى الرضا حالة معتدلة. والبطى الرضا السريع الغضب حالة مذمومة. اذ هو خارج عن حد الاعتدال. واما البطى الغضب السريع الرضا فمحمود فى الغاية. وهذه من مناقب الرجال الكبار الافاضل الذين ليس يكادو ان يظهر فى اخلاقهم الغضب. واما من كان من الذين يقمعون نفوسهم الغضبية ويقهرون طبايعهم على تجرعها فقد وصفو بالشرف ‖ ورسمو بالتسانى. كقّ الحكيم מוב ארך אפים 94 a. מנבור. وهى من الد وصفًا الذى قيلت فى الله تع المشروحة فى ויעבר. وقيل كما ان التجرب من امراض الجسم كذلك الغضب من امراض النفس. ولا ينبغى ان يكون الانسان الاديب كثير الغضب. لانه يتحمل من ذلك اوزارًا. وكمّ قال الحكيم גדל חמה נושא עונש. وقد نهى الحكيم عنه فى قوله אל תבהל ברוחך לכעוס. ثم بين لاية علة نهى عنه فى قوله כי כעס בחיק כסילים ינוח. فحق

لمن كان غضبانا ان يسمى כסיל. ولن يكاد الانسان الشديد الغضب على اكثر الاحوال ان يسلم من الخطا العظيم والجرم الجسيم. وعلى زما قال الحكيم. ובעל חמה רב פשע وقد ترى كثير من الناس اذا ما غضب واشتد غيظه لا يبالى باى نكبة ينتكب بشدة غيظة وشبيه بمن قيل فيه. כל רוחו יוציא כסיל. وبالضد 5
94 b. וחכם באחור ישבחנה. ومما تحرو احبارنا ‖ ع ס فى النهى عن استعمال الافراط فى هذا الخلق. قالو כל הקורע בגדיו בחמתו כאלו עובד ע"ז. فبحسب هذا لا ينبغى للانسان الفاضل ان يكون شديد الغضب. فيكون متطبعا باخلاق الحيوان الداعر والسباع. ولا يكون ايضا لطيف الغضب فان ذلك من اخلاق الصبيان الاصاغر. ووجه 10 الحزم فى ذلك الاخذ بالتوسط. ومما ينبغى ان تعلم ان تمام عقل الانسان قمعه لغضبه. كقو الكت שכל אדם האריך אפו: ومما قال الحكيم بطلميوس فى الغضب. اذا غضبت فاعف. فان لم يكن ترخ. فالانتقام عجزا:

الباب الد من القسم الد 15

وهو الباب الد من الكت القول فى خلق الرضا.

هذا الخلق من الاخلاق المحمودة. اذ ليس يوجد على اكثر الاحوال الا فى من كان ذا نفس كريمة التى تقبل الاحوال كيف ما اتتها. ولا تتشوف الى امر عظيم. ويتفرع منه ايضا خلق
95 a. القناعة. ‖ وهو كما علمت ايها الناظر خلق سرى. وقد تقدم 20 وصفنا له ومدحنا اياه فى الباب الد من القسم الد فى خلق الخشوع. واذا رضى العبد الصالح عن الناس. ورضى الناس عنه فلا محالة ان الله قد رضى عنه. بل حتى اعدايه يسالمونه. كق الحكيم ברצות ד דרכי איש וגו. وكما علمت من رضا אבימלך عن אברהם ع س ومسالمته له. ونحو قو רבנו הקדוש לרבי חייא وما اشبه 25 ذلك. ومما فضل الرضا نسب الى الحياة التى هى معدن الفضل وينبوع الخير. كق באור פני מלך חיים ורצונו כעב מלקוש. هذا فى

الانسان وكما رضى فرعون عن يوسف حتى درجه الى الملك. وكما رضى اخشورش عن مردخى وقد رايت كيف بلغ به وعلاه. فكيف من رضى الله عنه. نحو قوّ اني יי אלהיך מלמדך להועיל מדריכך בדרך תלך. وقال الحكيم كل راض غنى. وكل مطيع مستانس. وكل عاص مستوحش. وكان يقوّ من لم || بحالة اكثيارًا رضى به اضطرارا. 95 b.
ومن هذا الخلق يتفرع العفو والصفح. وهما من صفات البارى تعّ وتّ. والانسان الحكيم الكريم. قال الشاعر

إِذَا كُنتَ لَا اَعْفُو عَنِ ٱلذَنبِ مِن اَخٍ وَقُلتُ اَكَافِيهِ فَـايـنَ ٱلتَفَضُّلُ
وَإِن اَقْطَعُ ٱلاَكْوَانُ عِنْد ذُنُوبَهُم بَقِيتَ فَرِيدًا لَيسَ لِي مَن اوَاصِلُ

وقيل ان ملكا سخط على جماعة فامر بقتلهم فقال بعضهم انا نحن اسينا فى الذنب ما تظهر من احسانك فى العفو فرضى عنهم ولم يقتلهم.

الباب الد من القسم الد

القول فى الغيرة وهو الباب الثلث من الكتاب.

هذا الخلق هو شعب من الغضب. واكثر نفوس الناطقين لم تعرو منه. اذ هو فيهم احمع. اذ نرى الناس انما يريدون ان يمتثلون صنع اقرانهم. مثلًا اقول كمن يرى صاحبه يقتنى من المكاسب الدنياية من الجماد او من الحيوان او من النبات || او ساير الالات فهو يروم ان يقتنى ايضا مثلها. وقد 96 a.
يستغنى دونها او يتعوض باشيا غيرها مقامها. ولا يطيل سعيه ويتبع يباله فى ان يلحق بمثل تلك المكاسب. وهو القول الذى قاله الحكيم عّ تّ וראיתי אני את כל עמל ונ. כי היא קנאת איש מרעהו. فان كانت هذه النخلة اغلب على طبايعه فهو مذموم. اذ تاول فى حالته الى ان يتحسد. ولا يوجد الكريم حسود. وقد امتلت الدواوين من ذم الحسد ولا يخفى على كل ذى لب ما قيل فيه من القبح: فينبغى ان يعرض عنه وربما الت امور الحاسد الى ان يغصب. كمّ قيل فى مثل هولا וחמדו שדות וגזלו.

والحسد افة مذمومة. ينبغى للعاقل ان ينزه نفسه عنها ما قدر. اذ ليس يستجلب بها منفعة. بل طول اختياب وتعب النفس فى الامانى ودوام البغضة من الناس وقلة الراحة وشغل السر والهم والعقوبة من الله من مخالفة ما نهى
96 b. عنه فى ‖ كتابه المنزل. ولا ينبغى ان يغار الانسان من القوم الظالمين لما نراهم منهمكين فى اللذات وفى الشهوات. بل يصرف غيرته الى طاعة الله. كق الحكيم אל יקנא לבך בחטאים. وقال ايضا אל תקנא בעשי עולה. وانما حسنت الغيرة فى الطاعة كما علمت من פינחס فى قو בקנאו את קנאתי. وما استحق بذلك من حسن العاقبة. كق לכן אמר הנני נותן לו. ومما قيل فى الغيور والحسود. قال قد ترى الحسود يكثر ودّه فى النقا وبغضته فى المغيب واسمه صديق ومعناه عدو. وقال كان الحاسد خلق ليغتاظ. وقال يكفيك من الحسود انه يغتم وقت سرورك. ويجب للانسان ان يرتقى الى الدرجات السنية ليحسد فيها مع معونة الاقدار والمواهب. وليكون بذلك مفتكرًا: كقول الشاعر
اَنِى حُسِدتُ فَزادَ الله فى حسَدِى لَا عَاشَ مَن عاش يَوْمًا غَير مَحْسُودُ
لَا يُحسَد الْمَرء اِلّا فِي فَضَايِلِهِ فِي الحلمِ. وَالعلمِ والاِكْرَامُ والجودُ

97 a. ‖ الباب الح من القسم الح

القول فى النشاط وهو الباب الاو من الكتاب.

الذى ينبغى ان اقدم من الكلام فى هذا الخلق من اى طبع يتفرع. فاقول انه من شكل المرة الصفرا. واكثر ما تظهر كيفيته عند خلا النفس من سايرِ الاخلاق المذمومة ولا يشوبها شى من الهم واكثر ما يكون ففى النفوس الركية الشريفة. وهو خلقا محمود. فينبغى ان يستعمله الانسان فى جميع ما يتناوله من الصنايع العلمية والمهنية. الا ما قيل فيه והון אדם יקר חרוץ. يريد بهذا القول ان افضل خصال الانسان العزيز

هو النشاط فى الدارين جميعًا. فى عالم الكون والفساد ينشط فى طلب العلوم مع حسن الطاعة والاعتقاد والاخذ فى تدبير كيفية الوصول الى العالم العقل. وقيل فى عكس هذا التخلق الذى هو العجز من السعى فى الاحوال والعلاج فى خلاص النفوس. فمن
5 ذلك قو התרפית ביום צרה וג׳ وايضا || לא יחרוך רמיה צידו. وعلى انا قد ذكرنا 97 b. الملول فى خلق البغض. ومن كان من الافاضل وتناول اموره بنشاط نجح فيها. وكما قال יד חרוצים תמשול ורמיה תהיה למס. وقيل فيه شعر

وَإِذَا كَانَتِ ٱلنفُوسُ كِبَارًا تَعِبَتْ فِى مُرَادِهَا الأَجْسَامُ:

10 وهذا قول حسن وقد حث الحكيم ع س على النشاط فى الامور الديانية والدنوبة بقو עצלה תפיל תרדמה. وهذا القول ظاهر برهانى. لان بالضرورة يوقع الكسل السبات لان البخار الذى سبيله ان يتحلل من مسام البدن بحركة البطش فاذا هى سكنت ولم تحلله رقى الى الدماغ فاحدث نومًا دايمًا: وفى كتاب القوطى يقول
15 فى النشاط من اشبع ارضه عمارة اشبعته خبزًا. ووجه الادب فى هذا التخلق ان لا يظهره الانسان فى شهواته. ولا يطيش به فى غضبه. فان الطيش مذموم. لانه ليس من || اخلاق العقلا. ولا 98 a. يستعملونه الفضلا. بل يصرف النشاط فى اعماله الدنيايا وفى الشرايع. ومن اكبر الدلايل على سعد الانسان نشاطه فى ما يحاول
20 من اعماله ومن اعظم العلامات على نحوسه كسله فيها. وقال الشاعر مرجزًا

والانفس الذكية الشريفة. يقظانة ساهرة خفيفة:
والانفس البليدة الثقيلة. مسبوتة وكيمة ذليلة:

وانما النشاط العظيم الذى يودى الى العجلة فذلك مذموم.
25 فليحذر العاقل من استعماله. اذ هو غاية الشر. ومن عجل تورط. ومن ركب العجلة لا يامن النخيبة. وقيل شعرًا

1 Read عالم.

قَد يَدرِك المُتَأَنِّى بَعْض خاجَتَهِ. وَقَد يَكون معا المستعجل الزَلَلُ

فلا ينبغى ان يستعجل الانسان فى احواله. اذ ليس ياتى فى العجلة امر محكم. وبالتانى تسهل المطالب. وانما حسنت حالة النشاط لتكون فى قوة النفس ولا تظهر فى الفعل بسرعة. تم القسم الد.

98 b. || الباب الا من القسم الد

القول فى خلق السخا وهو الباب الا من الكتاب.

هذا التخلق اذا كان مستعملًا باعتدال دون ان يبلغ الى حد الابذال فانه محمود. وينبغى للانسان ان يوثر هذا التخلق على ضده اعنى خلق البخل. اذ لم يكن الرجال الكبار الموسومون بالفضايل يعتقدون البخل خلقا محمود. الى[1] ترى ارشدك الله كم من مكان مدح الحكيم للكريم. فموضع يقول ان الانسان السخى يبلغه سخاه الى درجات كثيرة من الشرف فى الدنيا والاخرة. לגוֹ מתן אדם ירחיב לו ולפני גדולים ינחנו. اما فى الدنيا فباتصاله بالملوك من اجل برهم بالعطا. كما علمت من اكرام בן הדד לאסא ותגלת לאחז لما اهديا لهما وفى الاخرة ما ينال الانسان من الاستحقاق لنعيمها لما اطاع ربه بماله فى الصدقة. وكما قال לכן אחלק לו ברבים.

99 a. ولما كانت خلة אברהם אבינו ע"ה || السخا عرف بها ونسبت اليه وقد نشرت له فى مواضع فى الكتاب المقدس. وكذلك يقتضى تفسير נדיבי עמים נאספו. وهذا خلق محمود اذ يوجب الكرامة لفاعله. وكما قال רבים יחלו פני נדיב. وبه يستوجب الانسان الشكر من الناس اذا عطى ويمدح بذلك:

وكما قال بعض الشعرا

تراه اذا ما حيته متهللا. كانك تعطيه الذى انت نايله:
ولو لم يكن فى كفه غير نفسه. لجاد بها فليتقى الله سايله:

واما موضع القبيح من هذا التخلق هو ان يبذل الانسان ماله

[1] Read الا.

فى ما لا يحتاج اليه ويسى تدبيره فيه. مثل ان يصرفه فى الانهماك فى اللذات واتباع الشهوات. فذلك هو البذخ وليس ذلك من شيم العقال لان العطا فى مكانه فانه ذخيرة مرفوعة لا تضيع مع طول الدهور بل تبقا مع ‖ الازمان. هذا هو مذهب .99 b
שלמה ע״ה فى قوّ שלח לחמך על פני המים וגו׳ ظاهر هذه الاية الحث على الكرم وان يتجود الانسان ويفضل فانه يحصد ثمرة ذلك كما قال الشاعر

زرعت التجود فى ارض العطايا. فاصبحت المكارم فى حصاد:

ومما ينبغى للانسان ان يعلمه انه اذا كان فى حال اقبال لا يفنى جوده اقباله. واذا كان فى حال ادبار لا يبقى بذلك ادباره. ومن خاصة هذا التخلق الكريم انه لا يعوز على نفسه ابدا لمستعمله شى بل يزداد اضعافاً كثيرة. وكما قال נתן לרש אין מחסור. وقال الولى דוד عليه السلام فى ذى التجود والكرم פזר נתן לאביונים צדקתו וגו׳. وما ظنك فى استعمال خلة حسنة. وهى كالسلف بين يدى الله عز وجل هو قوّ מלוה יהוה חונן דל. وكما قيل فى كتب الادب اصنع المعروف فى اهله وفى غير اهله فان كان اهله فصنعته فى ‖ مكانه وان كان غير اهله كنت انت اهله. وقال فى السخا .100 a
من مكارم الاخلاق اعطا السايل. وفى كت القوطى اعلم ان الحزم هو حسن التثبت فى الامور فاحسن تعاهدك ذلك عند ما تعطى وما تمنع وتفعل وتقول. فان العطيية بعد المنع اجمل من المنع بعد العطية والانعام وان الاقدام على الفعل بعد الثانى خير من الاستثنى بعد الاقدام. ولتعلم انك الى فعل ما لا تقول اقرب منك الى قول ما لا تفعل. فاحذر الاسراع بالقول فى ما تخاف العجز منه بالفعل. وزين قولك بالصدق وعملك بالعدل:

الباب الد من القسم الה

القول فى البخل وهو الباب الית من الكتاب.

اعلم ان هذا خلق ذميم. ليس فى كثير من الاخلاق

المذمومة اقبح منه. لانك ترى المسرف فى ابذال ماله وعلى
انه مذموم فانه يكتفى بلذته وطيب الثنا عليه. وهذا لا يتحصل
100 b. ‖ الا عن سو ثنا دون بلوغ لذة وليس المقت من اخلاق الافاضل.
وينبغى لمن كان من ذوى الاشراف ان يانف عن هذا التخلق ولا
يستعمله فى حالة من الاحوال. وقد اجتمعت ارا الحكما على 5
انه لا مروة مع البذل ولا دين مع الرغبة. ومن كان بهذه الصورة
فقد يايس من الثنا الحسن والذكر الجميل. وكما قيل لא יקרא
עוד לנבל נדיב וגו׳ وهذا النبل شبيه الذى كان بمعون الذى قال ולקחתי
את לחמי ואת מימי وقد رايت عظيم ما لقى من العقوبة. وانما حسنت
هذه الخلة فى ان لا يضيع الانسان ماله قليلة ام كثيرة وليحفظه 10
بتوسط هذا التخلق. ولا ينبغى له ان يفرط حتى يخرج الى خلق
الرغبة التى ليست من اخلاق الكرام. كما قال الحكيم فى ذم
البخل מונע בר יקבוהו לאום׳ وبالضد וברכה לראש משביר ظاهر هذه الاية فى
الصدقة وباطنها فى العلم. ولا ينبغى للعاقل ان يبخل بعلمه اذ
101 a. ليس ينقص من العلم الاستقباس ‖ منه كما ان النار اذا اخذ منها 15
ضو لا يخمد نورها. ومن حسن التدبير فى سياسة هذا التخلق
ان يتعود الاحسان الى الاقارب حتى يتدرج الى بر الاباعد ويروض
نفسه فى ايثار الجود.

الباب الد من القسم الה

القول فى الشجاعة وهو الباب الט من الكتاب 20

من كان من الناس الغالب على مزاجة طبيعة الدم وكان ذا
قلب عظيم ممتلى العروق طويل الذراعين فاكثر ما تراه ذا شجاعة
ولا سيما ان كان مع ذلك متوليا لامور الحروب. وهذا التخلق هو
محمود اذا اظهر فى قوته وبحسب تقديره للتخلاص مما يتولاه
فاذا خرج عن الاعتدال وايتلف الى الشجاعة خلق الهوج كان ذلك 25
داعيًا الى ان يرمى الانسان نفسه فى المهالك فذلك مذموم وفى
هاذين التخلتين قال الحكيم אשרי אדם מפחד תמים واما الرجال الكبار

المذكورين بهذا الخلق فكانت ‖ لهم اثارة فلكية اظهرت منهم .101 b
تلك القوة نحو יהושע ונדעון ושמשון ושאול ודוד ויהונתן ויואב ואבנר ومن
ماثلهم فانه ظهر منهم خلق الشجاعة وحمدت لهم وبعكس
هولآ من ظهر منهم خلق الجبن ولم يحمد منهم. كما سأذكرهم
في الباب الذى يتلو هذا. وقد ينبغى ان يصرف هذا الخلق فى
طاعة الله كما علمت من موسى ع مّ فى حال اقتصاصه من القوم فى
قوله לבני לוי שימו איש חרבו וגו׳ وكما علمت من פינחס فى حال غيرته فى
قو וירא פינחס בן אלעזר. ولم يزل هذا الخلق اعنى الشجاعة مشهور
فى نفوس الرجال الكبار والصناديد الابطال. وفى الشجاعة والصبر
على المخارة قول الشاعر

ويوم كان المصطلين بحره. وان لم يكن نارا قيام على الجمرِ
صبرنا له حتى تقضى وانما تكشف ابواب البلية بالصبرِ

‖ ومما قيل فى الحث على استعمال الشجاعة احرص على الموت .102 a
توهب لك الحياة. وكانت العرب تسمى الشجاع موقا. ومما قيل
ايضا فى تشجيع النفس فى الحروب قول الشاعر

تاخرت استبغى الحياة فلم اجد. لنفسى حياة مثل ان اتقدما

فعلى هذا السبيل ينبغى ان يكون الانسان الشريف
يستعمل من هذا الخلق ما لم يخرج به عن حد الاعتدال ليلا
يسما اهوج. بل يسير بهذا الخلق على العادة الجيدة. وقال
الفيلسوف حد الشجاعة. القوة والثبوت على ما تكره. وليس
الشجاعة فى الباطل. والثبوت على المحال. والصبر على التعب.
فان هذه من اخلاق الحمير والخنازير. واما الشجاعة الصبر على
الحق والغلبة لهواك حتى يكون عندك موتك على الاخير الذى
وجدته بعد ذلك خيرًا من البقا على ضد ذلك من الشر الذى
كشفه لك ‖ حكم العقل. وللفوطى الشجاعة من طبيعة النفس .102 b
الشريفة بازا القوة فى البدن:

الباب الد من القسم الد

القول فى التجبن وهو الباب الد من الكتاب.

هذا التخلق اكثر ما يكون فى ذوى النفوس المهينة الوكيمة التخليلة. الذليلة. وهو خلق مذموم فليتحذره الانسان العاقل ولا يستعمله ويبالغ فى الزوال عنه والافلاع عنه الذى لا يستجلب به منفعة بل على سو الثنا ودناة الذكر وحطيطة الوصف. وانما الذى ينبغى ان يتخافون منه فالرجال ذوى الهمم العالية بعد تصريف قوة التمييز فى استعمال اذ كان سببا للنجاة من الامر العظيم. ومن فروع هذا التخلق الكسل الذى قد ذكرناه. وقد علمت ما قيل فيه من العار والدناة. فمن ذلك قو التحكيم ع س ממן עצל ידו בצלחת وهذا غاية فى وصف العار. والذى يعرف من
103 a. || الكسلان التجبان يقول لا اسافر لخوف قطع الطريق والوحوش ولا اتتجر ليلا اخسر ولا اصوم ليلا امرض ولا اتصدق ليلا افتقر وما اشبه ذلك من الامور المبطلة لتجميع الصناعات حتى لا يتم له فعل شى بل يبطل ويبقا لا يتحرك من موضعه شبيه بقوله הדלת תסוב על ציריה. ولا ينبغى للانسان العاقل ان يوثر هذا التخلق اعنى التجبن او يستعمله على ساير طباعه كى لا يعرف به فيكون كمن يتحدث نفسه انه سيقتل قبل انقضا الأجل وكمن اطنب فى التجبان الكسلان وقال شعرا

اذا صوت العصفور طار فواده. وله حديد الناب عند التراييد:

واما اذا كان فى امر لا يكاد ينتجو منه فواجب ان يغرض فيه خلق التجبن. وكمن قيل فيه انه ارسله الملك الى مكان مخوف فابا ان
103 b. يمضى فشتمه فقال احسن ان تشتمنى وانا حى || خير من ان تدعونى وانا ميت. وقد قيل ان هذا التخلق يستعمله الموثورون الراحة فى الدنيا دون جميع الاخلاق ولا يعلمون ان الراحة نفسها لا تتم لهم الا بعد العناية الوكيدة واحكام التجوايج واصلاح ما يحتاج اليه من الاسباب. كما قال הכן בחוץ מלאכתך ועתדה בשדה לך. واما

الراحة المفردة فتحاصل معناها الكسل والتجبن. وقد علمت ما يرتكب الانسان من الكسل حتى يعدم جميع مصالحه بغاية الفقر. كما قال מעט שנות מעט תנומות וני ובא מתהלך רישך. ومع ان هذا التخلق يولد فى التجسم من الالام والامراض ما ليس بالقليل نحو الترهل والثقل والنفخ والنقرس وعرق النسا وذا الفيل وما اشبه ذلك مما يتولد من قلة الهضم بل حتى يصير له هذا التخلق عادة ويرى ما سواه نقصا وخلافا ولا سيما ان وافق التجبان العاجز || مزاج بلغمى مع سن الشيخوخة فانه ما مما يثقلانه زيادة: 104 a. تم القسم الثالث.

فها لك يرحمك الله ما تضمنته فى الصدر مع حبنا الايجاز وكرهنا التطويل وخوفنا الخروج عن غرض الكتاب اختصرنا كثيرا من الكلام فى الابواب المفردات وفى الاقسام. ولم نضم كل خلق منهما الى كل طبيعة والى كل حاسة ايضا ونسبة الحواس الى الطبايع وحتى كنت ابين اين مسكن كل خلق من البدن وكثيرا من علم المزاج والتشريح والفراسة لكن رايت ترك ذلك الى بعد حين ان شا الله تع وهو المستعان. واذ قد اكملنا ما تمكن لنا وكف علينا من الكلام فى هذا الكتاب من هذه الابواب

نقول انه يوشك ان تكون فى الانسان اخلاق غير هذه المقسومة وطبايع سواها فنقول نعم اننا اختصرنا الكلام فى غيرها || الوجهين احدهما 104 b. لعلمنا ان فى اخلاق الناس خلق لضجر والملل. فخفنا ان يلحقان كتابنا ولذلك لم نطل فى جلب الشعر الكثير من العبرانى والعربى. وايضا لعلمنا ان ما من خلق قد اعرضنا عن ذكره الا وقد دخل فى طى هذه المذكورة وهو لها كالفرعين للاصل وايما معترض يقول لا ينبغى لك ان تحث الناس على اصلاح اخلاقهم وتنبههم على تحسين ادابهم دون ان يكون ذلك فى غريزة نفسك فتكون كمن يوصى بالبر وينسى نفسه

قلنا ان كل انآء بالذى فيه ينضح. وما اجهل من طلب

مساحة الدنيا ولا يعرف كمية الفرسخ الممسوح به وما من فضل ذكرناه الا وامتثلناه. وما من خلق مدحناه حتى تطبعنا به. ومن تحلا بما ليس فيه فضح الامتحان ما يدعيه. ولواهب العقل اوجب شكرًا. وبه انتصر وله اغزل فخرا. وبه من هاولا اعتصم || وله احمد وهو ولى الحمد واهله ومستحقه وكما قال وليه 105 a.

עַ מַ אודה יי מאד בפי ובתוך רבים אהללנו כי יעמוד לימין אביון להושיע משופטי נפשו. וכן יהי רצון:

كمل ما اردنا اثباته من كتاب اصلاح الاخلاق بعون الله وتوفيقه وهو حسبى ونعم النصير المعين, والحمد لله رب العالمين בריך רחמנא דסייען:

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